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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Evaluation of the Use of Engineering Judgments Applied to Analytical Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) Methods. (December 2005) 
Katherine D Kohlhepp, B.S.; B.S., The Pennsylvania State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William E. Burchill 
 
 Due to the scarcity of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) data, one of the key 
elements of any HRA analysis is use of engineering judgment. The Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) HRA Calculator™ guides the user through the steps of any 
HRA analysis and allows the user to choose among analytical HRA methods. It applies 
Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP), Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction (THERP), the HCR/ORE Correlation, and the Caused Based Decision Tree 
Method (CBDTM). This program is intended to produce consistent results among 
different analysts provided that the initial information is similar. Even with this 
analytical approach, an HRA analyst must still render several judgments. The objective 
of this study was to evaluate the use of engineering judgment applied to the 
quantification of post-initiator actions using the HRA Calculator. The Comanche Peak 
Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) HRA was 
used as a database for examples and numerical comparison.  Engineering judgments 
were evaluated in the following ways: 
 iv 
1) Survey of HRA experts.  Two surveys were completed, and the participants 
provided a range of different perspectives on how they individually apply 
engineering judgment. 
2) Numerical comparison among the three methods. 
3) Review of CPSES HRA and identification of judgments and the effects on the 
overall results of the database.  
The results of this study identified thirteen areas in which an HRA analyst must 
interpret and render judgments on how to quantify a Human Error Probability (HEP) and 
recommendations are provided on how current industry practitioners render these same 
judgments. The areas are:  identification and definition of actions to be modeled, 
identification and definition of actions to be modeled, definition of critical actions, 
definition of cognitive portion of the action, choice of methodology, stress level, rule-, 
skill- or knowledge-based designation, timing information, training, procedures, human 
interactions with hardware, recoveries and dependencies within an action, and review of 
final HEP. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) in the context of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) has been the subject of numerous critical reviews because no one 
method is considered acceptable and appropriate for all conditions.  Each plant-specific 
HRA represents a highly iterative analytical process. System analysts and human 
reliability analysts work together to define the operator actions to be modeled in the 
PRA. HRA methods and techniques must be evaluated in a consistent and logical 
manner, and there needs to be sufficient analytical resolution so that the plant-specific 
aspects of the procedures, plant design, and training practices are reflected in 
representation and quantification of human error probabilities (HEP).1   
 Because human error is dynamic and involves individual and crew experiences, it 
is challenging to calculate a single failure rate to describe a specific action.  It would be 
ideal to collect the frequency of each human action failure on a large data sample of 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operators. But, this is impractical because error probabilities 
are very small, and in any reasonable amount of time not enough errors would occur to 
collect a meaningful distribution of data points. Thus, actual data of human failures in 
NPPs is sparse.   
 With the development of NPP simulators, studies have been completed to try to 
collect HRA data. In 1990, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted the  
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology.  
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“Operator Reliability Experiments Using Power Plant Simulators” which attempted to 
collect HEP data from simulators.2 The objectives of this study were two-fold: first, to 
collect operator response and reliability data using full-scale NPP simulators and actual 
operating crews and second, to examine the validity of the Human Reliability 
Correlation for use in HRA.3  This study examined operator actions in simulators for 40 
accident scenarios, and data was collected on timing information and the specific steps 
taken by the crew. The results provided a small collection of simulator data for specific 
operator actions, but this is in no way representative of all accident scenarios or all 
operator actions within a NPP.  
 Due to the lack of physical HRA data, one of the key elements of any HRA 
analysis is use of engineering judgment. The application of the engineering judgment 
can vary between methods and range in the degree of subjectivity.  In some instances 
there will be no actual data available for an analysis, and HRA experts will have to 
estimate an HEP value based entirely on their experience. Various HRA models have 
been developed around the use of engineering judgment.  Finally, there are HRA 
methods based on analytical approaches using generic data, but occasionally these 
methods produce unrealistic results which require adjustment by the use of engineering 
judgment. 
 In 1984, Stillwell4 published a study on generating human reliability estimates 
using expert judgment.  HRA experts were asked to rank a series of tasks based on their 
estimated importance and then give an estimate of the HEP value and its lower and 
upper bounds. The ranking and the HEP estimates were compared among experts, and 
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the results showed consistent agreement (same order of magnitude).  It was concluded 
that this was an acceptable solution for gathering HEP data. 
  Just because experts are consistent in their judgment, does not necessarily mean 
they are accurately modeling the action.  Observations of operators during simulator 
training exercises have shown that sometimes when scenarios were expected to be 
routine and easy, the crews find them challenging, while other times complex actions are 
performed error-free.  Furthermore, HRA experts often have to estimate timings for 
actions, and when observed in the simulator, the timings are often incorrect; or the 
experts were expecting a different chain of events to occur and the estimated timing is no 
longer relevant.       
 Not all HRA methods rely entirely on engineering judgment, the Success 
Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) and Failure Likelihood Index Method5 (FLIM) are 
based on the combination of known anchor values and estimates of the HEP for a 
particular human action and Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) which are influences 
that affect the system.  The values and weighting of the PSFs are determined by the use 
of expert judgment. 
 Analytical HRA methods are the more commonly used methods for the 
quantification of HEP values. These methods begin by using generic data, not necessary 
from NPPs, and adjustments are made using PSFs. Widely used methods include, 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP)6, ASEP7, the Caused Biased 
Decision Tree Method (CBDTM)8 and the Human Cognitive Reliability/Operator 
Reactor Experiments (HCR/ORE)2.   
 4
 In 1983, Swain and Guttman published the Handbook of Human Reliability 
Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications6 (THERP). This 
pioneering study laid the foundation for current standards and techniques used in 
practice today. It presents a methodology that enables analysts to make quantitative or 
qualitative assessment of the occurrence of human errors that may affect the availability 
or operational reliability of engineering safety features and components in nuclear power 
plants. The THERP handbook gives tabulated human failure data from a military facility 
for potential errors, errors of omission, and errors of commission and gives 
recommendations on how to adjust these valves for NPPs by the use of a PSF.  
 The Accident Sequence Evaluation Procedure (ASEP)7 presents a shortened, less 
detailed version of THERP which enables analysts to make estimates of HEPs and other 
performance characteristics that are sufficiently accurate for the needs of PRAs. ASEP 
begins by categorizing human actions into two categories: pre-accident tasks and post- 
accident tasks. 
 Pre-accident tasks are activities done under normal operating conditions 
including special conditions such as startup operation or other activities that affect the 
availability of equipment needed to cope with an abnormal event. Pre-accident tasks are 
synonymous with test and maintenance.  The method is based on assigning each critical 
action a basic HEP equal to .03 and summing over the total number of steps. For each 
one of the recovery factors present in the action, the basic HEP is multiplied by 0.1.  
Recovery factors are environmental influences that will alert the operator when an error 
is committed; examples include alarms and peer checking.    
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 Post-accident tasks are all tasks required to cope with an abnormal event. These 
tasks can be further divided into diagnosis and post-diagnosis actions. ASEP makes two 
large simplifications in post-accident tasks. First, it assumes that any failure to diagnose 
correctly an abnormal event within the allowable time will result in core damage; and 
second it assumes that the total time available can be segmented into two independent 
parts: first, the time it takes for operator to diagnose the problem and second, the time it 
takes him to respond physically.    
 Both THERP and ASEP rely on the use of generic data for their analysis, other 
HRA methods have been developed around the use of simulator data.  The HCR/ORE 
correlation used in the calculation of HEP values is one such example. This correlation 
describes and predicts the operating crew’s success probability as a function of time. 
Unlike THERP and ASEP this model examines the probability of failure for an operating 
crew as opposed to individual actions. The correlation was first hypothesized then 
modified to match actual simulator data conducted during the Operator Reliability 
Experiments.2  
 The CBDTM8 approach to calculating HEP values is part of the SHRAP1 HRA 
Frame-work methodology.3  It is based upon using an event tree as opposed to a fault 
tree like other methods to describe the action.  Failure of the action can be divided into 
two parts, failure to initiate timely correct response (Pcog) and failure to execute the 
correct response.  (Pexe).   
 Pcog  is  intended  to  predict  the  average  crew  behavior.  Ideally  Pcog  would  be 
determined  by  the  use  of  a  simulator.   If  this  option  is  not  available,  a   secondary 
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approach is to determine the potential causes of errors and decompose them into failures 
associated  with  plant  information-operator  interface  and  failures  associated  with 
operator-procedure interface. Pcog is then the sum of all these small contributors. EPRI 
Report TR-1002598 gives specific decision trees and failure probabilities to be used for 
decomposing the action.   
 To determine Pexe engineering judgment must be used in considering the 
following:  how the operator interacts with the control panel, quantification of 
manipulation probabilities, and relevant hardware failures or events.  If only a simple 
switch manipulation is required, the analyst could either reference an available data set 
or use an ASEP screening value of  .003. If the action is more complex the analyst can 
choose to use a method such as THERP to calculate Pexe.     
 The EPRI HRA Calculator9 is a computerized tool for HRA analysis.  This 
program guides the user through the steps of any HRA analysis. The program allows the 
user to choose among analytical HRA methods and applies ASEP, THERP, the 
HCR/ORE correlation, and CBDTM. The software is intended to produce consistent 
results among different analysts provided that the initial information is similar.   
 By using the HRA calculator, or any analytical HRA method, one would expect 
if the HRA procedures were followed, the end result would be an acceptable and 
consistent HEP value. This is not always the case, because an analyst must render 
judgments on many different parameters and small variations in input parameters in 
some situations can change the final HEP value by several orders of magnitude. In 
addition, an analyst may apply his personal engineering judgment, because he feel’s that 
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the chosen method does not accurately reflect the action. Other times the final HEP will 
be adjusted so that it is consistent with an historical value.   
 This application of engineering judgment is critical in the calculations of HEP 
values, and it has been accepted and is practiced by HRA analysts. However, there has 
been little research done to determine its acceptability and consistency among experts. 
Furthermore, little guidance is available for when or how to apply this subjective 
judgment. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
 The objective of this study is to evaluate the use of engineering judgment applied 
to the quantification of post-initiator actions using the EPRI HRA CalculatorTM (From 
this point forward the EPRI HRA CalculatorTM will be referred to as the HRA 
Calculator) The Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Level 1 PRA HRA 
was used as a database for examples and numerical comparison. Engineering judgment 
was evaluated in the following ways: 
1) Survey of HRA experts.  These experts provided a range of different perspectives 
on how they individually apply engineering judgment. 
2) Numerical comparison among the three methods. 
3) Review of CPSES and identification of judgments and the effects on the overall 
results of the database.  
 This study primarily focuses on judgments made within the context of the using 
the HRA Calculator. It addresses issues such as choice of stress level, and identification 
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of rule, skill or knowledge based actions, training, and clarity of procedures.  The 
endpoint of the judgment evaluation is defined to be the point at which a value has been 
quantified by HRA Calculator.  External to the HRA Calculator the user may determine 
the value calculated by the HRA Calculator is not acceptable, but this decision making 
process is outside the scope of this project. The intended results of this study will aid in 
the development of guidelines for HRA Calculator users. 
 
 
LENS MODEL OF JUDGMENT APPLIED TO ANALYTICAL HEP 
CALCULATIONS 
 The lens model of judgments developed by Parkin10 in 1996 presents a logical 
well-suited model for understanding the use of engineering judgment in analytical HEP 
calculations.  This model suggests that we do not perceive the essence of an object or a 
situation but rather a number of ‘cues’ received by our cognition. 
 “An object may be judged to be a table as a result of our 
integration of cues such as color, mass, function, and other cues we have 
come to associate over time with tables. These measurable cues may be 
seen and interpreted correctly by most observers. However, when we are 
contemplating ambiguous social situations, no such agreement is likely. 
The cues tend to be ill- defined, complex, and entangled and not easily 
interpreted by our cognition. In response, our cognition will only register 
a few of the numerous available cues. This lens of cues bares only a 
statistical relationship with attributes of the situation we are 
contemplating and, therefore, have less than 100% validity as a basis for 
judgment. Each individual will perceive different cues and interpret them 
differently but luckily the cues that can be perceived are normally 
interrelated, and therefore a high redundancy will exist within the lens of 
cues. This redundancy reduces the effect of differential selection and 
weighting of cues and makes many judgments rather robust.” 10 
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 This same approach to judgment is observed in the engineering judgment applied 
to HEP calculations. The lens would be the HRA analyst and the analytical HRA 
framework that he has chosen to use.  The cues can be thought of as input parameters 
such as stress level, timing information, procedures, training, method chosen and so 
forth.  When each parameter is examined external to any HEP calculation, most HRA 
experts will identify the same parameters as influences on the human failure probability.  
However, when the HRA analyst is asked to calculate a specific HEP value for a single 
human failure event, there tends to be large discrepancy on how to interpret and quantify 
each of these parameters.  When examining the different results from different analysts, 
this becomes quite obvious, because the parameters used by analysts were weighted 
differently. However, the end results show that most analysts can agree within the same 
order of magnitude for any HEP calculation.  
 Among HRA analyses, not only are there different HRA analysts, but there are 
also different methodologies. The information is not only filtered by the analysts, but it 
is also filtered by the quantification method.  The HRA Calculator has attempted to 
remove the filter around the quantification stage, but the analyst must render judgments 
on how to input parameters.  
 The lens model is simplistic in design, and it has been demonstrated that 
cognitive information is primarily completed within the short-term memory, and short-
term memory has limited capacity.  It has been found that short-term memory can only 
manipulate up to approximately seven ‘chunks’ of information at any one time.  This 
corresponds rather nicely to the lens model. 11  
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 HEP calculations can be broken up into ‘chunks’ of information as well.   For 
any HEP calculation there are eight broad areas that the HRA Calculator requires the 
user to address as input parameters.  These cues or ‘chunks’ of information are required 
for each calculation regardless of which method is used. How the information is used is 
dependent upon the method chosen. shows how chunks of information relate to the field 
of HRA. 
 HRA analyses are seldom completed by a single analyst, and each analyst has his 
own personal biases that affect cue selection. Mullen and Roth have identified the 
following five biases for cue selections,12 and these can be observed in the quantification 
of input parameters for HEP calculations. (See Table 1)  
 Identification of these biases in use of engineering judgment is useful in 
understanding how an HRA analyst renders judgment in an HEP calculation. These 
theories suggest that is not possible for any two HRA analysts to render identical 
judgments for an entire analysis, but it does suggest that if the framework for the 
judgments are the same, then the HRA analyst will arrive at the same overall 
conclusions. (See Table 2) In the field of HRA this is typically all that is expected 
because of the limited data availability to benchmark results.  For any calculation an 
analyst must determine an estimate for a human failure event in a consistent, well-
justified, logical format, and this study is intended to create a framework for this process.   
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Table 1 
How HRA Relates to the Len Models Groups (‘Chunks’) of Information  
 
Procedures The analyst must identify both the procedures the operators will be 
using during an accident scenario, and then judge clarity of the 
procedures.  
Complexity of 
 the actions 
The analyst needs to categorize each action in terms of rule- based, 
skill-based or knowledge-based. In addition, he must judge whether the 
execution and cognitive portions of the action are  simple or complex  
Stress levels The analyst must choose a stress level of optimal (low), moderate, or 
high for each action. 
Operator cues The analyst needs to determine what physical cues the operators will 
receive and use to identify the problem.  These include cues such as 
reactor trip alarm or pressurize water level dropping alarms. 
Timing information Before beginning any calculation, the analyst must determine that there 
is enough time available to complete the action before core damage 
will occur.  If there is not enough time to complete the action, then 
obviously the action will be failed, and it is not necessary to do further 
calculations.  In addition, the analyst must determine how long it will 
take the operators to execute the action and if there is a time delay 
between the start of the accident and the control room cue the operators 
would receive.    
Training The analyst must identify how many times a year an action is trained in 
a simulator and in the classroom.  
Dependencies The analyst needs to determine a dependency level for each critical 
action. The choices available within the HRA Calculator are: zero 
dependence, low dependence, moderate dependence, high dependence 
or complete dependence. The HRA Calculator provides 
recommendations for dependence levels based on time available, but 
the analyst has the option to override this function.  
Recoveries within  
an action  
The analyst must identify recovery steps listed in procedures and if 
additional people will be available to aide in the recovery of the 
scenario.  
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Table 2 
How HRA Is Related to Mullen and Roth’s Personal Basis That May Affect Cue 
Selection 12   
 
Cue How It Related to HRA 
Availability  
 
“If data is easily 
retrievable, it may 
cause us to put too 
much weight on 
associated cues.”12 
This is observed in HEP calculations in the parameter of timing.  If an analyst 
has access to timing from thermal-hydraulic computer codes, he may use this to 
obtain exact timing on how long the operator has to complete an action before 
core damage can occur.  Another analyst may not have access to thermal- 
hydraulic codes, but instead he is able to observe the action in a simulator to 
determine timing information.  The end result is that both analysts have collected 
timing information but from two different sources, and more than likely the 
timings are not numerically identically.   
Selective perception  
 
“Your role will, to a  
large extent, 
determines  what cues 
you perceive.”12   
The HRA analyst’s background will influence the weighting of certain 
parameters. For example, a HRA analyst with a background in operations may 
put more weight on operator interviews as opposed to someone with a 
background in thermal-hydraulics. Another example would be an analyst who 
has developed his own HRA methodology. In this case, he may be more 
confident in his method and be less likely to use an unfamiliar method.  
Concrete  information 
 
“We are more likely 
to value information 
derived from past 
experiences or those 
from a trusted 
colleague”12.  
This can be observed in HRA when analysts compare the results to historical 
values. Even if the original analysis was not well-documented and the historical 
value is hard to justify using current practice today, many analysts will try to 
adjust the current calculations to show better agreement with the historical 
values.   
 
Wishful thinking 
 
“Our personal 
preference may inflate 
the importance of a 
cue beyond its real 
significance”12.  
In the nuclear industry failure of any type is not accepted by the public.  If a 
nuclear accident were to occur, even if there were no risk to the public, the U.S. 
power industry would suffer serious consequences.  This mindset is carried over 
to the calculations of human failure probabilities.   Every U.S. NPP stresses the 
importance of operator training and spends a great deal of money and effort 
developing state-of-the art training. Many HRA analysts, especially those who 
participate in the training programs, may judge the operator training as excellent 
in every circumstance and consequently over-weight this parameter in HEP 
calculations. 
Halo effect 
 
“This is the effect of 
one particular cue on 
another –one cue casts 
a halo over the others. 
We tend to experience 
cues in clusters such 
that one thing goes 
with another, so that 
we tend to reject or 
rationalize any cue 
that appears to 
contradict the 
consistent set”12.  
Typically as the accident progress, the crew’s stress level will increase, because 
they will be frustrated by the fact that their first reactions did not fix the problem. 
This would be the cluster of cues that one would expect to observe. As time 
passes, the crew may be proceeding in the correct direction, but there is very 
little time available before core damage.  The analyst may conclude the action 
will always fail. This may not necessarily be the case, but because the analyst has 
identified timing as the dominate parameter in this action, and he has rejected all 
other cues that may lead to success.   
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CHAPTER II 
OVERVIEW OF THE HRA CALCULATOR 
 The HRA Calculator provides a standardized approach to HRA that promotes 
uniform methods to achieve comparable results when considering plants that are similar 
in design, procedures and training.  Users of the HRA Calculator belong to the EPRI 
HRA/PRA Tools User Group. This group currently consists of 19 utilities, three 
corporate members and two international members.  The users work together to aid in 
the development of the software tool and to achieve a common industry approach to 
HRA that will assure high marks in PRA reviews and is consistent with the ASME PRA 
Standard13.  
 The software is setup to guide the user through an HEP calculation by interactive 
windows and is based upon SHARP13 for Human Failure Events (HFEs). While the 
HRA Calculator provides many choices for input values, the user also can add his own 
input values and comments for documentation.       
 The user can choose from the following three HRA methods to quantify Pcog for 
post-initiator actions: 1) CBDTM Method, 2) THERP, and 3) ORE/HRC Correlation. 
For pre-initiators the methods available are THERP and ASEP.  (This study is only 
concerned only with post-initiator actions.)  
 These methods were selected in the development of the HRA Calculator, because 
in 2000 the HRA Calculator developers believed that these were the most commonly 
used methods among U.S HRA analysts for Light Water Reactors (LWR).  These 
methods offer an analytical approach that follows a defined set of steps.  Other methods 
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rely more on an approach based around the use of engineering judgment. One of the 
goals of any HRA analyst must be to produce consistent and acceptable HEP results, and 
by using one of the methods within the HRA Calculator the user has the best chance of 
meeting this objective. 
 The HRA Calculator has the capability of modeling the following types of 
actions (See Table 3) as defined by SHARP1.  
 
Table 3 
SHARP 1 Types of Actions Modeled by the HRA Calculator 
 
Type –A Pre-initiating event interactions 
Type –B Initiating event related interactions 
Type – C Initiating event interactions 
 Cp Interactions that are dictated by operating procedures 
 Cr Interactions that are dictated by recovery of equipment that has failed 
earlier in the sequence.  
 
 In the current configuration the program is best equipped to handle Type A and C 
actions. Type B actions would to be difficult to model, because there is no ideal place to 
document the sequence of events that follows an initiating event. However, these types 
of actions tend not to be explicitly modeled in PRAs.  Instead, the impact of theses 
events is explicitly accounted for within initiating event frequencies. The user is 
explicitly asked to distinguish between Type A and Type C actions, and this choice 
influences the other information that is required to complete the calculations.  
 The user must further separate Type C actions into control room and ex-control 
room actions.  In version 2.0 of the HRA Calculator, there is no mathematical difference 
between control room and ex-control room actions. For post-initiator actions the user 
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must identify for documentation purposes where the actions take place. Because there is 
no mathematical difference between control room and ex-control room actions, the user 
could be creative and adjust other input parameters such as stress and timing information 
to reflect the location of the actions. If this is done, it must be well-documented so that 
the final result is justifiable during peer review. 
 Once the action has been defined, the user must identify a method for 
quantification. The HRA Calculator breaks every HEP calculation into two parts: failure 
to execute the action correctly (Pexe) and failure to recognize the need for human 
intervention and determine the correct action to take (Pcog).  Pexe is calculated using the 
traditional THERP method regardless of the method chosen, and Pcog will vary among 
methods used. 
 
PROBABILITY OF EXECUTION FAILURE ( Pexe) 
 To calculate Pexe the user is asked to identify each critical action, a task that if 
failed would lead to core damage. Each critical action is then assigned an error of 
omission and an error of commission.  These failure probabilities come from THERP 
with some modifications based on recommendations stated in THERP on how to account 
for exceptionally well-written procedures.6,9 Each error of omission and error of 
commission is then multiplied by a PSF based upon the stress level chosen  (Table 4).  
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Table 4 
Stress Levels and Corresponding PSF Applied by THERP and HRA Calculator6,9 
 
Stress Level PSF 
Optimal (low) Stress 1 
Moderate Stress 2 
High Stress 5 
 
These new errors of omission and errors of commission are related by an OR gate to 
obtain the unrecovered probability of failure. 
P(AUB) = P(A) +P (B)                                                               [1] 
 Next, the analyst must identify steps within the procedure that could act as 
recoveries and assign a dependency level to each. The HRA Calculator provides a 
minimum recommendation level based on time available for recovery as shown below in  
 
 
Fig. 1.  
 
                 
 
 
Fig. 1 Time Available for Recovery as It Relates to the HRA Calculator Recommended 
Minimum Dependency Level 9,14 
High     Moderate        Low        Zero 
0         15            30                               60    minutes 
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From the chosen dependency level the HRA Calculator calculates the conditional 
probabilities between the recovery and the critical action using the formulas described in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 
Quantitative Interpretation of Qualitative Dependence Levels 6, 15 
Dependence Level  Formula Minimum Conditional Probability 
Complete P A ∧ B = P A  1.0 
High P A ∧ B = P A
1 + P B
2  0.5 
Moderate P A ∧ B = P A 1 + 6 • P B7  0.14 
Low P A ∧ B = P A
1 + 19 • P B
20  0.05 
Zero P A ∧ B = P A • P B  P(B) 
 
To obtain the final execution probability the conditional probabilities are again related 
by an OR gate.  
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PROBABILITY OF COGNITIVE FAILURE (Pcog) USING ANNUNCIATOR 
RESPONSE MODEL 
 The Annunciator Response Model comes from THERP6 and provides a simple 
approach to model cognitive failure. In this model the user selects Pcog from a table of 
failure probabilities based on the number of annunciators present in the control room. As 
the crew receives more alarms, the probability of success will decrease.   THERP has 
defined an annunciator as a set of alarms that trained operators regard as a single unit. 
Table 6 gives the tabulated values for the choices of Pcog using the Annunciator 
Response Model.  
 
Table 6 
Tabulated Pcog Values Using Annunciator Response Model 9 
Total 
Number  
of Ann. 
1 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 10 3.00E-04
2 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 6.00E-04 10 1.50E-03
3 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 1.00E-03 10 3.00E-03
4 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 2.00E-03 10 5.00E-03
5 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 3.00E-03 10 8.00E-03
6 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 5.00E-03 10 1.40E-02
7 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 9.00E-03 10 2.40E-02
8 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 2.00E-02 10 4.00E-02
9 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 1.30E-01 3.00E-02 10 8.00E-02
10 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 1.30E-01 2.50E-01 5.00E-02 10 1.40E-01
11 to 15 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 1.30E-01 2.50E-01 1.20E-01 10 3.10E-01
16 to 20 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 1.30E-01 2.50E-01 1.50E-01 10 4.00E-01
21 to 40 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 1.30E-01 2.50E-01 2.00E-01 10 5.30E-01
> 40 1.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 8.00E-03 1.60E-02 3.20E-02 6.40E-02 1.30E-01 2.50E-01 2.50E-01 10 6.70E-01
10 Pr[Fj] EF Mean
Order in which operator responds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
  
 In version 2.0 of the HRA Calculator, the user can only select from the mean 
values given in the last column of Table 1. But, in the newer versions of the HRA 
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Calculator the user can choose any value listed in the table. The values provided within 
THERP were for median values with an error factor of ten. The values shown in Table 1 
have been converted to mean values for consistency with all other probabilities used 
within the HRA Calculator.9 For this method, there is no override function available. 
 
PROBABILITY OF COGNITIVE FAILURE (Pcog) USING HCR/ORE 
CORRELATION 
 The HCR/ORE correlation uses the following formula derived from simulator 
data to calculate Pcog. 
 
1/ 2
ln( )
1 [ ]
w
cog
T
TP
σ
= − Φ                                                          [2] 
where,  
σ  =  logarithmic standard deviation 
1/ 2T  = crew median response time 
Φ  = standard normal cumulative distribution   
2
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∫ .                                                           [3] 
wT = time window for cognitive response and is calculated by: 
where, 
TW = TSW – TM                                                           [4] 
Tsw = the total time from the initial event to the point were the action can no longer 
succeed.  
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TM =  time required to complete the action 
 σ  represents the variation among different crews in responding to a specific set of 
cues. Factors that influence σ include: diagnostic difficulty, degree and kind of procedural 
guidance, level of operator experience, communication among crew members.15 The HRA 
Calculator calculates σ  using decision trees based on procedures, operator training and 
stress level. An example of the decision tree is shown in Fig.  29 This decision tree was 
developed as part of the HRA Calculator and presents an alternative to tabulated σ 
values provided in EPRI Report TR-100259.8 
 
 
 
Fig.  2 Decision Tree Used for Determining Sigma Using HCR/ORE Correlation9 
  
 An assumption behind the decision tree is that following an initiating event, as 
the accident proceeds further into the response, one can expect to see larger deviations in 
crew response times. A large σ can be indicative of difficult diagnosis, the need for 
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deriving diagnoses by monitoring annunciators, or use of different response strategies. 
Thus, σ is an indication of how demanding and stressful the scenario is for the 
operators.15 
 
PROBABILITY OF COGNITIVE FAILURE (Pcog) USING CBDTM METHOD 
 The CBDTM Method calculates Pcog by the use of eight decision trees and then 
applies recovery by identification of time available for recovery and credit for additional 
personal present in the control room. Table 7 provides the failure mechanisms each tree 
addresses. The complete set of decision trees is shown in Appendix A. No changes were 
made between EPRI Report TR-100259 and the HRA Calculator.  
 
Table 7 
CBDTM Failure Mechanisms 15 
 
Type Decision Tree Description 
Pca Data not available 
Pcb Data not attended to  
Pcc Data misread or miscommunicated 
Failures in the 
Operator–Control Room 
Interface 
Pcd Information misleading 
Pce Relevant step in procedure missed 
Pcf Misinterpret instruction 
Pcg Error in interpreting logic 
Failures in the 
Operator-Procedure 
Interface 
Pch Deliberate violation   
 
 The CBDTM Method allows the possibility that there may be time to review and 
to correct errors in detection, diagnosis, or decision-making related to an interaction. 
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EPRI Report TR-100259 provides general qualitative guidance on how to apply these 
recoveries, but the HRA Calculator has defined more specific guidance so that 
recoveries are applied in a consistent manner. As stated in EPRI Report TR-100259 
there are five groups of possible recoveries. For any given human interaction, one or 
more of these recovery measures may be possible. But the HRA Calculator only allows 
one recovery per decision tree to be credited. Not only does the HRA Calculator provide 
recommendations when additional crew can be credited, it provides recommendations on 
minimum dependency levels. The qualitative scale suggested in THERP is used to define 
numerically a minimum dependence level, and formulas are the same as those used 
within Pexe. Table 8 gives the times after initiating event the additional people can be 
credited for recovery of post-initiator actions.  
  
Table 8 
Times at Which HRA Calculator Considers Taking Credit for Additional People 
 
Time People 
0-15 minutes Self Review 
10 -15 minutes  STA 
1 hour ERF 
6 hours Shift Change 
 
Once Pcog and Pexe have been calculated, they are related to one another by an OR gate.  
 
ERROR FACTORS 
 Once a point estimate has been calculated, the HRA Calculator assigns an error 
factor based on recommendations provided by THERP ( See Table 9). 
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Table 9 
Error Factors Applied Within the HRA Calculator9 
 
HEP Error Factor 
Estimated HEP < 0.001 10 
Estimated HEP > 0.001 5 
Estimated HEP > 0.1 1 
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CHAPTER III 
IDENTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING JUDGMENTS WITHIN 
THE HRA CALCULATOR 
 Both literature and HRA analysts agree that HRA can not be completed without 
the use of engineering judgments. Before one can understand how to apply the use of 
engineering judgment, the judgments themselves must be identified.  The types of 
judgments will vary among methods used for quantification. This study has identified 
the types and locations of engineering judgment a user of the HRA Calculator would 
need to consider for quantification of post-initiator actions.  
 The HRA Calculator was developed to fit within the four stages of the SHARP1 
HRA framework. Most of the judgments made within the HRA Calculator are made 
within the Define and the Quantification Stages, and this study will focus primarily in 
the Quantification Stage.       
 The following presents a complete list of places where users of the HRA 
Calculator must render engineering judgments, and the following assumptions should be 
noted: 
• There is not always a one-to-one correlation between the original methodology 
and the application within the HRA Calculator.  Unless otherwise stated, this 
study refers to the methods as used within the HRA Calculator. 
• HRA can consider crew behavior or a single operator behavior. Within this 
study, it will be assumed that the analysis is focusing on crew behavior unless 
otherwise stated.  
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•  The judgments identified will numerically effect the HEP calculations.  There 
are some judgments that the HRA Calculator asks the user to render which are 
used for documentation purposes only.   
• The judgments identified are intended for post-initiator actions.  
 
STAGE 1: DEFINE 
 Within the Definition Stage of HRA the HRA analyst must render the following 
four categories of judgments. 
 
Identification and definition of actions to model within the HRA Calculator 
 The first step of an HRA is to identify and explicitly to define which human 
actions to model using the HRA Calculator. The judgments made in identifying the 
actions in this stage influence every other decision made in the HRA. Identification of 
the actions is not completed by a single HRA analyst but comes from discussion with the 
PRA model developers and understanding the accident sequences.  Once the analyst 
understands the PRA model, only then can the actions be identified as actions that will 
be quantified using the HRA Calculator.  
 The next step is to define explicitly each action. For each action the following 
areas must be addressed: 
• Why is the human interaction required? 
• How is success of this action defined? 
• How does the operating crew interact with the hardware? 
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• Can this action be acceptably modeled using the HRA Calculator? 
 
Categorization of actions as pre- or post-initiators and grouping actions 
 By classifying each action as a pre- or post-initiator, the analyst begins to 
conceptualize how the HEP will be quantified. Based on the definitions of pre- and post-
initiators, the distinction between the two is self-evident. An analyst may determine that 
an action needs to be broken down into small actions so that it can be unambiguously 
classified, and each analyst has their own method of how to sub-subdivide further each 
action. Furthermore, the quantification methodology varies significantly between pre-
and post-initiators, and this designation needs to be made so that the action can be 
quantified appropriately.    
 For a complete HRA there can be several hundred pre-initiator actions, and 
modeling each action individually will be an overwhelming task for any HRA analyst.   
A reduction in the number of analyses can be made by grouping similar actions together. 
Because quantification methods for pre-initiator actions often involve screening 
probabilities, the grouping of pre-initiators will have little or no effect on the final 
results. For example, an HRA analyst may decide to group all level transmitter 
calibrations together. While there are several different types of level transmitters, the 
same general procedures will be followed, and the choices for errors of commission will 
be the same. Thus, the final HEPs for all level transmitters will be identical.   
 The HRA calculator is best suited to handle each pre-initiator separately. The 
input for documentation tends to be directed toward a single action. Nowhere within the 
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pre-initiator calculations is the user asked to address the issue of grouping events and 
identifying which actions fall within this group.  If a grouping approach is employed the 
user must document this type of information external to the HRA Calculator. 
 Within an HRA there are usually less than 100 post-initiators identified for 
quantification. To reduce the number of independent analyses further, it is not 
uncommon for analysts to use the same calculation for actions which have different 
initiating events, but the operators are expected to respond in a similar fashion. This 
grouping of actions can vary among analysts; and if not clearly stated in the 
documentation of the calculation, this can lead reviewers to question the similarities 
between actions with different initiating events.          
 
Definition of critical actions 
 Within the definition stage it is important for the HRA analyst to identify the 
critical actions.  Within the calculation of Pexe the analyst must identify the critical 
actions and assign a probability of failure to each action. The analyst must identify the 
procedure being used and the step number which addresses each critical action.  
 
Definition of cognitive portion of the action 
 Before the cognitive portion of any action can be quantified, it must first be 
defined. For example, this could be as simple as the operating crew transferring from a 
general Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) to a more specific procedure.  Another 
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example may include the action of diagnosing the accident by the use of a specific cue in 
the control room. 
 Nowhere within the HRA Calculator is the analyst asked to state explicitly the 
definition of the cognitive action. The analyst’s definition will influence every other 
judgment made within the Pcog calculation, and furthermore, the definition many vary 
among analysts. For each action within the HRA Calculator the user is asked to calculate 
Pcog once. If the analyst identifies that there is more than one Pcog action, the analyst 
would need to break the action into two separate calculations to be quantified using the 
HRA Calculator.     
 Within the definition of the cognitive portion of the action, the HRA analyst must 
identify the cue that will alert the operating crew to perform the specific task.  The 
analyst can use any cue he chooses, and the definition of the cue will influence the 
choices made about the following parameters: human interactions with hardware, timing 
and procedures.  
 
Annunciator Response Model  
 In this model, the cue must be defined as an annunciator; otherwise this model 
can not be used.  
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 The cue definition will directly effect how Tdelay and T1/2 are calculated, and these 
values will affect the results of the mathematical correlation. 
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CBDTM Method 
 The cue definition will affect the analyst’s decisions about the choices made in 
decision trees: Pca, Pcb and Pcg. Specifically, the definition of the cue will affect how 
the analyst answers questions about the clarity of control room indicators and clarity of 
procedures.   
 The cue definition would also influence the timing sequence of the actions. 
Based on the timing information, the HRA Calculator gives recommendations of 
recoveries applied to the results of the CBDTM decision tress.   
 
STAGE 2: QUANTIFICATION 
 Once the action has been defined, the HRA analyst must employ the use of 
engineering judgment several more times in order to quantity each HEP, and these 
judgments will vary among methods. Within the quantification stage the HRA analyst 
must render the following judgments. 
 
Choice of methodology 
 The HRA Calculator allows the user to choose among the THERP, ASEP, 
CBDTM, and HCR/ORE methods for post-initiator events and THERP and ASEP for 
pre-initiators.  When choosing which method to use the HRA analyst must consider and 
judge some of the following parameters: ease of use, data required for the type of actions 
being modeled, and traceability of the final results. The analyst must also decide if one 
method will be used for the entire analysis, or the method will vary among actions.    
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Stress level  
 The HRA Calculator requires the user to identify the stress level of the operating 
crew.  It requires that the stress level be judged as optimal (low), moderate or high. Once 
the analyst chooses the stress level, the HRA Calculator gives recommendations (the 
user can override any of these options) on other parameters such as recoveries and 
dependencies. Twice within any post-initiator calculation the user is required to identify 
a stress level, first for the calculation of Pcog and second for the calculation of Pexe.   
 Within the calculation of Pexe, the user must identify the stress level for each 
critical action, and this decision influences the results of Pexe as a PSF.  One would 
typically expect that the stress level for each critical action would be the same, but the 
user can vary the stress level among actions.  
 Within the calculation of Pcog the choice of stress level influences the results 
differently depending on the method used.  Regardless of method chosen, the user is 
required to determine a stress level.  
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 Stress level is not explicitly used in the calculation of Pcog within the Annunciator 
Response Model and is for documentation only. The user may, however, implicitly 
consider stress level when selecting a probability to represents the probability of failure 
due to the number of annunciators present. As more alarms begin to sound in the control 
room, the stress level of the operating crew may increase and, thus, increase the 
probability of cognitive failure.  
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HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Stress level choices influence the determination of sigma using the HCR/ORE 
correlation. Fig.  2 (Shown in Chapter II - HCR/ORE section) shows that stress level is 
the last branch of the decision tree, and the user must identify the stress level as high or 
low.  Prior to reaching this screen within the HRA Calculator the user was asked to 
determine stress level, and the choices were optimal, moderate or high.  In the 
determination of sigma there is no option for moderate stress, unless the override 
function is used. The analyst must apply judgment on how to handle a moderate stress 
choice made in the previous steps. For example, if the user determines a moderate stress 
level, he could interpolate between high and low stress results of the decision trees.  
 
CBDTM Method 
 Using the CBDTM method the HRA analyst again must determine a stress level 
as optimal, moderate or high for documentation. Within the eight decision trees of the 
CBDTM the question of stress level is never explicitly addressed. This method does 
address issues that should implicitly affect stress levels such as training and clarity of the 
procedures.  By close examination of the decision tress one can observe that in many 
cases the same branches of the decision trees could be used for both high stress and low 
stress actions. For example, the analyst may decide the overall action is high stress 
because there are only a couple of minutes available to complete the action. In the 
decision trees he has justified that there is a low work load and only monitoring of the 
control panel is required. These same choices could be made for low stress actions where 
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there was a larger amount of time available. Decisions made within the CBDTM 
decision trees are not effected by timing information.   
   
Rule-, skill-, or knowledge-based designation 
 For every HEP calculation the HRA Calculator user is asked to classify each 
action as rule-based, skill-based, or knowledge-based for documentation. Only within 
the HCR/ORE Correlation does this parameter have a numerical effect. Within the 
HCR/ORE Correlation the user must define the action as rule- or skill-based. If an action 
is determined to be knowledge-based, the user would have to consider extrapolating the 
results produced by skill-based or rule-based actions. This parameter has no effect on the 
calculation of Pexe but may influence Pcog.  
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 The Annunciator Response Model in not influenced by categorizing the actions 
as rule- or skill-based. 
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Classification of actions as rule-based or skill-based influences the calculation of 
sigma in the HCR/ORE correlation, as shown in Fig. 2. (Shown in Chapter  II - 
HCR/ORE section) Knowledge-based actions are not considered within the sigma 
calculation. If the analyst determines that the action is knowledge-based in the 
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documentation section, for consistency he must then apply additional judgment to 
extrapolate a final sigma value.  
 
CBDTM Method    
 The classification of rule-based and skill-based actions has no numerical effect 
on the results of the CBDTM method.   However, this many implicitly affect the results 
of the decision tree, failure of attention.  Within this tree the analyst is ask to distinguish 
between high and low workloads, and one way the analyst may make this decision is to 
look at the action as a simple skill-based action or a complex rule-based action.   
 
Timing information 
 Regardless of method used to calculate Pcog, the HRA Calculator requires the 
user to complete the timeline shown in Fig.  3  
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Fig.  3.  Timing Diagram 
 
There are three general questions the analyst must answer when completing this 
diagram.  
1) Is there enough timing available to complete the action?  If not, the HRA 
Calculator will not allow the user to proceed. 
2) How is the timing information going to be obtained?  
3) How accurate does the timing information need to be? 
 Timing affects the results of Pcog differently depending upon method chosen.  
The numerical inputs into Fig. 3 have no effect on the numerical results when calculating 
Pexe. But the identification of critical actions in Pexe will affect the timing values 
identified. For example, in order to determine the manipulation time the analyst must 
consider the number of critical actions and how long it takes to complete them 
individually.  
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Annunciator Response Model 
 The identification of the timing information presented in Fig. 3 has no explicit 
effect on the numerical results of Pcog using the Annunciator Response Model.  However, 
probabilities for this method were intended to be interpreted such that as time increases 
the severity of the accident will also increase. There will be more alarms which the 
operators will need to address, and additional alarms will lead to an increase in 
confusion. Thus, as time increases the probability of cognitive failure also increases. 
This is shown in the tabulated probabilities used within the model. 
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Timing is the dominating parameter in the HCR/ORE Correlation, especially T1/2 
and Tw. The HRA Calculator uses Eq 2 to determine Pcog.  
 
1/ 2
ln( )
1 [ ]
w
cog
T
TP
σ
= − Φ                                                          [2] 
where,  
σ  =  logarithmic standard deviation 
1/ 2T  = crew median response time 
Tw = Tsw - Tm 
Φ  = standard normal cumulative distribution   
The dominating term in this equation is the ratio of Tw/T1/2 and Pcog is sensitive to 
small changes in this ratio. The high degree of sensitivity produces large uncertainty in 
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the calculations of Pcog. This is especially true when Tw is very short (less than about 5 
minutes).  
 
CBDTM Method 
 Using the CBDTM method, timing influences the calculation in two areas. First, 
the HRA Calculator uses the timing information to provide recommendations on 
considering additional crew who may be available for recovery. The longer the sequence 
progresses, the more people will become involved, and their presence may be credited in 
cognitive recovery. In this sense timing has the opposite effect on the Pcog compared to 
the Annunciator Response Model. 
 The second place timing influences Pcog is in answering the questions: is there 
enough time available to complete the action?  Before addressing the decision trees this 
question must be answered, because the decision trees assume that there is enough time 
for the crew to complete the action.         
 
Training 
 For documentation purposes the HRA Calculator requires the user to identify 
what type of training is completed. The user must identify the training as none, 
classroom or simulator. 
 The distinction between simulator training and classroom training should have 
very little subjectively among HRA analysts. Again for documentation purposes the 
analyst must identify how often each type of training occurs. This identification of 
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training can be rather subjective. Many times a single action will be discussed within 
several different training sessions, and the analyst must decide whether to count each 
discussion as a single training session or only count the total number of training sessions 
dedicated to the specific action being modeled.   
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 The Annunciator Response Model is not influenced by the parameter of training, 
and thus the purpose of defining how often and what type of training is completed is for 
documentation only.  
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Using the HCR/ORE correlation, the parameter of training is addressed in the 
decision tree used to calculate sigma. Fig.  2 (Shown in Chapter 2 - HCR/ORE section) 
This parameter occurs in the middle of the decision trees, and its impact on the results on 
Pcog can not be independently characterized.    
 
CBDTM Method 
 Within the CBDTM decision trees, judgments about training are made in the 
following decision trees: 
• Pca – Availability of Information 
• Pcd – Information Misleading 
• Pcf – Misinterpret Instructions 
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• Pcg – Misinterpret Decision Logic 
In all of the trees the issue of training is a middle or final decision node, and it is difficult 
to determine what effect a single decision will have on the overall results of the Pcog 
calculations. Within any one tree the decision about training can vary from having no 
effect on the final tree value to influencing the results from a negligible value to 1E-2.    
 
Procedures  
 In addition to identifying which procedures will be used during the accident 
scenario, the HRA analyst must also address the high level question: how does the use of 
procedures affect the probability of failure? This question can be further broken into 
small questions with sometimes rather subjective answerers.  
• How will the operating crew know to transfer to another procedure if necessary? 
• How are the procedures used by the operating crew? Are the actions completed 
from memory, or are procedures used in hand? How does the clarity of the 
procedure affect the actions of the operating crew? 
• How accurately does the operator or operating crew follow the procedures? 
Within the calculation of Pexe, the procedures will be used to identify both critical actions 
and recoveries of the critical actions.  
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 The annunciator response model is not influenced by the any judgments made 
about procedures.   
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HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Using the HCR/ORE correlation, the judgments made about procedures are again 
addressed in the decision tree used to calculate sigma. (See Fig.  2 in Chapter 2 - 
HCR/ORE section) This parameter occurs in the middle of the decision trees, and its 
impact on the results of Pcog can not be independently characterized. It is interesting to 
note that the judgments made about the procedure use have the same effect as training on 
the Pcog calculation.  
 
CBDTM Method 
Table 10 shows the CBDTM decision trees, where analysts must render 
judgments about procedures. Decisions about procedures and their use during the 
accident scenario being analyzed are the dominating contributor within the Pcog 
calculation. Within the eight decision trees the analyst must render a total of 10 different 
judgments. More judgments are made about procedures than any other parameter within 
the calculation of Pcog.   
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Table 10 
CBDTM Decision Trees That Require Judgments About Procedures 
 
Pcd 
 
Information 
Misleading 
The user must answer the following question:  Are cue states or 
parameter values as stated in the procedure? A yes response to this 
question will lead to a negligible probability and will have no effect 
on the results of Pcog.  
 
Pce 
 
Skip a Step in 
the Procedure 
Every node in this tree is answered by examining the procedures to 
identify the probability that an operator will skip a critical action 
stated in the procedure. Within the eight decision trees used to 
calculate Pcog this is the only tree that gives a non-negligible value 
for every decision path. Therefore, the results of this tree are always 
a dominating contributor to Pcog 
Pcf 
 
Misinterpret 
Instructions 
Within this tree, there are two nodes addressed by procedures, and 
the analyst must answer the following questions: 
o “Does the step include unfamiliar nomenclature or an    
                unusual  grammatical construction?”9 
o “Does anything about the wording require explanation in 
                order to arrive at the intended interpretation?”9   
o “Does the proper interpretation of the step require an      
                 inference  about the future state of the plant? “9 
o “Does the step present all information required to identify     
                 the  actions?” 9 
Pcg 
Misinterpret 
Decision Logic 
Three out of the four nodes in this tree address the clarity of 
procedures. The user must identify if for any critical step there is a 
NOT, AND, or OR statement which could lead the operating crew to 
misinterpret the instructions. 
 
 
Human interactions with hardware 
 Within the category of human interactions with hardware the HRA analyst must 
render judgments within the following two broad areas: 
1) Errors of Commission (EOC) and Errors of Omission (EOO) – The analyst must 
render judgment on what the possible errors of commission and errors of 
omission are and assign a probability of failure to each error. Analysts typically 
use data from Chapter 20 of THERP for these failure probabilities. There is not 
always a probability for every action, and the analyst must render judgment on 
 41
how to extrapolate the small sample of data to best represent the action under 
consideration.   
2) Control room signals layout and its effect on cognitive failure.  
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 The Annunciator Response Model is impacted only by this parameter. The 
analyst must determine how many annunciators the operating crew will observe before 
they diagnose and respond to the problem.  If every action could be observed in a 
simulator, the analyst would not have to render any judgments as to the exact numbers of 
annunciators present in the control room. However, this would be extremely time 
consuming, so analysts typically estimate the number of annunciators.  Furthermore, 
analysts could group alarms together, because they act a single annunciator, and this 
would affect the total number of alarms each analyst counts.   
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 The HCR/ORE does not explicitly address how the operating crew will interact 
with hardware. This parameter will be implicitly addressed within the timing 
information.  The analyst can not determine the manipulation time if he is not aware of 
what type of hardware interactions need to be completed.  
 
 42
CBDTM Method 
 Within the CBDTM decision trees, judgments about the control room layout and 
its effect on cognitive failure are made in the following decision trees shown in Table 11 
 
Table 11 
CBDTM Decision Trees That Require Judgments About  Human Interactions with 
Hardware. 
 
Pca  
 
Availability of Information 
The user must determine whether there are indications 
available to diagnose the accident correctly and then to 
determine if the indicators are accurate. The indicators could 
be malfunctioning due to the progression of the accident. If 
an indicator is determined to be inaccurate, the analyst must 
address potential recoveries available either by training or 
procedures by additional decision nodes. 
Pcb  
 
Failure of Attention 
First, the analyst determines whether the work load of the 
crew is high or low. Then, the analyst must examine whether 
the control panel needs to be continuously monitored or 
checked only once.  
Pcc 
 
Misread/miscommunication 
The user must answer the following questions:  
o “Is the layout, demarcation, and labeling of the 
control boards such that it is easy to locate the 
required indicator?” 9 
o “Does the required indicator have human 
engineering deficiencies that are conducive to 
errors in reading the display?”9 
 
  
 A total of six judgments must be rendered within the calculation of Pcog. Most of 
these decision are made in the beginning of trees, and without knowing the failure 
probabilities of each subsequent node, is not possible to identify how each decision 
directly affects the results of Pcog.  But, because there are so many judgments made about 
human interactions with hardware, it is important to identify and to understand that as a 
group the judgments impact the results of Pcog. 
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Recoveries within the action 
 The HRA Calculator does not address the issue of recovery actions between 
individual actions.  It does incorporate smaller steps and identification of parameters that 
may affect the crew’s ability to recover within an action.  Within the calculation of Pexe, 
the HRA Calculator asks the user to identify steps listed within the procedure that would 
act as recovery.  The analyst must judge what to credit as a recovery step.  If too many 
recoveries are credited, then Pexe will be unrealistically low. If no recoveries are credited, 
then the results will be overly conservative.       
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 The Annunciator Response Model does not account for any recoveries.    
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 The HCR/ORE Correlation does not account of any recoveries explicitly. This 
method was developed from actual simulator data, and within the scenarios observed the 
crew was not restricted in attempting to recover an error.  
 
CBDTM Method 
 The HRA Calculator asks the user to account for recoveries made by the 
presence of additional people after completing each decision tree.  The more time 
available to complete the action, the more people may become available for recovery. 
While there is a minimum amount of time available to allow for additional crew, the user 
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is not required to take credit for any recovery.  Also, without using the override function, 
the user can only take credit for one recovery per decision tree.     
 
Review of final HEP 
 Once an HEP calculation is complete one final judgment must be rendered. The 
analyst must address the following two questions about the final HEP value. 
 1) Is the final value realistic? 
 2) Does the final value appear to be consistent compared to other actions within 
 the same analysis? 
Not only must the final result make physical sense, the analyst may screen both Pexe and 
Pcog and render judgments about their individual physical significance.   
 
Annuciator Response Model 
 When applying the Annuciator Response Model the analyst must simply choose 
a Pcog value from the provided list. The lower bound limit is the lowest possible Pcog 
value (3E-4), and this is considered to be conservative.     
 
CBDTM Method 
 The CBDTM Method does not apply a lower bound to Pcog. However without 
using the override feature it is unlikely to obtain probabilities below about 1E-8. 
Applying multiple recoveries to a single action is the primary reason for obtaining 
unreasonably low Pcog probabilities.      
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HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Using the HCR/ORE Correlation it is not unrealistic to obtain Pcog values of 1E-
10. This occurs when relatively long (over 1hour) periods are considered.  The HRA 
Calculator sets a lower bound of 1E-16, and anything below this is considered to be zero.   
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CHAPTER IV 
JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE CPSES DATABASE 
 To begin this study the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station’s (CPSES) 
complete HRA for Level 1, full power, post-initiator actions was used as an example 
database.16 The purpose of analyzing a complete database was to observe how one 
renders engineering judgments and to understand the types of judgments actually made 
within a complete analysis. It was not to critique individual calculations.    
 The CPSES analysis was completed in 2004 as an update to the 1999 version and 
performed as part of the PRA update for the entire plant.  The HRA Calculator was used 
exclusively for quantification, and specifically the CBDTM Method was used for every 
post-initiator action. While there may be discussion about the appropriateness of this 
method for every action, it does provide consistency within the entire HRA.  
 This database consisted of 52 post-initiator actions, and Table 12 summarizes the 
types of actions modeled.  The analysis included operator interviews for every action, 
and a documented MAAP or RELAP calculation was used to determine timing 
information.  The HRA Calculator allows easy documentation of the input parameters, 
and the analyst did a thorough job of documenting all calculations.  Because of the 
documentation, it was possible to re-calculate the HEP values using different methods 
without collecting additional information.   
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Table 12 
Summary of Post-Initiator Actions 
Post-Initiator Actions 52 Total actions                                                   
45  Control room actions                            
7   Ex-control room actions 
Rule-Based Actions 44 
Skill-Based Actions 7        
Knowledge-Based Actions 1  
High Stress Actions 17 
Moderate Stress Actions 15 
Optimal (Low) Stress Actions 20 
Total time for scenario Ranged from  10 to 4800 minutes 
Time required for manipulation Ranged from 1 to 30 minutes 
 T1/2 Ranged from 3 to 35 minutes 
 
 The seven ex-control room actions were excluded from this study, because the 
sample size and the specific actions chosen do not give a statistical representation of all 
ex-control room actions. The HRA analyst chose to model only actions for which there 
was an excessive amount of time available to complete the action i.e.,. more than 90 
minutes.  If there was a short time available to complete the action, the analyst used a 
conservative approach and considered the final HEP to be 1.  
 In addition to the types of ex-control room actions that were chosen, the analyst 
has identified that the environmental conditions are other than ideal.  The HRA 
Calculator (Version 2.01) does not consider environmental PSFs such as radiation, 
lighting and temperature explicitly in its numerical algorithms. 
 Within the CPSES HRA Calculation Notebook, the HRA analyst did document 
30 assumptions.  Some of these assumptions fit within the twelve areas of judgments 
(Defined in Chapter III), but others were outside the scope of this study. The complete 
set of assumptions was used as part of the Pilot survey.   
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 The Pilot survey and the Phase II survey were derived from examination of this 
database. Also, every action within the database was recalculated using the Annunciator 
Response Model and the HCR/ORE Correlation to show the numerical comparisons 
among actions and methods.  
 
STAGE 1: DEFINE 
 
Identification and definition of actions to model within the HRA Calculator 
 According to the CPSES HRA Calculation Notebook the following approach was 
taken to identify and to define the actions to be modeled using the HRA Calculator.   
“In general, human interactions were identified and defined as part of the 
plant response modeling in the accident sequence development and the 
system models.  The human interactions were then classified as pre or 
post-initiators.  The screening analysis used the method developed for the 
HRA in the IPE.16 
 The post-initiator actions were identified from the system models 
and the PRA accident sequences analysis. The operator follows the 
actions specified in the Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs) and 
Abnormal Conditions Procedures (ABNs).  These operator responses 
form the bases for each branch in the event trees.  Each human interaction 
event is modeled as having a cognitive and an execution portion.   The 
HRA success criteria follow the event tree success criteria, and are based 
on a "best-estimate" plant response.  While the HRA starts with input 
from the PRA and deterministic calculations, operator interviews were 
used to define the human interactions and performance shaping factors.  
 All post initiator HFEs in the PRA model had their Risk 
Achievement Worth (RAW) calculated using the PRA current model.  To 
ensure that the risk significant HFEs were included in this recalculation, 
several risk significant systems had one train removed and then the HFE 
RAWs were calculated.  The HFEs were ranked and the top 30 were 
recalculated using the HRA calculator.  Many HFEs were based on the 
same calculations so they were recalculated even though they may not 
have been in the top.” 16 
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Categorization of actions as pre- or post-initiators 
 The categorization of actions as pre- or post-initiators was based upon the 
definitions in SHARP1 for Type A actions (pre-initiators) and Type C actions (post-
initiators).  Type B actions were not explicitly modeled within the PRA.  
The HRA analyst defined three types of pre-initiators to be model using the HRA 
Calculator.16 
•  Test of safety equipment;  
•  Maintenance of safety equipment;  
•  Calibration of safety sensors and actuators.  
These three groups were further subdivided into groups according to their path through 
the CBDTM decision trees. Each subgroup was then modeled only once, and the 
calculated HEP was used for all actions in the group. For post-initiator actions each 
action was modeled individually.  
 
Definitions of critical actions 
 Engineering judgments about how to define critical actions and recoveries were 
based upon operator interviews, and by direct identification of tasks stated in the 
procedures. Only critical actions stated in the procedures were credited.   
 
Definition of cognitive portion of the action  
 During operator interviews the HRA analyst specifically asked the operators to 
identify a cue for each action. Typically the cue definition was based on a control room 
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alarm or signal to which the crew would respond following steps of an EOP. The cue 
was defined to be the beginning of the timing sequence.    
 
STAGE 2: QUANTIFICATION 
 
 Choice of methodology 
 For pre-initiator actions the THERP methodology was always applied, and for 
post-initiator actions the CBDTM Method was always applied.  Judgments about which 
methodology to use were based upon three consideration: 
1. Choosing the method that identified the most parameters and completes the 
analysis in the greatest amount of detail.   
2. Using a method that is consistent with current industry use.  
3. For consistency purposes the same methodology was applied to every action.  
 
Stress 
 First an optimal level of stress was assumed for each action, because the 
operators were assumed to be highly skilled and experienced. Then, during operator 
interviews the operators were asked to identify a stress level. If there was disagreement 
about stress levels, then the operator’s choice was used. There was some attempt to 
include timing effects within the stress level choice to increase it from a low to moderate 
level.   
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 Within the calculation of Pexe there were several cases in which different stress 
levels were used for different critical actions. This was done because the analyst 
believed that some of the tasks were simpler to perform.  Also, if there was significant 
time between two critical actions, the stress level was lowered for the second task. 
  In summary, engineering judgments about stress level were based primarily on 
operator interviews but also training, time available and number of tasks influenced the 
decision.  
 
 Rule-, skill-, and knowledge-based actions 
 This classification was only for documentation. This decision was taken directly 
from the operator interviews. The operators were provided with definitions of rule-
based, skill-based or knowledge-based as defined in THERP and then asked to classify 
the action. The HRA analyst always used the operator’s opinions.  If an action was 
considered to be knowledge-based, it was not modeled within the HRA Calculator.   
 
Timing information 
 For each post-initiator action the HRA analyst collected a MAAP or RELAP run 
similar to the situation being modeled. This was used to determine Tsw. The start of the 
action was defined as the cue, and therefore Tdelay was typically zero.  The manipulation 
time was always taken from ASEP recommendations even if the operators gave more 
optimistic times.  For most actions T1/2 was collected from operator interviews.   
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 The CPSES HRA states that additional people could be credited for recovery at 
the times given in Table 13.  However, only in two actions was credit taken for anyone 
other than self review, and this makes the complete database almost independent of time. 
 
Table 13 
CPSES Times for Crediting Additional Crew for Recovery 
 
Self Review Immediately 
STA  More than 15 min 
ERF More than  1 hour 
Shift Change Never take credit for 
 
 
 Engineering judgments about timing were based on interpretation of thermal-
hydraulic calculations, operator estimates for T1/2 and ASEP recommendations for 
manipulation time. Judgments about times at which to consider additional crew for 
recovery were based on the recommendations of the HRA Calculator.     
 
Training 
 It was assumed that all CPSES operators are highly skilled and well trained, 
because the training programs are constantly being updated and improved upon. 
Therefore, judgments about training were based upon identifying and using the most 
optimistic values within the CBDTM decision trees. The number of times an action was 
trained and type of training on each action was obtained by interviewing operators.   
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Procedures 
 Within the CPSES analysis only proceduralized tasks were credited for control 
room actions. It was assumed that all actions begin with EOP 0.0 for diagnoses of the 
problem, then transfer to additional procedures. Therefore, EOP 0.0 was not included in 
counting how many procedures were being used.  
 For judgments about the clarity of procedures it was assumed that all procedures 
are well written and have been updated to remove any ambiguous or confusing wording. 
For decisions about the clarity of procedures the most optimistic values provided within 
the CBDTM method were used. A procedure step was considered graphically distinct if 
it was the only step on the page or was boxed by a CAUTION or NOTE statement.  
 
Human interaction with hardware 
 The HRA analyst addressed the issues of how the crew interacts with hardware 
during operator interviews. This provided a general understanding of the action being 
modeled. It was assumed that each individual present in the control room is well trained 
and responsible for completing their individual assigned tasks.  Within the control room 
the following people were assumed to be present: Control Room Supervisor (CRS), 
Reactor Operator (RO) and Balance of Plant Operator (BOP), Shift Supervisor (SS) and 
a Shift Engineer (SE, who is also the STA).   
 According to the CPSES HRA analyst the control room design and layout is 
continuously being updated to correct for any human factors issues that have been 
identified, and thus, for decisions about the clarity of the control room layout the most 
 54
optimistic values were used. Also, control room indications were assumed to be 
functioning unless failed by the initiating event.   
 For choices of errors of omission and errors of commission the HRA analyst has 
assumed that the modified HRA Calculator values taken from THERP are appropriate to 
use in all cases, because the procedures are in the response/response-not-obtained 
format.  
 
Recoveries within an action 
 In general, recoveries within an action were accounted for by the analyst’s 
interpretation of EPRI Report TR-100259 report and the recommendations provided by 
the HRA Calculator. Only recoveries stated within the procedures were credited, and for 
almost every action self-review was credited, because this is a site policy. The 
dependency level recommended by the HRA Calculator was always used even if the 
operator interviews provided conflicting opinions.        
 During operator interviews the following two questions (specific to the CBDTM 
Method) were asked: 
1) “What Pcog recovery factors can be applied to this action?” 16 
2) “What Pexe recovery factors can be applied to this action?” 16 
The responses provided the analyst with insight as to what he may want to consider, but 
the exact response was rarely used as stated.  
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Review of final HEP 
 The final HEP values were compared against previous models to check for 
consistency. However, no final values were modified within the HRA Calculator as a 
result of the final review. It is expected that this was because many of the actions that 
had the potential to produce unrealistic results were screened out prior to completing the 
analysis and were conservatively set to one.     
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CHAPTER V 
NUMERICAL COMPARSION AMONG THE THREE METHODS 
EMPLOYED BY THE HRA CALCULATOR 
It is common knowledge among HRA analysts that applying different methods 
for the same calculation will produce a range of HEP final values. If an analyst is 
attempting to provide consistent and justifiable results, it is important for an HRA 
analyst to understand the variations among the different methods. Understanding this 
variation helps an analyst render better judgments within his calculations.  This chapter 
shows the variation and agreements among the three methods employed by the HRA 
Calculator. For this analysis, the CPSES database was used as the base model, and all 
actions were recalculated using both the Annunciator Response Model and the 
HCR/ORE Correlation.   
The following assumptions were made in order to achieve consistency among 
methods and actions.  
• The stress level chosen by the CPSES HRA was not changed among 
methods.  In the HCR/ORE correlation the HRA Calculator does not allow a 
moderate stress level in the calculation of sigma.  Therefore, a median value 
between high stress and optimal stress was used for moderate stress actions. 
• A single annunciator was used as the number of annunciators present in the 
control room when calculating the Pcog using THERP. This was done simply 
because there was not enough information available to determine the exact 
number of annunciators present.  
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• Ex-control actions were excluded from this comparison.. 
• None of the figures show error bars or error factors. This is because the HRA 
Calculator simply assigns error factors based on the final HEP point value 
estimate recommended by THERP. The error factors are independent of 
methodology used. Table 9 (Shown in Chapter II) shows the three choices for 
error factors, and it is hypothesized that adding these error factors would not 
change any of the following analysis and conclusions.  
   Fig.  4 shows that in 80% of the actions the HCR/ORE Correlation and the 
CBDTM Method agree to within the same order of magnitude.  There tends to be 
greater variation between the two methods when there is high stress and the median 
response time in less than 5 minutes.  These are the two dominating factors in the 
HCR/ORE Correlation but are only two of many in the CBDTM Method.  The 
CBDTM Method does not use timing information explicitly, but it is considered in the 
application of recovery factors applied to Pcog.  
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Fig.  4  Comparison of Final HEP Values Using CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE 
Correlation 
 
 One would expect to see greater variation between methods for these types of 
actions, because at short response times the HCR/ORE Correlation has been 
logarithmically extrapolated beyond the data from which it was derived giving higher 
values for Pcog. Using the CBDTM Method only a discrete number of values can be 
chosen from the decision trees. Many choices in the decisions trees lead to negligible 
probabilities (below 1E-5), but there are few (less than 5) decision paths that give a 
value higher than 1E-1. For actions considered high stress and short time available, the 
CBDTM Method does not allow an exponential increase from other actions like in the 
HCR/ORE Correlation.   (While many values in the CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE 
Correlation can be overridden in the HRA Calculator, this function was not applied.)    
Excluding actions with high stress and T1/2 less than 5 minutes, the two methods 
agree to the same order of magnitude in 94% of the actions. This type of agre ement 
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between the HCR/ORE Correlation and CBDTM Method is expected, becaus both 
methods are modeling the same action, and these methods (or variation of these 
methods) are the most commonly used method among industry experts. Even with the 
use of simulators today, human failure data is sparse and there is not a complete database 
available for benchmarking these methods. If HRA analysts can not justify their HEP 
calculations by the use of physical data, it becomes increasing important to ensure 
consistency between methods.    
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Fig.  5 Comparison of Annunciator Response Model  and CBDTM Method 
 
Fig.  5 shows that generally the Annunciator Response Model and CBDTM 
Method agree to within the same order of magnitude. In 62% of the actions the methods 
agree to within one significant digit.  The largest variation again occurs for actions that 
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are considered high stress and there is less than 5 minutes response time available to 
complete the action. Both the CBDTM Method and the Annunciator Response Model do 
not use timing information or stress level as numerical inputs into the calculation of Pcog. 
However, in the derivation of both these models stress level and timing information were 
considered in the tabulated values.  
The CBDTM Method considers stress implicitly in the choices made in the 
decision trees, and timing is taken into account in the application of recovery factors; as 
time increases more people will be available to help diagnosis and recover the problem. 
The CPSES HRA has only taken credit for the recovery of self–review, which the HRA 
Calculator allows the user to credit regardless of time available.  Only in two actions did 
the CPSES HRA account for additional time by applying recovery factors to Pcog.    
In the Annunciator Response Model the tabulated Pcog values are based upon the 
idea that if there is only one annunciator present, then the operator will attend to it 
directly with no distractions. As time increases the operator will receive more 
annunciators, and his stress level will increase.  For this analysis the assumption that 
there is only one annunciator present for every action removes any dependency among 
timing, stress level and the calculation of Pcog.  
Using the Annunciator Response Model it is not possible to model Pcog for a high 
stress, short time available, because the model assumes that as time increases stress also 
increases. One would expect the final HEP values for these types of actions to disagree 
with other methods.  
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The Annunciator Response Model is based on a single operator failure 
probability without crediting additional crew for recovery. The CBDTM Method was 
developed around a crew failure probability where additional people can be credited for 
recovery.  In Fig.  5, it was assumed that only one person will be attending to the 
annunciator, and no credit was taken for additional people available for recovery.  
However, in the control room there are at least three people present at all times, and one 
could justify in many circumstances taking credit for these additional people.  (RO, BOP  
and the control room supervisor). THERP describes at length how to account for the 
additional people present in the control room for recoveries. Fig.  6 below shows even 
better agreement between The Annunciator Response Model and the CBDTM Method if 
the Annunciator Response Model is modified, external from the HRA Calculator, to 
account for recoveries for additional crew.  
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Fig.  6 CBDTM Method Compared to a Modified Annunciator Response Model 
to Account for Additional Personal in the Control Room. 
 
 In Fig.  6, 97% of the actions agree to the same order of magnitude and 
furthermore, 68% of the actions agree to within one signification digit. In these 
calculations, both methods are representative of the probability of crew failure, and one 
would expect better consistency than in the Fig.  5  
Fig.  7 shows the comparison between the Annunciator Response Model and the 
HCR/ORE Correlation.  Again, there is greater variation for actions that involve high 
stress and there is less than 5 minutes available to complete the actions. One would 
expect to see a greater variation between the HCR/ORE Correlation and the Annunciator 
Response Model as compared to the previous comparisons. As discussed previously, the 
Annunciator Response Model does not explicitly account for time or stress dependence, 
and the HCR/ORE Correlation is only dependent upon these two parameters.      
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Fig.  7. Comparison of Annunciator Response Model and the HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
In Figs. 5 and 7, the two actions that show large variations among all three 
methods are: failure to start a standby pump manually, and operator failure to align a 
single valve manually.  As shown in Fig. 8 below, Pexe for both of these actions is orders 
of magnitude lower than other actions in the database. This is because both contain only 
one simple critical action. Pcog is the dominating term in both actions, and the failure 
probability is very low. In the other actions, Pcog and Pexe are more evenly weighted.   
The HRA Calculator does not have a lower truncation limit for Pexe values, but it seems 
unrealistic not to set a lower limit. Using the tables provided in the THERP, most 
execution probabilities range from 6E-3 to 1E-1.  In both of these actions multiple 
recoveries have been applied to a low failure probability of 1E-3. Thus, the large 
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variations shown among the three methods in the final HEP value is not due to the 
method choice for the calculation of Pcog but due to the unrealistically low Pexe value.  
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Fig.  8.  Pcog Compared to Pexe Calculated Using CBDTM Method 
 
The HRA Calculator breaks every HEP calculation into parts Pcog and Pexe.  Pexe 
is always calculated by the THERP method regardless of the method chosen by the user. 
It is interesting to compare only the calculation of Pcog for different actions, because 
unlike in the comparison of final HEP values, Pcog can vary by several orders of 
magnitude among methods. Because a single annunciator response was used for the 
Annunciator Response Model, Pcog is the same for every action. Fig. 9 shows that the 
HCR/ORE Correlation varies by orders of magnitude among actions, and the range of 
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values is extremely large.  The HRA calculator uses a cut off value for Pcog of 1E-16. 
Values less than this are set equal to zero. 
Fig. 9 shows that generally for the HCR/ORE Correlation as the stress level 
increases, Pcog increases.  However, the CBDTM Method does not show this trend.  In 
the HRA calculator the user is required to address explicitly the stress level in the 
selection of σ , but in the CBDTM Method the analyst does not directly consider the 
stress.  One would expect that both methods should show the same trend, because the 
CBDTM Method addresses issues that should implicitly affect stress levels. These 
branches include workload, training, and clarity of the procedures. 
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Fig.  9 Comparison of Pcog Calculated by All Three Methods 
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Even though the CBDTM Method implicitly addresses stress by a variety of 
parameters, an analyst could address each parameter and not consider it in relationship to 
stress level.  Many of the same choices could be made for both high stress and low stress 
actions. The CPSES HRA, for example, uses several of the same choices for both high 
stress and low stress actions, and this explains why the CBDTM actions show no 
relationship to stress in Fig. 9.  
 THERP provides a chart of probability of failure to diagnosis compared to time 
after compelling signal of an abnormal situation. This is presented as an alternative to 
the Annunciator Response Model to calculate Pcog. While this chart is not used in any 
calculation applied by the HRA Calculator, it is interesting to observe the large 
discrepancies between Pcog calculations.  One would have hoped to see a stronger 
agreement between this THERP time-dependent model and the HCR/ORE Correlation, 
because both models are explicitly dependent upon time, and both methods are taking 
into account the crew’s response as opposed to a single operator. (Fig 10) 
A commonly made statement among HRA experts is that the HCR/ORE 
Correlation gives unrealistically low HEP values when there is a large amount of time 
available to complete the action and unrealistically high values when there is little time 
available to complete the action. Fig. 11 below tests this statement.  For smaller ratios of 
Tw/T1/2 the HCR/ORE Correlation is orders of magnitude higher than both the CBDTM 
Method and the Annunciator Response Model.  For larger ratios the HCR/ORE 
Correlation gives slightly lower values. 
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Fig.  10  THERP Prediction of Incorrect Diagnosis as a Function of Time6 Compared to 
Pcog Calculated by the HCR/ORE Correlation and CBDTM Method. 
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Fig.  11 Comparison of Final HEP Values Using All Three Methods  Listed in 
Order of Tw/T1/2 Ratio. 
 
It is reasonable to believe that as the timing ratio increases, the probability of 
failure should decrease regardless of the method chosen. On the log-log scale shown in 
Fig. 12, the data shows that all methods show this trend to some degree.  
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 From the data it is hard to draw definitive conclusions, but it does show that for 
ratios less than about 8, the HCR/ORE Correlation predicts higher values. As the ratio 
increases, the results of the HCR/ORE Correlation appear to decrease at a much faster 
rate than the CBDTM Method and the Annunciator Response Model.  
This difference in decreasing rate as a function of time is because the HCR/ORE 
Correlation uses a logarithmic correlation with no lower or upper bounds. Both the 
CBDTM Method and the Annunciator Response Model use a combination of tabulated 
values with only a finite number of possibilities.  The CBDTM Method considers any 
probabilities less than 1E-5 negligible and disregards that parameter in the calculation of 
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Pcog. It is nearly impossible to produce the same large range of HEP values using those 
two methods.  
The overall conclusion of this numerical comparison is that for the same input 
the three methods of the HRA Calculator will generally produce HEP values on the same 
order of magnitude with two large exceptions:1) actions that are high stress and T1/2 is 
less than 5 minutes and  2) actions in which the Pexe value is exceptionally low (below 
about 5E-4). 
In 44% of the actions in this study the Annunciator Response Model gave a final 
HEP value less than CBDTM Method, and in 40% of the cases gave a lower value than 
the HCR/ORE Correlation.   However, when the HCR/ORE Correlation is compared to 
CBDTM Method, the HCR/ORE Correlation gave a higher value in 75 % of the actions.  
Aside from the numerical comparison, this study has also shown that the user of 
the HRA Calculator can easily and often unintentionally remove the implicitly 
dependent parameters from a calculation. This is shown in Fig. 9 in the use of the 
CBDTM Method to calculate Pcog. When the actions are compared against each other 
using stress level there is no relationship between Pcog and stress level.    
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CHAPTER VI 
PILOT SURVEY 
 A pilot survey was done in order to ensure that the researcher would receive 
responses that were useful in meeting the needs of the study. For the pilot survey ten 
experts were asked to complete two tasks: 
1) From the complete set of documented assumptions presented in the CPSES HRA 
Calculation Notebook the participants were asked to identify and to discuss 
whether they would have made alternative or additional assumptions if 
performing this analysis. 
2) After reviewing the HEP calculation for the action of Feed and Bleed using the 
CBDTM, the participants were asked to evaluate the calculation by answering 
fourteen questions. 
The complete pilot survey is shown in Appendix B. 
 Of the ten participates who received the survey six responses were received from 
the following groups of participants: 
• Three industry experts – two currently work for a nuclear utility and one is an 
independent consultant 
• Two methodology developers 
• One academia expert 
It should also be noted that none of the experts who responded to this survey are 
currently using the HRA Calculator.  They all claim to be familiar with at least one of 
the methods employed by the HRA Calculator.  
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  The first comment that several experts made was that they were not sufficiently 
familiar with HRA Calculator or the CBDTM method to answer every question. This 
comment was taken into consideration when creating the Phase II survey.  This comment 
was also observed in the responses received.  Because the experts were not familiar with 
the method, sometimes they would disagree with how a parameter was calculated simply 
because they use a different method for quantification.  For this survey (shown in 
Appendix B), the experts were not asked to critique the methodology, but instead they 
were asked questions about the application of the CBDTM method. Even so, many 
experts felt the need to critique the methodology. 
 Experts were given two weeks to respond to the survey, and it was expected that 
the survey should have taken no more than a couple hours to complete.  However, from 
the responses to the survey and many of the comments, it was determined that the 
experts spent a large amount of time (up to 15 hours) completing the survey, and the 
Phase II survey was shorted significantly. 
 
CPSES DOCUMENTED ASSUMPTIONS 
 The experts were asked to provide comments on the complete set of 30 
assumptions documented in the CPSES HRA. The experts were asked to analyze each 
assumption and to identify and to discuss where they would have made alternative or 
additional assumptions.  From the comments received it was intended that one could 
draw general conclusions about how one renders judgments about the specific area each 
assumption addresses. In some instances this has been completed; comments on other 
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assumptions were used to create additional questions for the Phase II survey.  Since the 
participants were only asked to comment on assumptions they would make differently, it 
was assumed that by not commenting on an assumption the participant agreed with the 
stated assumption.  
 While the experts were given the complete set of assumptions, they did not have 
access to the database and were not able to see how the assumptions were actually 
applied within the analysis. The following summarizes each assumption as stated in the 
CPSES HRA Calculation Notebook and the comments received about it. The numbers 
correspond to the assumption number give by the CPSES HRA.  
 
Assumption 1 
“Operators are highly skilled in performing the necessary tasks, each 
having more than six months experience and most with several years 
experience. In most cases, “optimum stress” is applied due to the level of 
experience, the nature of the event and lack of an undue challenge in 
performing the proceduralized tasks. Some events, however, result in a 
high stress situation. For example, a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) 
event would in general result in a high stress situation and the nominal 
human error rates would be modified as appropriate.”16 
 
 The HRA Calculator asks the user to choose an operator stress level. The choices 
available are optimum, moderate and extreme. This assumption says that the optimum 
stress level will be chosen as a default value, because operators are highly skilled and 
most have several years of experience. Assumption 30 gives an exception to the default 
value. The expert’s comments are shown in Table 14.  
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Table 14 
Responses to Assumption 1 
Response 
• There ought to be some guidelines on how to recognize the characteristics of an accident scenario 
that requires elevation the of the stress level. 
• While I agree that the operating crews are highly trained and experienced, I would disagree with 
the assumption that stress is generally optimum during accident scenarios that lead to core 
damage. In order to approach core damage, various equipment or operator actions have failed.  
Every time that the plant does not respond as expected, the operating crew will get more 
frustrated and stressed. We generally use high stress for most post-initiator actions.  
• Instead of saying operators are highly skilled I would say they are highly capable. 
• In THERP, the stress model includes two levels of high stress- moderately high and extremely 
high stress.  I hope that in the CPSES HRA that more than an optimum level of stress was applied 
to more than just one abnormal event, the steam generator tube rupture. If there were other 
abnormal events analyzed, surely it would be appropriate not to assess optimum stress to all of 
them. 
 
 There are two independent parts to this assumption as noted by the experts. First, 
operators are highly skilled and second, during most scenarios the stress level of the 
operators will be considered optimal. It is interesting to observe that within the 52 post-
initiator actions in the CPSES database optimal stress was used only eight times. 
 For every action, the CPSES analyst has identified that the operators have 
excellent training and chosen to use the most optimistic stress values for quantification. 
It seems unrealistic that every action would have excellent training and that the quality 
of training would not vary among actions. If this assumption were actually applied, the 
overall results of the complete analysis would be independent of the training parameter.  
 From this assumption and comments the following conclusion can be drawn: 
engineering judgments about stress level applied, i.e., the associated PSFs, should be 
based on more than a single factor such as training. 
   
 
 75
Assumption 2 
“Control room indication is provided for equipment status, with visual 
and audible alarm indications of equipment failures or parameter 
deviations.  The control room indication is assumed to be available, unless 
affected by the initiating event.”16  
 
 Examination of the CPSES HRA shows that this assumption was consistently 
applied, and according to the CPSES HRA analyst every action modeled within the 
HRA Calculator database is diagnosable by an indication in the control room. With this 
additional clarification to this assumption, the experts and the CPSES are in consistent 
agreement about how to credit control indications. Table 15 shows the expert comments 
on this assumption. It is concluded that engineering judgments about main control room 
indication availability should be based on the consideration of human actions required. 
 
Table 15 
Response To Assumption 2 
 
Response 
• The first half of this assumption appears to indicate that instrumentation is available for any 
equipment included in the HRA.  If this is a correct interpretation to the assumption I disagree 
with it.  If it is not known whether indication exists for a particular piece of equipments, I would 
assume it is not available. With respect to the man machine interface issues for the indicators I 
would likely assume nominal conditions (not worst case). I do agree with the second half the 
assumption and would not assume instruments are unavailable unless there is an accident-based 
reason to assume it fails. 
 
 
Assumption 3 
“Visual and audible alarms demand (or serve as prompts for) initial 
operator responses.  Some events, such as Loss of Component Cooling 
Water and Loss of Safety Chill Water, are diagnosed within their 
respective Abnormal Operating Procedures. For any other abnormal plant 
condition resulting in a reactor trip or the need for reactor trip, the 
 76
operators' activities begin with the proceduralized steps in EOP-0.0, 
within which diagnosis of the event is conducted.  The operators are not 
led from the alarm indications directly to diagnosis of the event without 
going through the EOP-0.0 procedure.”16  
  
 By examination of the database it was determined that this assumption was 
applied by assuming that the operating crew always starts at procedure EOP 0.0. No 
actions were analyzed in which the crew diagnosed an event using other procedures.  
The first expert’s comment, (Shown in Table 16) is the correct interpretation of this 
assumption. It is concluded that engineering judgments about the sequence of procedures 
to be followed in response to any initiating event should be based on procedures 
requirements and operator training. 
 
Table 16 
Responses to Assumption 3 
 
Response 
• It is not clear what this assumption means. At our plant, the alarm procedures generally will 
instruct the operating crew to another procedure, not just the two procedures that are mentioned 
above. I would expect the same for CPSES.  I think what is intended with this assumption is that 
regardless of whether a reactor trip is automatic or manual, the operating crew will always go to 
EOP -0.0 following the reactor trip.  EOP 0.0 gives a generic list of post-trip actions that must be 
performed whether the event is diagnosed or not. 
• “The operators are not led from the alarm indication directly to diagnosis for the event without 
going through the EOP 0.0 procedures” this is a very strong and probably an unrealistic 
assumption. 
 
 
Assumption 4 
“It is assumed that each operator is responsible for completing specific 
tasks.  In addition to the Control Room Supervisor (CRS), Reactor 
Operator (RO) and Balance of Plant Operator (BOP) who are normally 
in the control room, there is a Shift Supervisor (SS) and a Shift Engineer 
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(SE, who is also the STA) on each operating crew.  The RO and BOP 
operators are familiar with the operations and controls in the entire 
control room; each is assigned one position for a shift, but can be 
rotated to the other position on a different shift.  For non-time critical 
actions, where the extra crew members are not specifically assigned to 
other tasks, a recovery factor for the extra crew member can be credited.  
Credit for STA actions, generally Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
related, are not credited until 15 minutes after the initiating event 
occurs, if credit is taken.”16  
  
 This assumption applies directly to the calculation of Pcog using the CBDTM 
method. The user of the HRA Calculator can only credit extra crew if there is more than 
15 minutes available to complete the action.  What is not clear in this stated assumption 
is that just because there is more than 15 minutes available for recovery of the action, it 
does not necessary mean that the extra crew will be credited. At the 15 minute time 
interval the HRA Calculator gives the user the option for crediting extra crew.  Extra 
crew was only credited in five of the 52 post-initiator actions even though in 41 actions 
there was more than 15 minutes available to recovery the action. In all these actions the 
analyst noted that extra crew was credited because there was more than one hour 
available for recovery.  The expert’s comments are shown in Table 17 
 
 78
Table 17 
Responses to Assumption 4 
 
Response 
• I would not allow a recovery factor for the extra crew because I would assume high or complete 
dependence between any extra crews and nominal crew. No exceptions to the other material. 
• Assessing zero credit for recovery factors by the STA for 15 minutes shows reasonable 
conservatism. However, as an evaluator of the HRA I would want to know how the following 
recovery factor is determined: “For non-time critical actions, where the extra crew members are 
not specifically assigned to other tasks, a recovery factor for the extra crew can be credited.” 
• I would only allow extra crew recovery if there was a reason (i.e. procedure or acceptable 
practice) why the crew member would be checking. In other words, I would not give credit for 
casual or accidental recovery. 
 
 From this assumption and comments the following conclusion can be drawn: 
engineering judgments about the recovery by extra main control room crew and shift 
technical advisor should be made by considering primary and collateral assigned duties 
in addition to time available.   
 
Assumption 5 
“Usually only one recovery factor is taken for each HFE.  Since “self 
checking” is a site wide policy that has received high management 
attention, this is the recovery most often credited.  Credit is taken for STA 
actions for the HRA events that need to be accomplished at a relatively 
long period of time after the initiating event has occurred.” 16 
  
 Table 18 shows that some experts would not apply self checking in this 
optimistic manner.  However, there were four experts who did not comment on this 
assumption, and from this it is inferred that they felt the assumption for crediting self 
checking is acceptable.  In the second part of this survey, the experts were asked again if 
they would have taken credit for self checking, and three out of the four experts who 
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provided comments agreed that taking credit for self checking is overly optimistic unless 
specifically addressed in procedures or other compelling reasons. 
 
Table 18 
Responses to Assumption 5 
 
Response 
• Self-checking should not be allowed for the CBDTM failure modes that involve 
misinterpretation. This should in the “rules” of the CBDTM. 
• The self checking credit would be a red flag for me. This reeks of extreme optimism, so if I were 
evaluating the HRA I would be very skeptical.  I remember a NPP HRA in which this type of 
recovery factor was assessed almost every task done under routine conditions. This optimism was 
further increased by assuming zero dependence between the original self checking so that the 
original HEP was squared.  
 
 
From this assumption and comments the following conclusion can be drawn: 
engineering judgments for crediting self-checking should be based on the availability of, 
and be directed by, scenario-specific prompts for self-checking.  
 
Assumption 6 
“Time critical actions are those which take a long time to diagnose and 
perform relative to the length of the time window available.  The time 
critical actions are primarily identified either through the operator 
interview process or via an examination of the relevant procedures, and an 
examination of the time windows available from thermal-hydraulic 
analyses (such as RELAP or MAAP) or other engineering calculations.  
The operator interview process ascertains the cues and steps in the 
procedure that the operators use to diagnose the event and the time at 
which this diagnosis takes place.  Then, the steps judged to be critical to 
that particular HI [Human Interactions] are confirmed and the overall time 
to successfully complete these steps determined.  The overall time 
accounts for potential delays due to additional, non-critical procedural 
steps that must be executed first, time required for the component to 
change state (e.g. to start a turbine-driven pump), and limitations that may 
be present due to crew manning.  If the available time window is less than 
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the diagnosis time plus the time required to successfully complete the 
action, then the action is assumed to be failed.  If the available time 
window is longer than the diagnosis time plus the time required to 
successfully complete the actions, then the probability of failure is 
adjusted through selection of the stress factor and the allowed credit for 
recovery.  For example, if there is a 30-minute time window and the 
action takes 5 minutes to diagnose and 15-20 minutes to execute, then an 
optimum to moderately high [Moderate in the HRA Calculator] level of 
stress is taken and no credit is given for recovery.  Alternately, if the time 
window is 1 hour, and the action is at the end of the success branches on 
the event tree (e.g. LOCA followed by successful injection, cooldown, 
and depressurization such that the time window starts several hours after 
the initiator), and the competition from other actions is low, then the stress 
is taken as optimum and credit may be given for recovery.  In each case 
the operator actions are examined within the context of the scenario to 
determine the potential impact of time constraints.”16 
  
 From the wording of the assumption it was not clear to the reviewers that the 
entire CPSES HRA was completed using only the CBDTM method.  No time reliability 
curves were used within this analysis, and the analyst had to account for additional time-
based stress factors using other methods. The expert’s responses are shown in Table 19. 
 
Table 19 
Responses to Assumption 6 
 
Response 
• I would not add additional time-based stress factors as the time reliability curves should 
implicitly account for time-related stress. Application of stress factors based on a perceived threat 
to the plant or public safety, which is not necessarily directly related to time, is considered to 
explicitly address the stress factor. My concern is that double counting the stress factor may yield 
overly conservative results.  
• I assume that if the action is time critical, then the probability from the HCR/ORE methodology 
will be higher than the CBDTM probability, and thus the HCR/ORE probability will be used for 
diagnosis failure.  
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 This assumption and responses show that experts agree that there should be some 
relationship between time and stress for time-critical actions. The relationship could be 
either explicit by increasing stress level for short time periods, or an indirect relationship 
could be established such as the use of time reliability curves to relate stress and time. 
Further questions about timing were asked in the Phase II survey.  
 
Assumption 7 
  This assumption was disregarded from this study because it’s interpretation  
might be ambiguous.  
 
Assumption 8 
“Execution errors are calculated using the THERP tables in Reference 5 
[Reference 9 of this study].  Values from these tables for errors of 
omission are divided by three based on Swain’s notes in Chapter 15 of 
THERP.  These notes describe adjustments to the nominal Swain values, 
in particular to credit the layout of the procedures into a 
“response/response not obtained” format”. 16 
 
 This assumption is built into the HRA Calculator. The user can choose values 
from tables within the HRA Calculator for errors of omission and errors of commission.  
The tabulated values have been divided by 3 based on THERP.  However, the user can 
choose to enter any appropriate value and is not limited to the tabulated values.  The 
experts were not aware of this detail within the HRA Calculator when reviewing this 
assumption and their comments are shown in Table 20  
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Table 20 
Responses to Assumption 8 
   
Response 
• I have read Chapter 15 multiple times and I think that the application of this assumption is 
incorrect for CPSES. First NUREG/CR-1278 page 15-16 states that the operators made 1/3 fewer 
errors with the columnar format that the narrative format.  Therefore, the failure rate would be 2/3 
of the values rather than 1/3 of the values from Chapter 20. However, in reading the EOPs, it is 
clear that within the response/response not obtained format, the steps are often narrative rather 
than the columnar formats as shown on pages 15-17.  For example, EOP 0-0, Step 1.b is very 
much a narrative rather than columnar format. 
• This division by three does come from page 15-15 of THERP, but this really should be applied 
very sparingly. It depends so much on how good the written procedures really are, and I have 
seen some poorly written EOPs. If I were evaluating the HRA, I would want the task analysis to 
include a detailed evaluation of written procedures, especially EOPs 
  
 The other four reviewers did not comment on this assumption which means that 
they agreed with the CPSES assumption as stated. These comments show that the 
experts were equally divided about how to interpret pages 15-15 thru 15-17 of THERP.  
By close examination of the referenced pages and data provided in Chapter 20 of 
THERP, the HRA Calculator has modified the data provided in THERP.  In some 
instances the values have been divided by 3 to account for response/non-response-not-
obtained procedures; other times this has not been considered.  The second comment 
came from the author of THERP, and his comments on how to interpret his original 
work should be weighted more than others who are interpreting the work.  
 From the stated assumption it would seem that sometimes the division by 3 for 
errors of omission and errors of commission would not be used simply because not all 
procedures are identical.  For the CPSES, every error of omission and commission was 
divided by 3 since the analysis was done using the HRA Calculator which applied this 
division. While this assumption does seem valid from the interpretation of THERP, 
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THERP also cautions that this assumption should be used sparingly; within the CPSES 
analysis it appears to have been over used.   
 From this assumption and comments the following conclusion can be drawn: 
Engineering judgments about dividing THERP6 Chapter 20 HEP values by 3 based on 
THERP page 15-15 should be based on considering whether the plant’s procedures are 
consistent with what is stated in THERP.  
 
Assumption 9 
“A procedure step is considered graphically distinct, as used in decision 
tree “e” of the cognitive error calculation (pc–e), if it is preceded by a 
boxed CAUTION or NOTE or is the only step on the page” 16  
  
 While this assumption seems rational, one would expect within any complete 
analysis that an analyst would encounter both distinct and graphically distinct steps.  
Within the CPSES HRA database, every step was considered graphically distinct.  
Furthermore, if one examines the procedures referenced in each action, there are several 
cases where there is no caution or boxed step or the only step on the page and the steps 
were considered graphically distinct. Within the CBDTM method the user of the HRA 
Calculator is not asked to document which procedure step is under consideration within 
each decision tree, and therefore, one cannot determine if this assumption was 
consistently applied. From examination of the procedures it appears that this assumption 
needs further clarification, and this is noted by the experts as shown in Table 21. 
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Table 21 
Responses to Assumption 9 
 
Response 
• I would apply “graphically distinct” to other types of steps as well, including: Steps in flowcharts 
that are distinct from others steps around it.  I think this definition is too narrow for defining 
graphically distinct.   
• EPRI TR-100259 states that the caution and notes are diluted if over used. You need to account 
for this fact in the HRA evaluation. If more than 2-3 cautions or notes on a page, then the 
distinction are diluted.   
 
    
 This assumption and responses show that judgments about how to determine 
graphically distinct can be based on identifying a caution box, note or the only step on 
the page.  However, because only two experts responded this subject was further 
questioned in the Phase II survey.  
  
Assumption 10  
“The Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Review recovery factor is not 
applied if the operator action took place less than one hour into the 
sequence, or if the time available for the operator action is less than one 
hour. The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center 
(OSC) are typically manned within one hour of an emergency plan 
declaration.” 16 
  
 Within the HRA Calculator, only the CBDTM method credits recovery factors 
for the presence of additional people, and without using the override function only one 
recovery can be credited.  For most of the actions within the CPSES HRA database, the 
single recovery credited is self review. Recovery from ERF was never applied to any 
action.  As stated, this assumption refers to when the HRA Calculator allows ERF to be 
credited and is not reflective of when the analyst made this choice. Only one response 
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was received (See Table 22). However, it is implied that the lack of responses shows that 
experts are in agreement with the HRA Calculator and feel it is appropriate to consider 
taking credit for the ERF and TSC after one hour. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
engineering judgment to take credit for the ERF and TSC after one hour is reasonable.   
 
Table 22 
Response to Assumption 10 
 
Response 
• In addition, I will only credit TSC/OSC if it is clear that the TSC/OSC have sufficient 
information to diagnose the action remotely. 
 
 
Assumption 11 
“The immediate action steps in Emergency Operating Procedures are 
steps performed from memory without reference to the written 
procedures. However, immediate action steps are reviewed after the 
actions are performed to ensure all required actions are taken. Recovery 
credit is typically not applied in this analysis of the final cognitive error 
(pc) estimation even though reading the procedure serves as a 
check/recovery of the operator's immediate actions. This is conservatively 
held as a potential future recovery”. 16 
  
 There were no comments made about this assumption, and from this it is inferred 
that all experts agreed with this assumption. Also within the database this assumption 
was clearly and consistently applied. What is not stated in this assumption is that if the 
steps were considered memorized, even if the operators were following an EOP, the 
cognitive portion of determining that a second procedure is required was never 
considered in the quantification of Pcog. Additional questions about procedures and 
cognitive recovery were asked in the Phase II Survey.  
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Assumption 12 
“There are a few instances where the CBDTM  may be inappropriate for 
estimating the cognitive human error probability(pc). Operator response 
to events indicated by a Main Control Board alarm(s) rather than a reactor 
trip are often skill-based in nature and do not require a decision or 
diagnosis. Initial operator guidance is typically provided in the 
appropriate Alarm Response Procedure(s), rather than in the Emergency 
Operating Procedures. For this type case, pc is validated by comparison to 
the THERP Annunciator Response Model.”16 
 
 Within the CPSES HRA database every action was modeled using the CBDTM 
method. The Annunciator Response Model within the HRA Calculator was never used. 
The experts comments were as shown in Table 23.  It should be noted that the experts 
did not have access to the database while analyzing the assumption. 
 
Table 23 
Responses to Assumption 12 
 
Response 
• I disagree with this assumption. Alarm responses are guided by procedure and often lead to either 
the EOPs or system operating procedures to respond to the alarm condition. Alarm responses are 
invaluable to diagnosing the event. 
• I am not familiar with any reasons why the CBDTM would not be adequate for a Main Control 
Board Response alarm response. Without a specific example, I can’t really make a judgment. 
• This is a very loose usage of the term “validate.” I think this word is inappropriate here. Perhaps, 
“compared with” would be a more appropriate.   
  
 All experts addressed different areas within this assumption. The intention of this 
assumption was to state when the CBDTM Method would not be used for an HEP 
calculation. Only one expert commented on this aspect of the assumption.  This shows 
that more specific questions need to be asked in order to understand how one renders 
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judgments about methodology choice. Additional questions about methodology choice 
were asked in the second section of this survey and in the Phase II survey.  
 
Assumption 13 
“The Emergency Operating Procedures are written in a columnar 
“response/response not obtained” format. They incorporate checkoffs and 
have provisions for place keeping. Use of both of these aids is practiced 
during operator training on the simulator. These assumptions are 
important to the EPRI CBDTM assessment of procedure usage 
performance shaping factors. “16 
  
 There were no comments made about this assumption and from this it is inferred 
that all experts agreed on this assumption. Also within the database this assumption was 
clearly and consistently applied. Therefore, it is inferred that experts agree that is 
appropriate to take credit for response/response not obtained format as applied within the 
CBDTM Method, and to verify this conclusion additional questions about the use of 
response/response-not-obtained procedures were asked in the Phase II Survey.   
 
Assumption 14 
 “For control room action, only proceduralized recoveries are credited.”16   
 
 Within the CPSES database, only proceduralized actions inside and outside the 
control room were modeled.  If an action was considered not proceduralized, then the 
action’s HEP was conservatively set to one. Within the CPSES database both 
proceduralized recoveries as well as additional crew were credited.  It is believed that 
this assumption was specifically written to address recoveries within the Pexe. Within Pexe 
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only proceduralized recoveries were credited. Furthermore, the HRA Calculator is setup 
to address only proceduralized recoveries for Pexe. The HRA Calculator requires the user 
to insert a procedure number for every critical action and recovery. The user can not 
proceed without providing this information. The expert’s comments are shown in Table 
24. 
 
Table 24 
Responses to Assumption 14 
 
Response 
• Regardless of whether the actions are performed locally or in the control room, we only take 
credit for proceduralized actions. [This assumption states is only concerned with procedurized 
recoveries not action] 
• Further explanation is needed for this comment. For instance, are the actions outside the control 
room credited? Does the PSA credit non-proceduralized actions outside the main control room? 
• I agree assuming that this does not exclude shift changes, etc. 
• This is a contradiction to assumption 4.  
 
  
 Without further justification on why this assumption was stated one can not draw 
conclusions on how one would render judgments on how to credit proceduralized 
recoveries. The responses to this assumption do show that with one exception the 
reviewers were not looking at the general overview of the assumptions but were more 
specifically concerned with each individual action. Furthermore, Assumption 4 conflicts 
with this assumption. Therefore, it is concluded that engineering judgments about 
crediting only proceduralized steps should be made on a case-by-case bases.   
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Assumption 15 
 This assumption was disregarded from this analysis because it referenced other 
documents used for timing information that were not available for this study.  
 
Assumption 16 
“In applying recovery, moderate dependence is usually assumed when the 
instruction that provides the recovery mechanism for an action is on the 
same page of the procedure as the instructions to perform the action, the 
rationale being that one way to miss a procedural step is to skip a page. 
The equation for conditional probability for moderate dependence from 
THERP Table 20-17 is used.”16 
  
 This assumption was applied to the calculation of Pexe and without having access 
to every page of procedure referenced it is not possible to determine how this 
assumption was consistently applied within the database. The expert’s comments are 
shown in Table 25. 
 
Table 25 
Responses to Assumption 16 
 
Response 
• This is not an assumption that I make. I am not sure that this assumption is logical when viewed 
in terms of an operating crew rather than a single operators. If the procedure has been performed 
many times, then it is very unlikely that the operating crew will not recognize that a whole page 
has been skipped. Note that this assumption contradicts assumption # 1, which implies that the 
procedures are so well known and well practiced that the crew is under very little stress. 
• I would probably not allow page location to hold this much influence over the recovery 
dependency level and do not agree with assigning moderate dependence to recovery just because 
it is on the same page as the initial action step.  
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 Two of the experts disagree while the four others did not comment. This shows 
that there is considerable disagreement on the appropriateness of assigning a moderate 
dependency level based on the page placement of the recovery step.  Therefore, it is 
concluded that engineering judgments about dependency levels for proceduralized 
recoveries should be based on more than page placement of recovery steps.  
 
Assumption 17 
“If the recovery instruction is on a different procedural page, the recovery 
factor used is usually the Error of Omission (EOM) (from Table 20-7) for 
the procedure step.” 16  
 
 This assumption was consistently applied within the analysis. However, for each 
error of omission identified as a recovery the HRA Calculator requires the user to 
identify an associated dependency level. This assumption does not address how the 
dependency level was chosen. One expert commented on this observation as shown in 
Table 26 and Table 27.  
 Since only one response was received, it is implied that it is justifiable to apply 
only an error of omission for a recovery factor if the recovery instruction is on a 
different procedural page.  Due to the lack of responses additional questions about errors 
of omission were asked in Phase II.  
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Table 26 
Response to Assumption 17 
 
Response 
• We do not generally assume zero dependence for recovery instructions, as is implied here.  We 
use a dependency model which is shown in  
• Table 27. 
 
 
Table 27 
Dependency Model Used by One HRA Expert 
 
Dependency Level 
Execution Time Available Definition 
Diagnosis 
Control Room Local 
Very Short  t < 5 min Complete Complete Complete 
Short  5 < t < 15 min High High Complete 
Nominal  15 < t < 60 min Moderate Moderate High 
Long  1 < t < 6 hrs Low Low Moderate 
Very Long  t > 6 hrs Zero Zero Low 
 
Assumption 18  
“In determining the EOM pe values, if the operator action takes place 
within ten procedural steps from the start of the accident sequence, Item 
20-7(1) [short list, with checkoff provisions] from THERP is used. If the 
operator action takes place > 10 steps into the sequence, Item 20-7(2) 
[long list, with checkoff provisions] is used.  Items 20-7(3) and 20-7(4) 
[no checkoff provisions] are usually used when the procedure is not an 
Emergency Operating Procedure.“16   
  
 Table 28 shows that there was disagreement between the two experts. This same 
question was asked again in the Phase II survey.   
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Table 28 
 
Responses to Assumption 18 
 
Response 
• I do not understand this. I think I would analyze the actions in groups that are associated with a 
specific task and done my counting at that level. However, THERP was never intended to analyze 
these types of procedures.  
• I would apply the checkoff provisions based on what is in the procedures.   
  
 
Assumption 19 
“Table 20-13 from THERP is for local manual valve operation. This table 
is also applied to operation of other local components such as switchgear 
breakers and room doors.”16    
  
 No experts commented on this assumption. This assumption was consistently and 
clearly applied within every action. The HRA Calculator does not mathematically 
differentiate between control room and ex-control actions. Additional questions about 
this assumption were asked in the Phase II survey. 
 
Assumption 20  
“Application of stress factors in quantifying human error probabilities 
tends to be quite subjective, and can vary considerably between analyses 
and analysts. For the CPSES HRA, stress is considered objectively in the 
following manner: 
  
a. Stress is implicitly included in the EPRI TR-100259 determination of 
cognitive errors (pc) through some of the selections in the decision trees 
such as workload and the recovery credit; stress is explicitly modeled in 
the determination of the execution errors (pe) (Reference 5) as  
outlined below; 
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b. Optimum stress (x1) is usually used for the pe portion of operator 
actions directed by the "base" emergency procedures. In some cases, such 
as steam generator tube rupture, the stress level is judged to be higher and 
a moderately high stress (x2) is applied; 
 
c. For those operator actions where the operators are following 
instructions  in the Function Restoration (FR) procedures or the 
Emergency  Contingency Action (ECA) procedures, moderately high 
stress (x2) is  applied to pe to reflect the increased stress caused by the 
failure(s) that put  the operators in those procedures; and 
 
d. If operator action is required as a result of subsequent equipment failure 
while in a FR or ECA, extremely high stress (x5) is applied to the pe for 
the additional action. “16 
  
No experts commented on this assumption.  Within the HRA Calculator the user 
must choose a stress level of optimal, moderate or high, and this is the foundation of this 
assumption. In this assumption, the analyst has simply stated how the HRA Calculator 
applies stress within an HEP quantification. Because this assumption is built into the 
HRA Calculator, it was consistently applied within the entire CPSES analysis. It is 
satisfying to identify that experts agree with HRA Calculator, because a disagreement on 
this assumption would be very difficult to compensate for within a calculation. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the approach within the HRA Calculator for assigning 
stress levels is a reasonable application of engineering judgments.   
  
Assumption 21 
“The dependence between elemental human error probabilities in the 
subtasks that make up each pe are handled using the dependency rules in 
THERP (Table 20-17 of Reference 5). For example: If an operator action 
required 2 of 2 manipulations for success within one HEP calculation, pe 
includes HEPs for EOC(1)+ EOC(2). [EOC - Error Of Commission] If an 
operator action required 1 manipulation, with 2 switches available, failure 
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to manipulate the first switch can be recovered by operating the second 
switch: EOC(1) * EOC(2). Consideration must be given that EOC(2) may 
have a link or dependence with EOC(1) based on the time available. A 
similar consideration exists for core damage sequences containing 
multiple operator action failure events. In this case the degree of 
dependence between the events representing different functions (no 
common elements) is determined using the following guidelines: 
 
 a. Two operator action failures separated in time by an essential successful 
 action are regarded as independent. 
 
  b. The time available for most operator actions varies from minutes to hours. The 
  degree of dependence between operator actions is varied accordingly: 
  Time Separation (min.) Dependence 
  0 < t < 15 High 
  15 < t < 30 Moderate 
  30 < t < 60 Low 
  60 < t Zero 
 
 c. Events initiated by the same cue and on parallel success paths are treated 
 as having a common pc element. 
  
 d. Responses to memorized IMMEDIATE ACTION steps are independent 
 of actions taken later in the procedure. Similarly, the IMMEDIATE 
 ACTION steps are independent if they are performed by different crew 
 members. 
  
 e. For cases where an operator action failure significantly reduces the time 
 window for a subsequent operator action, high dependence would be 
 assessed on the second operator action. 
  
 f. For cases where an operator action failure guarantees failure of a 
 subsequent operator action, complete dependence would be assessed.” 16 
 
 From this assumption and comments (See Table 29) the following conclusions 
can be rendered: general engineering judgments about how to assign dependency levels 
should be based upon the recommendations provided by THERP and some type of pre-
determined timing intervals.  
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Table 29 
Responses to Assumption 21 
 
Response 
• These appear to be reasonable guidelines and are things I would consider in a dependency 
analysis; however, I would not explicitly create events for cognitive and execution portions of the 
actions as it is resource intensive and typically does not add a lot of benefit. 
• In response to part a, we take credit for “intervening” successes, but we don’t necessarily assume 
zero dependence. We have created our own, decision tree matrix to model dependencies between 
separate operator actions. 
 
In response to part b, we use the dependency matrix shown in assumption 16 to account for 
dependency within-crew dependency for one action.  
This dependency level differs from that used above and in the current EPRI HRA Method, which 
assigns zero dependence after 1 hour. It was judged that based on the same crew being involved 
in the response until the next shift turn over (6 hours on average), some dependency will most 
likely still be present. Therefore, zero dependence was not assumed until 6 hours. For local 
actions, the level of dependence was increased to the next highest level given the fact that local 
actions are not as easily recoverable due to the limited amount of independent verification, 
additional time required to perform and verify the action, and general lack of direct indication of 
component status.  
 
 
Assumption 22 
“The HRA was conducted using the Emergency Response Guidelines and 
Abnormal Procedures from Unit 1. Discussions with the operators 
indicate the procedures are close enough for Unit 2 that they can be 
assumed to be identical.”16 
 
 No experts commented on this assumption, and it is inferred that they 
unanimously agreed. This assumption appears to be well justified, but only experts that 
have a detailed understanding of both units can comment if this assumption is 
appropriate.  
 
Assumption 23 
“In the quantification of human error probabilities, a lower bound of 1E-5 
was used as the minimum allowed value for single, or combinations of 
multiple, human interactions.” 16 
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 The HRA Calculator applies 1E-5 as a lower bound for final HEP values. The 
HRA Calculator does not set lower bounds for the Pcog portions or the Pexe.  The experts’ 
comments are shown in Table 30, and one can see the variation among experts. Since 
there was disagreement among experts, in the Phase II survey experts were again asked 
questions about lower bounds. 
 
Table 30 
Responses to Assumption 23 
 
Response 
• I have never used any 1E-5 for a single human action. In my long life experience, I cannot even 
come up with a 1E-4 low HEP. 
• 1E-5 might be a bit high for long term actions. I might used 1E-7 for actions over 24 hours. 
• I use a lower bound for 1E-5 for single events and 1E-6 for HRA combinations. 
• The HEP for any individual post-accident action is not allowed to be less than 1E-5. In addition, 
the minimum HEP that I use for the joint probability of multiple post-accident human errors 
occurring in a given accident sequence or cutest was not allowed to be less than 1E-6 due to 
uncertainty associated with determining the actual dependence between multiple operators 
actions and the ability to precisely quantify human performance.  
 
  
 
Assumption 24 
 This assumption was not considered in this study because it references a previous 
PRA analysis and other references not available for use in this study.  
 
Assumption 25  
 This assumption was not considered in this study, because it deals with 
documentation within the PRA model. This was more of a statement about previous 
HRA analyses than an assumption about the current analysis.  
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Assumption 26 
“The default value for time required to manipulate a switch on the control 
board is 3 minutes. This value is used as the minimum time, even if the 
operator stated a shorter time in the operator interviews, required by the 
operator to find and manipulate the switch.” 16 
  
 Within the CPSES analysis three minutes was consistently used as the minimum 
manipulation time.  However, observation of operator interviews consistently shows that 
the operators estimated significantly shorter manipulation times.  This assumption has 
not been justified (especially in conjunction with assumption one) relative to the basis of 
the three minutes. The expert’s comments are shown in Table 31. 
 It is concluded that engineering judgments about assigning a default 
manipulation time are difficult to justify and a better approach would be to evaluate a 
manipulation time for each action. Furthermore, the training and crew experience should 
have some influence on identifying a manipulation time.  
 
Table 31 
Responses to Assumption 26 
 
Response 
• I use two minutes as a default time. However, there are cases (e.g during ATWS events) 
where I take credit for shorter times 
• This assumption is in direct conflict to assumption one. The operating crew is highly 
skilled and experienced. The operators do not have to “find” a control panel switch. 
There minutes is a long time to turn a switch.  
• Three minutes is too long and its use would imply core damage in many short response 
scenarios which are commonly successful in simulator exercises and even in actual 
operations. One minute may be more appropriate and 30 seconds maybe applicable for 
some actions such as stand by liquid control (SLC) injection.  
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Assumption 27 
“The default value for time required to recognize and respond to an 
inidication/annuciator in the control room is 5 minutes. This value is used 
as the minimum time even if the operator stated a shorter time in the 
operator interviews, required by the operator to respond to an 
inidication/annuciator in the control room.“ 16 
  
 In addition to the stated assumption, it should also be added that for actions that 
had less than five minutes available to recognize and to respond only memorized actions 
were credited. If an action requires the use of procedures and less than five minutes are 
available to recognize and to respond, the HEP was conservatively set to one.  
 As in assumption 26, the five minutes was consistently used as the minimum 
response time.  However, observation of operator interviews consistently shows that the 
operators estimated significantly shorter times.  This assumption has not justified 
(especially in conjunction with Assumption 1) the basis of the five minutes. The expert’s 
responses are shown in Table 32. 
 
Table 32 
Responses to Assumption 27 
 
Response 
• This time is also likely too long as this can be nearly instantaneous.  Also, the conditions in the 
control room are so variable that believing we can model the operators’ response times down to 
the time it takes to respond to an annunciator may be a bit dangerous and could mask more 
meaningful contributors.  I would not use this. 
• This assumption could really skew the time based diagnosis from the HCR/ORE methodology.  
We will look at the priorities and what other actions could be required at the same time when 
determining the median response time.  For time critical actions, it is very likely that the median 
response time is 1-2 minutes. 
• We accounted for this time in the overall execution or response time. 
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 In conclusion, engineering judgments about assigning a default response time are 
difficult to justify and a better approach would be to evaluate a response time for each 
action. Furthermore, the training and crew experience should have some influence on 
identifying the response time. 
 
Assumption 28 
“The value used for the dependency in the recovery of an execution error 
was the value determined by the HRA Calculator (i.e. zero, low, medium, 
and high), this is in lieu of any comments made during operator 
interviews.” 16  
  
 For each action analyzed operator interviews were conducted. The 
documented results of the interviews show that dependency in the recovery 
actions was not addressed.  The HRA Calculator assigns a minimum dependency 
level for each recovery action based on the amount of time available. The experts 
comments are shown in Table 33.  
 
Table 33 
Responses to Assumption 28 
 
Response 
• We use the following, as described in the matrix given in Assumption 16  
       [See  
Table 27] 
• The assumption does not mention when recovery credit is taken.  We will normally credit self-
review and other crew review for actions inside the MCR [Main Control Room] (time 
permitting).  However, for actions outside the MCR, we would generally not credit other crew 
review because normally only one crew member would be assigned to perform this task.   
• Factors identified in operator interviews that could impact the assumptions made in the HRA 
analysis should be considered in the assessment of dependence.  That is what the interview is 
for. 
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 From the responses shown in Table 33, it is concluded that engineering 
judgments about how to determine dependency levels should be based upon some 
consistent set of criteria and consideration of the results of the operator interviews. 
These criteria could be given within the HRA Calculator or available within internal 
guidance.  
 
Assumption 29 
 This assumption was not considered in this study because it deals with procedure 
numbering internal to CPSES.  
 
Assumption 30 
“The stress level (optimal, medium, high) was determined during the 
operator interviews and are not annotated in each HFE detailed 
calculation. The stress level was based on time and actions required to 
complete the task.”16 [This assumption is an exception to the default stress 
level chosen in assumption 1] 
 
 
 No comments were received on this assumption.  The use of operator interviews 
was the preferred method for determining the stress level within the CPSES analysis. 
Further questions about stress levels were asked in the Phase II survey.  
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IDENTIFICATION OF TYPES OF JUDGMENTS EACH ASSUMPTION 
ADDRESSES 
 Table 34 gives the assumption number which addresses each area of judgment 
defined in the previous section.  From the expert comments it is observed that the most 
disagreement among HRA analysts is within the judgment categories of Stress, 
Procedures, and Timing Information. While the experts did disagree with several of the 
assumptions directed at judgments made about recoveries within a specific action, it is 
clear from the comments that this group of assumptions were confusing, and it was not 
clear to the reader how they were applied. Without making additional judgments about 
what the intention of the assumption was and how assumptions were actual applied 
further conclusions can not be drawn. The comments the experts provided about 
recoveries within an action show that this area is one that requires several judgments and 
can be challenging to document appropriately. 
 The entire CPSES analysis was completed using the CBDTM Method, and it is 
interesting to note that many of the assumptions made have no influence on this method.  
For example, the only timing information required for the CBDTM method is to answer 
the question: Is there enough time available to complete the action? The HRA 
Calculator, requires the user to enter the manipulation and median response time for 
documentation purposes only.  While the reviewers were probably not aware of this fact, 
they all commented that they would make different assumptions on how to collect this 
information.  The same is true for judgments rendered about stress level. 
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Table 34 
Classification of Assumptions Based on Which Category of Judgment They Address 
Judgment Area Assumption 
 Number 
Comments 
Definition of Critical Actions 11  
Definition of Cognitive Actions  There is no stated assumption about how the 
cognitive actions were defined 
Choice of Methodology 12   The CBDTM method was used for every action 
within the database 
Stress Level 1, 20, 30  
Rule vs Skill  This designation  is not required when using the 
CBDTM method for quantification 
Timing Information  6,  26,  27  
Procedures 3,   9,  13,  
14,  22 
Only  procedurized actions were credited within 
the database 
Human Interaction with 
Hardware 
2 , 8, 17, 18, 
19 
 
Cue 2 Every action within the database was 
diagnosable by a control room indication. 
Training 1 Interviews with the CPSES HRA analyst 
confirmed the following  assumption: The most 
optimistic values for training were always used 
in quantification because operators are perceived 
as highly and well trained 
Recoveries within an action 4, 5, 10, 16, 
21, 28 
 
Review of final HEP  The CPSES HRA  general assumptions did not 
include this type of review. 
 
REVIEW OF SAMPLE CALCULATION USING CBDTM METHOD 
 For the second part of this survey, the experts were asked to review a complete 
HEP calculation within the CPSES HRA database. The action chosen was Feed and 
Bleed with the initiating event of general transient. This action was used as a model 
action, because it was assumed that every expert participating would be familiar with 
this action and may have actually completed an analysis for this action for a different 
plant.  In addition to the complete analysis using the CBDTM method the participants 
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were also provided with the results of the operator interviews and relevant pages of the 
procedures referenced.  
 Of the six experts who responded to the survey two of them choose not to 
comment on this section.  Four responses is not enough data points to draw general 
conclusions on how to render judgments, but their comments do provide insight on 
understanding the use of engineering judgments and what types of things outside 
reviewers identify as questionable uses of engineering judgment. For this section, each 
expert has been assigned an alias of expert A, B, C, or D, and this is helpful in 
understanding the set of comments each expert provided.  
 Before responding to the specific questions about the analysis, two of the experts 
provided general comments shown in Table 35. 
 
Table 35 
General Comments About Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A I could not find the transition into FRH-0.1 in the EOP, I guess because it’s in 
the critical safety function procedure, which was not provided. It seems to me 
that there are two cognitive steps in this HFE. The first is recognizing you have 
to transition to FRH-0.1, and the second, in FRH-0.1 is the initiation of feed and 
bleed (i.e, step10). I think the analysis is focused on the latter and there’s no 
evidence of the former being considered. So my responses are based on that 
interpretation. 
 
Expert B The timing figure shows Tw as 20 minutes, T1/2 as 10 minutes and Tm as 2 
minutes. Based on the operator interviews, I do not see how this was obtained. 
It would seem to me that T1/2 would be 1-2 minutes and Tm would be 2 minutes, 
which would leave 16-17 minutes available for diagnosis. According to the 
figure, only 8 minutes appear to be available for diagnosis. I am assuming that it 
takes about 8 minutes to receive the cue. 
 
One problem I have with the HRA Calculator is that it does not actually 
quantify the PSF identified in the execution errors. Our HRA does explicitly 
quantify PSFs, although not necessarily the one give in the analysis. 
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 Expert A’s interpretation of which cognitive portion of the action is being 
addressed in this analysis is correct.  While not documented in the analysis, interviews 
with the CPSES HRA analyst confirmed this assumption. There was no consideration of 
the transition from the EOP to FRH-0.1.  
 Expert B’s interpretation of the timing information is justified; however, CPSES 
choose to override information provided by the operator interviews in most of their 
analysis. This is one such example, and there is little justification given on why this was 
done.   
 The experts were specifically asked to answer a list of questions about the 
analysis. Below is the set of questions asked and the responses received from the experts 
 
Question 1 
 Question 1: “When completing an HRA analysis do you or your company follow 
a set of guidelines?”  
 
Table 36 
Responses to Question 1 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A Yes, SPAR-H model [This is the NRC Model] 
Expert B Yes, Internal guidance 
Expert C Yes, Internal guidance 
Expert D Yes, IDAC HRA Manual Procedure 
 
 Table 36 shows that there is no one consistent methodology used among the 
experts, because the guidance documents referenced all apply different methodologies.  
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Question 2 
 Question 2: “If possible without doing an independent calculation, what would 
you expect a typical HEP value for this Human Failure Event (HFE) to be? Based on 
your intuition do you agree with the model HEP value?” 
 The responses given in Table 37 show that while every expert had an estimate of 
what a typical result might be, when compared against each other the estimated values 
encompass four orders of magnitude.  The final HEP calculated by CPSES was 1.9E-2 
which falls in the middle of the spectrum. This is important when discussing the use of 
engineering judgment, because in this question all experts were provided with the same 
information, and they all chose to answer the question differently.  
 
Table 37 
Responses to Question 2 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A Something in the range of 1E-3 to 1E-01 
Expert B I would expect the HEP to be in the range of 5E-3 to 2E-2. Therefore, I believe the 
estimation given in the analysis is reasonable. 
Expert C I would normally expect the HEP for Feed and Bleed to be in the range of 1E-2 to 1E-4 
depending on the time available.  However, based on the timeline in this analysis, I would 
expect the HCR/ORE diagnosis to dominate the cause-based diagnosis and the over all HEP 
to be >0.2 
Expert D The main factors contributing to failure of initiating Feed and Bleed, in my opinion, is not 
from wrong diagnosis or execution error but the hesitation of the operators wanting to 
initiate Feed and Bleed due to the system damage would result from such action. In the 
analysis, the operators would take ten minutes to identify the problem and additional two 
minutes to execute the procedures instructions, if the operators decide to do so. There are 
eight minutes available for the operators to deciding whether go for Feed and Bleed, as 
instructed by the procedures, or restoring AFW/MFW to have less system damage.  Based 
on this type of analysis, I would expect a higher HEP and estimated it to be around 1E-1. 
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Questions  3 and 4   
 
 Questions 3: “Are there assumptions within this action that you feel are invalid or 
lacking justification?” Question 4: “If asked to complete an independent analysis, would 
you have chosen to make the same assumptions? Please note your different assumptions 
and justification.” 
 The responses to Question 3 (See Table 38 ) show that with the exception of 
timing information the assumptions are adequately justified and documented. 
Furthermore, the responses to Question 4 (See Table 39) show that even though the 
experts agree on these assumptions, they would have still chosen to make different 
judgments for this same calculation if completing it dependently.   
 
 
Table 38 
Responses to Question 3 of Pilot Study 
 
Response  
Expert A In general, the assumptions seem OK 
Expert B No 
Expert C The timing diagram shows 10 minutes as the median response time and 20 minutes for the 
time window. Neither of these is adequately justified. The operator interviews said 1-2 
minutes for response time. This is consistent with the caution statement in FRH.0.1.B The 
document states that the 20 minute time window comes from MAAP, but does not state 
what the time is based on (eg. Time from low SG level to CD or latest time to open 
PORVs).   
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Table 39 
Responses to Question 4 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert B I would have only taken credit for one recovery step for critical step number 14. I would have 
also used the same stress level throughout the entire execution error. 
Expert C Expert C – I would have chosen a median response time of 1-2 minutes based on the caution 
statement in FRH.0.1B. I would have also addressed the action for different accident scenarios 
rather than picking the most limiting case. 
 
With the assumptions on the timeline, I can not justify the CBDTM Method vs HCR/ORE for 
diagnosis. That is the time considerations will dwarf an causal considerations. 
 
Question 5 
 Question 5: “The methodology chosen for this action was the CBDTM Method. 
In your opinion, is this the best methodology for this action? Other methods available are 
HCR/ORE and THERP.” The responses are shown in Table 40. 
 
Table 40 
Responses to Question 5 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A Of the three methods, I would have chosen this one. 
Expert B I think the use of the CBDTM method was appropriate. 
Expert C I calculate the diagnosis probability using both the HCR/ORE and the CBDTM 
methodology then choose the higher probability of the two. 
Expert D If we assume that the operators follow procedure closely no matter what the situation 
is, the timing becomes the major issue in this case. The HCR would be more 
appropriate for such situations. 
  
As mentioned in Question 2, the main contribution to the HEP is the operators 
decision of not following the EOPs. Among all the methods available  for HEP 
quantifications, currently only expert judgment based HRA methods  could assess 
the values of such HEPs. 
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 Methodology choice is the first judgment an analyst must render in the 
quantification stage. In Question 1, every expert answered that in their calculations they 
currently use a different method. But when asked if the CBDTM method was best choice 
of methods within the HRA Calculator, three out of four experts agreed that this method 
was appropriate. Experts A, B, C are all using either the original CBDTM method or a 
slight variation of this method. Expert D is working on developing new methodologies. 
(See Table 40) Because of their backgrounds it is expected that experts who use this 
method will feel its use was appropriate while others developing new methods would 
choose methods either they developed or apply the same principles of methods they are 
developing.   
 
Questions 6 and 7 
 Question 6: “Do you agree with the critical steps assigned to this action?”  
Question 7: “Would you add or subtract any of the critical steps?” 
 Questions 6 and 7 show the same results as questions 3 and 4. (See Table 41 and 
Table 43) 
The experts tend to agree with the assigned steps, but if they were completing 
this calculation independently they would have rendered other judgments. 
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Table 41 
Responses to Question 6 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A Yes 
Expert B It is not clear to me why resetting the contentment spray signal (Step 17) is a critical 
action and why it can not be recovered 
Expert C Generally I agree.  
 
 
Table 42 
Responses to Question 7 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A  No 
Expert B I would not take credit for both Steps 16 and 18 as recoveries for Step 14. 
Expert D I would suggest adding a step “decision for activating Feed and Bleed either before Step 
11 or Step 19. The added step is only for HRA modeling but is not stated in the EOPs. 
 
Question 8  
 Question 8: “Do you agree with the choices made in the decision trees within the 
CBDTM method?” 
 The scope of this question is rather large, and the experts each commented on 
different judgments rendered within the CBDTM trees. (See Table 43) More specific 
questions about the judgments made within the CBDTM trees were asked in the Phase II 
survey.   
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Table 43 
Response to Question 8 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response     
Expert A Yes 
Expert B For decision tree pcb, (data not attended to), it is not clear what alarm would is present to 
select branch l. It seems branch m is more appropriate. 
Expert C I would disagree on the “check vs monitor” in Pcc. If there is an alarm on low SG level, then 
the crew would respond to start OTC on this signal. 
      I would also disagree on “single vs. multiple” in pce. In most events, the operating crew 
will be suing an EOP and an AOP for determining the diagnosis. Therefore, unless the 
scenario is in the very early stages of the events or very late, then I would say multiple 
procedures are being used.  
      For decision tree pcg, I would probably say that the procedure contains an  “OR” 
statement based on the “OR” statement in Steps 10 and 12. 
 
 
Question 9 
 Question 9: “CPSES has a site policy of self checking. Is this enough 
justification for ALWAYS taking credit for self checking?” 
 Question 9 is directly related to assumption number five and confirms that there 
is controversy among the participating experts about how to apply self checking as a 
recovery factor within the CBDTM Method. (See Table 44)  Within the assumption 
section, this is one of the most strongly stated and consistently applied assumptions 
within the CPSES database. 
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Table 44 
Responses to Question 9 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A I am not sure what self-checking means for monitoring, or for missing a step in the 
procedure, unless there is a mechanism for triggering the checking. I do not think it is 
appropriate to assume this unless a mechanism can be identified. 
Expert B It depends on time available. I think that if self-checking were the only recovery mechanism 
available, the credit should be limited for time-critical actions. However, after 15 minutes, I 
believe the STA and control room supervisor provide better recovery mechanism for control 
room actions.  
Expert C Yes 
Expert D  No, policy is a work statement that might be different from what has really been practiced. 
The performance shaping factors “work/safety” culture is more meaningful since it indicates 
the practice side of policy. 
   
Question 10  
 Question 10 “Do you agree with the choices of THERP values for errors of 
omission and errors of commission? If you disagree, then why and what values would 
you use?”  
 Table 45 shows the responses to Question 10. The responses show a range of 
opinions on how to interpret and to extrapolate the small amount of data presented in the 
THERP tables to calculate Pexe. Additional questions about the interpretation of THERP 
tables were asked in the Phase II survey.  
 The HRA Calculator provides summarized THERP tables and simply requires 
the user to choose a tabulated value. The results of Pexe are then documented in the 
tabulated format.  There is no documentation provided on how the dependencies 
between actions are calculated. Expert D’s comments reflect this idea.  If the intentions 
of the HRA Calculator are to provide a well-documented calculation to reviewers not 
familiar with the HRA Calculator, then this goal has not been achieved.  
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Table 45  
Responses to Question 10 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert B I agree 
Expert C No! First given a successful diagnosis of the need for OTC, there are few if any 
omissions errors that apply. Basically the whole point of OTC is to start the SI 
pumps and open the PORV’s, the operators would not omit these steps. For errors 
of commission, I would pretty much stick to table 20-12. The SI actuation is a 
series of push buttons. Since CPSES is a latter plant, I would assume that the 
control panels have mimic layouts. 
Expert D I am not convinced with these values for the following reasons: 
 
The steps between Step 11 (Actuate SI) and Step 20 (Verify bleed path) are aiming 
the same goal: establishing feed&bleed.  Once feed&bleed is decided, the 
conditional HEPs of the subsequent steps should be much less than their 
independent HEPs.  In other words, the HEPs of subsequent Steps (i.e., Steps 12 to 
20) are highly dependent on the success/failure of Step 11. 
 
The Errors of Commission (EOCs) mentioned in THERP mainly address the EOCs 
induced by attention failure.  The cognition induced EOCs are not addressed.  The 
operators responses in Davis-Besse lost of heat sink incident in 1985  are an 
example.  In this case, the operators decided not to Feed and Bleed the RPV 
[Pressurized Relief Valve]  (i.e., an error of omission) but tried to restore EFW.  
[Emergency Feed Water]  (this activity is hard to be categorized with use of EOO 
and EOC classification since the EOO and EOC classification is system-centered 
rather than human-centered classification).  
 
As I stated in question two, I would assign 1E-1 for EOO of Step 11.  State EOC 
only does not have much meaning.  EOC make sense only it is associated with a 
failure mode. 
 
As for Steps 12 to 20, their basic HEPs are highly dependent on  the success 
or failure of their preceding steps.  The following example calculates EOO of Step 
12, the EOOs of other steps can be calculated by the same manner: 
 
Given: P(Failure of Step 12 | given situation) = 1.3E-3 * 2 = 2.6E-3 
 
Assume: success of Step 12 is highly dependent on the success of Step  11.The 
dependency level is high. 
 
Calculate: 
P(Failure of Step 12 | success of Step 11, given situation) =  
1 - P(Success of Step 12 | success of Step 11, given situation) 
 
P(Success of Step 12 | success of Step 11, given situation) =  
{1 + [1 -P(Failure of Step 12)]}/2 = (2 – 2.6E-3)/2= .9987 
 
P(Failure of Step 12 | success of Step 11, given situation)  
= 1 - P(Success of Step 12 | success of Step 11, given situation) = 1 - .9987= 1.3E-
3 
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Table 45 Continued 
Expert D 
(Continued) 
I agree with the value of the EOC of Step 11 shown in your table; however the 
EOC is only due to attention failure and it does not count cognitive failure.   
 
The EOCs of all other steps (Steps 12 to 20) caused by intention failure can be 
calculated as the same way I calculating the P(Failure of Step 12 | success of Step 
11, given situation) in the example above 
  
Question 11  
 Question 11: “Do you agree with the stress values and how the stress 
performance shaping factors are applied?” 
 As with Assumption 1 there is again little agreement among experts not only on 
what an appropriate choice for stress level should be but also on how to apply stress as a 
PSF. (See Table 46) Further questions about how to determine a stress level were asked 
in the Phase II survey.    
 
Table 46 
Responses to Question 11 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert B No.  The stress factors very from moderate to extreme stress with no explanation for why 
the stress level would be impacted.  Given the failure of AFW, I would assume moderately 
high stress level (just as the operators said).   
Expert C Expert C - No, I believe that the stress level should be high (x5) throughout the entire 
execution error.  As it stands, lower stress levels were assumed for some critical actions.  
As a minimum, the justification for using the lower stress level for certain critical actions 
should be justified in the analysis. 
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Question 12  
 Question 12: “How would you determine if this HEP value is acceptable in terms 
of meeting the needs of the PRA model? What additional information would be needed?  
What other people would need to be included in this discussion?”   
 This question was asked to try to understand how an HRA analyst determines if 
his answer is “correct.” Since there is no physical data for comparison, each expert must 
render judgment on how they justify that their results are complete and will meet the 
needs of the PRA model.  Table 47 shows that each expert rendered judgments on how 
they define acceptable results.  Expert C even commented that he did not know how to 
interpret what “acceptable” was referring to.  
 
Table 47 
Responses to Question 12 of Pilot Survey 
 
Response  
Expert A  I would look at it in relation to the other HEPs and do a comparison based on the 
scenario specific demands, training etc.   To me the absolute value is less important as 
there is a significant uncertainty associated with HEPs, and this would have to be 
addressed when using the PRA. 
Expert B I would compare its relative value with other HEPs in the PRA.  In addition, I would 
compare it to similar HEPs at other plants, including the HEP used in the NRC’s SPAR 
model.  In addition, operators and/or training personnel should review the final results of 
the HRA. In terms of additional information the following would be needed, other PRAs 
or the SPAR model. 
Expert  C I am not sure what you mean by the term “acceptable”.  When I look at the HEPs, I look 
for consistency.  In other words, I would expect that a more difficult action would have a 
higher execution error than a simple action.  Actions that are more time critical will 
generally have a high probability than non-time critical actions.  I also try to be very 
consistent with the cause based determinations.   
 
It is not clear to me what type of walkdowns or control panel reviews or simulator 
reviews were done to support the HEP analysis.  Also, you reference the Reactor Trip 
procedure and the Functional Recovery procedure.  I would also have looked at the Loss 
of Feedwater procedure and any alarm procedures that would cue the operators to the 
loss of AFW (pump trip alarms, low SG alarms, etc.). 
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   It was intended that from the responses to this question, all experts would apply 
the same principles to determining if the results were acceptable. Overall, the three 
comments suggest that HRA analysts would want to compare their final HEP values to 
other results within the same PRA model to produce consistent results.   However, this 
statement is too general, and there needs to be some definition on what specifically to 
compare between HEP values. The comments do provide some ideas such as timing and 
quantifying the same action using a different method.  Question 13 further addresses this 
same issue. Sometimes HRA analysts may “check” the results of an HEP calculation by 
comparing it to historical values, and question 13 was attempting to address this issue.      
 
Question 13 
 Question 13 “Can you determine if the HEP is consistent with historical values 
and/or similar to other NPPs values?  If this value were inconsistent with the historical 
value, would you question and change this analysis in any way?”    
 The comments (See Table 48) show that while experts do make comparison with 
historical values, they all agree that this should be done with caution. 
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Table 48 
Responses to Question 13 of Pilot Survey 
 
Responses  
Expert A I believe it is in the ballpark of other assessments. 
Expert B I would look at it to see if there are any valid reasons why the HEPs are different.  However, 
if the HRA methodologies have changed, this may explain the difference. 
Expert C For some actions you can look at HEPs developed for the IPE or for past generic studies.  
However, you also have to be aware of what types of things are driving your HEP and 
potentially what was driving the HEP in the historical analysis.  I believe that it is much 
more important to be consistent within your PSA.  If the HRAs are consistent within the 
PSA, then if all HEPs are consistently high then the CDF is higher but the system 
importance ranking identifies the most important systems.  With HRA you can always 
second guess the analysis (no matter how well it is documented), but consistency counts. 
 
Again, I am more focused on consistency with other HRAs in the same analysis.  However, 
I would question the value if it were significantly higher or lower than the previous plant 
HRA analysis. 
   
Conclusion 
 From the comments on the sample calculations the following conclusion can be 
drawn. If the calculation is documented appropriately, reviewers of an HEP calculation 
may not question or criticize assumptions made within an analysis, but if personally 
asked to render the same judgment they might use a different approach than was used by 
the analyst.  
 The questions asked in this survey were directed at identifying where judgments 
are made within an analysis, and it was intended that the experts’ responses could be 
used to draw conclusions about how the judgments were rendered.  This survey 
succeeded in identifying judgments; however, with only four complete responses no 
final conclusions can be drawn about how one renders these judgments. Furthermore, the 
questions asked did not address specifically the issue of how judgments were made.  The 
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Phase II survey was created to address specifically the issue of how one renders 
judgments.   
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CHAPTER VII 
PHASE II SURVEY 
 From the results of the Pilot survey the Phase II survey was created. For this 
survey twenty additional HRA analysts were asked to participate, and a total of eleven 
responses were received. Five of the responses were from participants of the Pilot 
survey. Of those who responded four people are currently using the HRA Calculator and 
the seven others are familiar with the methods employed by the HRA Calculator. All of 
the participants have completed numerous HRA analyses and have several years of 
experience.   
 The Pilot survey showed that the questions asked were too specific to the 
example to draw general conclusions. The Phase II survey was broken into small 
sections addressing different areas of judgment. The first section asked general HRA 
questions not specific to a method. The second section contains questions specific to the 
HRA Calculator and the use of the CBDTM Method, Annunciator Response Model and 
the HCR/ORE Correlation. Because most HRA analysts only use one methodology, it 
was expected that no participant would answer every question.   
 The following presents each question asked followed by the responses received.  
The responses are stated exactly as received from the participants, but only the responses 
that address the question in a context relevant to the HRA Calculator are provided. 
Several participants answered questions in relation to other methods not applied by the 
HRA Calculator.  The results from both surveys were used to create recommendations 
on how to render judgments within the HRA Calculator. The complete Phase II survey 
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which includes the introduction and instructions, and sample calculations used for 
reference are included in Appendix C.  The categories in the survey were defined prior 
to defining the areas of judgments (See Chapter III), and there is not always a one-to-one 
correlation between survey sections and identified areas of judgments.  
 
COMPLEXITY OF ACTIONS 
 
Question 1 
 Question 1 “How do you judge whether an action is rule-based, skill-based or 
knowledge based?”  
 Table 49 shows that most analysts follow the THERP definitions for rule-based, 
skill-based or knowledge-based classification (See Chapter VIII). However, they also 
have generalized and created simplified rules for classification such as rule-based = 
training + procedures.   
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Table 49 
 Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey - Complexity of Actions 
 
Responses 
• In skill-based processing there is a close coupling between the sensory input and the response 
action. Actions that are classified as skill-based are typically those that are immediate actions in 
emergency procedures, for which there is extensive training and practice. In essence, the 
operating crew is expected to respond immediately to the available cues for skill-based actions, 
without having to refer to procedures or to discuss the actions extensively with each other.  
  
  
Rule-based cognitive processing is governed by a set of procedures that are expected to be used 
and followed during the event. It is expected that the operating crew is familiar with and has 
practiced the use of the procedures, but not necessarily to the extent that the actions are 
performed by rote. 
    
Knowledge-based processing encompasses actions that may require the  integration of a more 
complex set of indications stemming from multiple equipment failures, particularly unusual 
events, or instrument readings that provide only indirect information regarding plant status. 
Because the specific conditions may not have been anticipated, response is not necessarily 
governed directly by procedures. Instead, the performance of the operating crew may depend 
significantly on their knowledge of the plant design and operating characteristics and their 
ability to apply this knowledge in formulating an appropriate response. 
• I would avoid using time-reliability curves based on the results of the EPRI ORE work, but if I 
were to use one it would be the ORE version, which did not use the skill/rule/knowledge as a 
differentiating parameter.  This is a hold-over from the original HCR, which was not supported 
by the ORE project results.  However, if I were to make such a judgment, it would be based on 
whether the response was skill-of-the-craft (i.e., very practiced and done without need to consult 
procedures) – skill-based, whether the actions were guided by procedure – rule-based, or 
whether there was some thinking to be done – knowledge-based.  While I would not call the 
actions skill- rule- or knowledge-based, I would differentiate between instinctive actions (e.g., 
confirmation of reactor scram), procedure based actions, and potential recovery actions that are 
not procedure based. 
• I follow the guidance in NUREG/CR-1278 (THERP).  I consider knowledge-based actions to 
apply to situations that are to some extent unfamiliar to the operator, either due to lack of 
training or lack of procedures.  Rule-based actions apply to situations where the operator relies 
on procedural guidance for performing a particular action.  It is expected that the operator has at 
least some training on or familiarity with the procedure.  Skill-based actions typically apply to 
actions for which the operator has extensive training or experience.  While the actions are 
usually proceduralized, the operator is capable of performing the required action(s) from 
memory. 
• Judgment. Most actions are procedure-driven, and thus rule-based. Some field actions are 
considered skill-based, as is normally controlling level in RCS  and steam generator. 
Knowledge-based actions are for actions outside normal EOPs. 
• Judgment. Most actions are procedure-driven, and thus rule-based. Some field actions are 
considered skill-based, as is normally controlling level in RCS  and steam generator. 
Knowledge-based actions are for actions outside normal EOPs. 
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Table 49 Continued 
 
• Rule-Based: proceduralized, highly trained, compliance based.  
        Skill-based: proceduralized; habit or stored patterns of pre-programmed instructions. 
Knowledge-based: no procedures, or instructions; highly analytical 
• The line between rule based and skill based is difficult to define and may change between 
operators and/or plants based on training and the content of the procedures.  If an operator is 
considered to have committed a simple step or set of steps to memory, then I might consider it a 
skill based action (maybe putting the mode switch in shutdown, for example).  Other 
proceduralized actions I would mostly define as rule based actions.  Knowledge based actions I 
tend to think of as those actions that require the operators to interpret symptoms of the plant and 
determine the correct course of action.  With the advent of symptom based EOPs, the 
knowledge based actions that might be analyzed in a PRA are, in my opinion, not very common 
because the procedures tend to address the interpretation. 
• Actions directed by procedure are typically considered to be rule based. These are typically 
actions that are pertinent to the cognitive portion of the analysis. Actions directed by verbal 
communication, such as to an operator in the field, or execution type actions, such as opening a 
valve, starting a pump, etc are considered to be skill based. Cognitive actions without specific 
procedural direction are knowledge based. In general, we would consider all troubleshooting 
type actions, or infrequent evolutions requiring a number of steps without procedural guidance, 
to be knowledge based. 
• Rule-based: Completion of a task requires the operator to follow written procedures.  The 
operator knows the general guidance or direction of the procedures but not to the specific details 
such as all the procedural steps in their exact sequential order 
 
Skill-based: the operating procedure of a task is familiar to the operator.  Without the help of 
written instruction, the operator can comfortably complete the task.  Completing a task by 
reciting the procedure steps which are familiar to the operator also counted as skill-based. 
 
Knowledge-based: there are no written procedures/instructions nor formulated solution to 
complete a task.  The operator has to rely on his/her engineering knowledge and system-specific 
knowledge to act on the task. 
• Rule-Based=procedure+training.  
       Skill-Based=procedure+training+frequent practice 
       Knowledge-based=No procedure, only training for qualification exam and college 
• When the required action is specially stated in the procedure and the operator has enough time 
to follow the procedure, I would consider it as Rule-based.  When the operator required an 
immediate action (such as manually tripping the reactor during ATWS event) prior to follow the 
procedure, I would consider it as Skill-based.  When the action is not specially stated in the 
procedure, I would consider it as Knowledge based. 
• I consider that all proceduralized actions are rule-based.  
• When the required action is specially stated in the procedure and the operator has enough time 
to follow the procedure, I would consider it as Rule-based.  When the operator required an 
immediate action (such as manually tripping the reactor during ATWS event) prior to follow the 
procedure, I would consider it as Skill-based.  When the action is not specially stated in the 
procedure, I would consider it as Knowledge based. 
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Question 2 
 Question 2 “Do you use this type of designation in your HEP calculations? If so, 
how is this information used?”  
 The responses can be grouped into three categories as shown in Table 50. Some 
analysts do use this type of designation directly in their HEP calculations and apply it 
within the use of time reliability curves. Others feel that this information is useful in 
understanding the action and should have some implicit effect such as skill-based actions 
should have lower stress values that other knowledge-based actions or less recovery is 
applied for knowledge-based actions. The third group of participants agree that this 
classification is not used in any form within their calculations and do not bother to 
classify actions in this manner. 
 
Table 50 
 Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey - Complexity of Actions. 
Response 
• Yes, the HCR model is based on a time-reliability correlation for crew response. The correlation 
was evaluated separately for three different types of cognitive processing: skill-based, rule-
based, and knowledge-based. 
• Yes. It is useful to document the analyst’s thoughts and views of the action. It does not have a 
direct quantitative effect, however there may be specific cases where the information may be 
used to override an HRA calculator default or value. These cases would typically be those where 
we feel that we have significantly more uncertainty than is typical. 
• Yes, this information used during the procedure step review. 
• No, not explicitly 
• I do not use the designation of rule-based, skill-based and knowledge-based explicitly in the 
HRA.  However, they are implicitly considered.  For example, in general we only take credit for 
actions that are proceduralized.  As such, knowledge-based actions are typically not credited.  
Instead of designating actions as either skill-based or rule-based, we categorize them based on 
amount of training and/or experience the operators have with the particular action.  We assign 
levels of high, nominal or low to represent the amount of training/experience on a particular 
action, with corresponding multipliers of 0.5, 1 and 3, respectively.  (These multipliers are 
consistent with those used in the NRC’s SPAR-H Method). 
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Table 50 Continued 
 
• Indirectly. Less recovery for knowledge based actions.  
• Qualitatively it appears that skill-based would have the lowest probability of failure; followed by 
rule-based, and then knowledge-based.   
• No, the skill, rule, or knowledge-based classification is still too high level to assess HEPs of 
variant types of tasks in different industries. 
• I do not use the skill/rule/knowledge based distinctions in my HRA evaluations. 
 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “To what extent do you think the designation between rule-based, 
skill-based, or knowledge-based actions influences your HEP calculations?” Based on 
the responses to Question 3 shown in Fig. 13 it is concluded that this designation should 
influence the HEP calculations.  
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Fig.  13. Participants Opinions on How the Classification on the Complexity of 
the Action Affects Overall HEP. 
 
Question 4 
 Question 4: “Do you think your answer to Question 3 is different for different 
methodologies? If so how? “ 
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  The responses to Question 4 (See Table 51) show that there is large 
disagreement about how the classification should affect the calculations. Again, most 
participants agree that judgments about the classification of the actions should affect the 
results of the calculations. The original intent of this question was to identify if one 
would use different parameters when classifying the actions. Other than the simple No 
responses, the participants did not consider the question in this context.  
 
Table 51 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey - Complexity of Actions 
Response 
• No [5 participants] 
• Only to the extent that I would differentiate between, instinctive, procedure driven and non-
procedure driven recovery actions. However, I would be using different HRA methods for each 
category, not shifting a parameter within a TRC. 
• Our approach is identical to that used in the SPAR-H Method, but probably differs from other 
methodologies.  In fact, some HRA methods may not even quantitatively account for these 
designations. 
• My understanding is some of the methodologies were based explicitly on the rule, others more 
implicitly or use other variables which are related to these three different factors.   
• It depends on whether the methodology specifies that the distinction must be used as an important 
characteristic of the action’s definition and quantification.  If it is an integral part of the 
methodology, then I would use it, but I don’t think I would rely on a methodology that required 
the use of this characteristic. 
• Certainly!   Surgery operation is skill-based task; answering the midterm examine questions are 
mostly knowledge-based activities; and setting up a newly purchased equipment is mostly 
procedure-based activities.   The skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based activities are not 
usually the dominant factors affecting HEPs. 
• Some methodologies do try to account for the use of skill, rule and knowledge-based actions. For 
example I used it in the construction of the HCR approach.  
 
Conclusion 
 When rendering engineering judgments on how to assign a complexity level 
analysts tend to formulate simple guidelines (unique to each analyst) based upon the 
complex THERP definitions.  The classification should have some implicit effect on the 
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calculation if the methodology does not use this parameter within the numerical 
algorithms. The responses to the questions in this section show that all analysts agree 
that this parameter is important to several different portions of the analysis such as 
methodology development, timing, stress, training, and review of the final HEP.   
 
STRESS LEVEL 
 
Question 1   
 Question 1: “How do you determine stress level for an action?” 
  The responses show (See Table 52) that there is no common approach to 
determining a stress level. Furthermore, the same levels for stress are being used in 
entirely different contexts. For example, the HRA Calculator uses low, moderate, or high 
stress, and many of the participants have defined their levels differently. From the 
responses there are four re-occurring parameters used by experts: operator interviews, 
time, workload, and consequences of the action the crew fails.   
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Table 52 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Stress Level 
 
Response 
• Operator interviews [2 responses] 
• Indirectly through consideration of complexity, time constraints, workload (I used the CBDTM 
Method for the cognitive element and that was constructed to focus on factors a PRA analyst 
might be able to address, without being an amateur psychologist). 
• We classify stress as being in one of three levels: nominal, high and extreme.  An extreme stress 
level is disruptive to the point where performance of most people will deteriorate drastically.  
Extreme stress is likely to occur when the onset of the stressor is sudden and the duration of the 
stressing situation is long.  This level of stress is also associated with the feeling of threat to 
one’s physical or emotional well-being.  An example of an extreme stress situation is one 
involving catastrophic failures that have the potential for radioactive release.  A high stress 
level is considered to be higher than nominal.  Examples include the presence of multiple 
instruments and annunciator alarms at the same time and unexpectedly; loud and continuous 
noise which impacts the ability to focus on the assigned task; or the consequences of the task 
represent a threat to plant safety.  A nominal stress level is conducive to good performance. 
• Judgmentally. Bases on combinations of perceived time, complexity of sequence, consequences 
of the actions, expected frequency of the sequence… I start with moderate stress for accident 
responses actions and upgrade (to high) or downgrade (to low) only if there is a good case.  
• Time available, and perceived consequences of the failures to accomplish something, and 
familiarity with the situation.  
• I typically use a time reliability correlation to account for the stress factors as it usually captures 
important stress issues.  For instance, containment failure is a potentially disastrous 
consequence which could threaten the lives of plant personnel and the general public, but the 
long time that is generally available to mitigate the conditions that are causing the containment 
challenge would reduce the stress for completing that action.  I think time stress overrides 
consequence stress in most cases.  If I were forced to apply stress levels, I suppose that 
imminent core damage with limited time available would be extreme or threat stress, high stress 
when multiple emergency systems have failed but core damage is not imminent, moderate 
stress for other accident conditions, and low stress for actions a reactor trip situation when all 
systems are operating properly.  That’s a pretty simplified approach, but I would view a more 
detailed approach as limited in benefit due to the fact that the assignment of stress levels will 
always need to be subjective to address all potential scenarios.  A cookbook method is difficult 
to apply. 
• With great difficulty and much discussion. Seriously, this is considered to be one of our most 
difficult steps of the analysis. The stress level affects the quantitative result within the HRA 
calculator and the typical sources are not particularly satisfying regarding guidance. We tend to 
shade to Moderate stress more frequently than the HRA Calculator would recommend. This 
most often happens for actions that are occur during events where a number of things are 
simultaneously changing in both the primary and secondary parts of the plant, or for loss of 
power scenarios. 
• Two ways: First, direct assessment by experts or interviewing operators.  Second, calculate 
stress as function of other directly assessable PSFs (e.g., whether reactor tripped, alarms 
activation state, severity of the situation)   
• Guidance in NUREG 1278. Response to an evolving accident leads to MODERATE stress, if 
operator is under threat of loosing control (no response to prior actions, or additional events), 
then EXTREME stress is applied. 
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Question 2 
 Question 2: “Suppose during operator interviews that the operators conclude that 
the action is low stress but you believe the action is high stress, how do you determine a 
stress level?” 
 Table 53 shows that this scenario does occur in HEP calculations and that 
analysts have pre-constructed solutions to this problem. The simplest way to 
acknowledge this disagreement is not to ask operators. However, these three responses 
came from participants that all had over twenty years of experience.  The least 
experienced analysts both commented that they would defer to operators. Applying 
weighting factors would be another approach, but it does place more subjectivity on how 
to weight each response, and there will be variation among analysts.  
   
Table 53 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – Stress Level 
 
Response 
• I would defer to operators as being most knowledgeable. 
• I would explain to the operator the criteria described above for classifying stress levels.  
Beyond that, I would generally defer to the operator’s opinion. 
• I would pick the high stress.  I would also write a justification to document why I picked 
the high stress level. 
• I do not ask the operator about potential stress level. It is not possible to simulate stress 
level at the Simulator. Instead, I use my own consistent judgment i.a.w. the pre-
established guidelines. Later, I review all HRA for consistency of assumed stress levels. 
• If operators and trainers agreed unanimously for low stress, I would likely make it 
nominal stress. 
• I probably would use nominal, which average out the differences. Alternatively, I would 
interview additional personnel to see whether there are other factors not captured in the 
first interview.  
• Provide appropriate weight factors to the operator’s assessment and my assessment to 
obtain a combined result. 
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Table 53 Continued 
 
• I would not ask directly about stress, but focus on the indirect measures above, which are 
somewhat more objective.   
• After 20 years of daily contact with operators, including interviews, I have concluded that 
interviews have limited value. Every operator is unique and every interview depends on 
the immediate context of the interview (your relationship with the operator, is the operator 
having a “good” day, is the operator interested in the review, etc). Further, in matters like 
these, operators tend to react like fighter pilots, i.e. they tend to label everything as low 
stress. I rely more on my view of the context of the action/event and any observations I 
have made on the simulator or the infrequent real event. 
• The best way to proceed if you disagree with an expert’s (operator) opinion is to try to 
observe crews at work on the simulator for a similar accident.  
 
 In summary there were four different types of response to this question: 1) 
simply defer to operators’ opinions, 2) use the level determined by the HRA analyst, 3) 
apply even more subjective judgments and apply weighting factors, and 4) do not ask 
operators for stress levels but instead focus on indirect measurements or observations in 
the simulator. 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “To what extent do you think the stress level choice influences your 
HEP calculations?” 
 The responses to this question are shown in Fig. 14, and the results show that 
most analysts consider stress to have a some impact on the HEP calculation. 
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Fig.  14.  Participants Opinions on How Stress Influences HEP Calculations. 
 
Question 4 
 Question 4 “Do you think your answer to Question 3 is different for different 
methodologies? If so how?” 
 Five participants responded with a simple No response, but an equal number 
responded that they do think stress level influences the calculations differently 
depending on methodology. (See Table 54)  If one actually considers several different 
HRA methods available for quantification, it is easy to reach the conclusion that stress is 
treated differently by different methods. However, this study is only considering 
analytical methods applied by the HRA Calculator, and four out of the five participants 
who responded No are current users of the HRA Calculator.  This is most likely because 
the stress level is asked for as low, moderate, or high, and the same PSF value is used 
regardless of which method is used to calculate Pcog. It is therefore, concluded that a 
consistent PSF value is more important than the classification.     
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Table 54 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey – Stress Level 
Response 
• No [5 responses] 
• Yes, because in CBDTM, the question about “stress” are asked differently than they are in 
THERP 
• I think that the choice of stress levels in other methodologies has an appreciable cumulative 
impact on the HEPs, especially in terms of execution errors. 
• My understanding is some of the methodologies considered explicitly the stress, others may 
use other variables which are related to the stress factors.   
• The use of stress could vary depending on the methodologies used, but I don’t use many 
methodologies and don’t have the insight as to how the use of stress might change. 
• Yes, depend on the context stress is not always a dominant factor.  Other factors (e.g., 
fatigue, biased mind) have superior influence than stress in some situations. 
• Yes, for example HCR does not consider stress. 
  
Question 5 
 Question 5: “When calculating Pexe  (using the HRA Calculator) is it better to 
maintain a constant stress level for all critical actions or vary the stress level between 
actions? Table C-2  and Table C-3 show both scenarios for the Feed and Bleed Action 
used in the Phase I Survey.” 
 There were three different opinions on how to handle this situation (See Table 
55).  First, four participants agree that they would generally maintain a constant stress 
level. Second, four analysts stated that they would attempt to quantify the action as 
accurately as possible and, therefore, they would vary the stress level among critical 
actions. The third approach used by three analysts is to use a different methodology 
approach or to analyze in the action in more detail than applied by the HRA Calculator.  
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Table 55 
Responses to Question 5 of Phase II Survey – Stress Level 
Response 
• Maintain constant stress level unless involving different people in different environments. 
• I would use the same stress value for all critical actions.  I couldn’t see a basis for me, as an 
HRA analyst, rather than a psychologist, to make any distinction. 
• I would apply a constant stress level for all of the subtasks within an action.  There are a 
couple of reasons for this.  The first is that the resources available for HRA are limited and 
applying stress on a subtask level can be time consuming.  The second is that is not clear 
that the additional rigor makes the answers any better.  Step based stress assignments are 
even more subjective than one for the overall action and an additional layer of guesses does 
not imply a more accurate answer. 
• Largely same stress levels. When reactor operator request an action outside the control room 
by someone else, that other person will be assigned OPTIMAL stress level. 
• I think it is better to quantify HEPs as accurately as possible.  Therefore, if the stress level 
varies between tasks for a specific action, it should be modeled as such.  Having said that, I 
do not believe in practice that the stress level will vary frequently between tasks for a given 
action. 
• I am not sure without doing a more detailed sensitivity studies. My intuition argues for both 
cases, depending on the different understanding and the plant scenarios of interest.  
• Vary stress level only if there is a clear justification. It makes sense that the first step in the 
example might have higher stress than subsequence actions. 
• I believe the stress level should reflect the specific action to the extent possible. Otherwise, 
may make it difficult to see differences between actions. We are always trying to reduce the 
subjectivity, but we should be cautious about arbitrary choices during analysis. Our overall 
objective is consistent application of the methodology so as to better be able to see 
differences between various actions. Please note that I believe there is a significant 
difference between consistent action and arbitrary action. 
• Since the success of some steps within the procedure are more important then the others, I 
think the stress level should be vary based on the critical actions. 
• It depends on the duration of the task.  For the feed-and-bleed scenario, I would use 
constant pressure level. 
• The problem with the table is that it does not deal with the context within which the 
assessment is being made.  The approach is typical of Swain’s approach in breaking down 
tasks into sub-elements and then trying to quantify them and then attempting to account for 
context by using nominal PSFs.  Based purely workload considerations I would say that 
most of the actions are low workload since they involve the operation of a small number of 
switches in readily available locations.  Establishing N2 and Instrument air could be 
difficult based on where the various stations in the MCR  [Main Control Room] or outside 
in the Aux room.  In the case of errors of commission, I would say the importance of the 
actions, in sense of core damage frequency, will determine what will even be looked at.  If 
it is looked at then I am not sure that individual steps are looked at in this manner.  Again 
we are back to the Swain way of looking at things, piecemeal.  More modern approaches 
deal with the whole response of the crews to an accident.  As for the Table C-3 a & b, the 
same comments hold. 
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 In general, the participants were equally split on whether it was appropriate to 
vary the stress levels among actions. In the Pilot Survey only one participant identified 
the variation in stress levels between critical actions. It was anticipated that with this 
question there would be strong agreement among participants; however, this was not the 
case. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Engineering judgments about stress should be considered on an individual bases 
and no “cookbook” formula can be applied. When determining a stress level analysts do 
generally consider the following: operator interviews, time, workload, and consequences 
of the action if the crew fails. This is shown both in the survey responses and the CPSES 
HRA (See Chapter III).  In addition, HRA analysts are using the same classifications in 
different contexts, so it is better to determine the PSF value as opposed to a level such as 
low, moderate or high.   
 To avoid rendering inconsistent engineering judgments during operator 
interviews analysts tend to have pre-constructed solutions about how to handle 
disagreement. For example, the CPSES HRA conducted operator interviews and chose 
to always defer to operators opinions when there was a disagreement about stress levels. 
However, the survey responses show that the more experienced the analysts, the less 
weight they place on the operator’s responses to stress level.  
 Engineering judgments made about varying the stress level between critical 
actions are difficult to justify if the action is completed by the same person in the same 
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location. Therefore, the engineering judgment should be based on what level of detail is 
necessary for the analysis. In some instances this would be a time consuming task that 
would not impact the results, and in other cases, this level of detail is a requirement.  
One example, where analysts would want to apply additional detail to the calculations 
could be for actions that are high stress and T1/2 is less than 5 minutes. In these types of 
actions the results of the CBDTM Method and the HCR/ORE Correlation can vary by 
orders of magnitude.      
 
TRAINING 
 
Question 1 
 
 Question 1 “Do you differentiate between simulator training vs. classroom 
training in HEP calculations? If so, how is this used in your calculations?” 
  The current configuration of the HRA Calculator does not differentiate between 
simulator and classroom training, but it does ask the analyst to identify the different 
types of training for documentation purposes.  Two participants responded with a simple 
no response, and three responded that they do not differentiate between types of training 
directly.  
 Four participants responded that they do differentiate among training types. In 
general they do this either within the design of the methodology, such as CBDTM 
Method asks the analyst to differentiate between training and actually practicing the 
action, or using a larger sigma within the HCR/ORE Correlation for classroom training 
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compared to simulator training. Table 56 shows the complete set of responses. This 
shows that if an analyst chooses to differentiate between simulator and classroom 
training, this is typically done as prescribed within the methodology or implicitly used to 
determine other parameters. However, half the participants do not differentiate between 
training types, and it is implied that this is because the methodology they use does not 
directly specify this task. 
 
Table 56 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Training 
 
Response 
• No [2 Responses] 
• I would question the relevance and amount of the training more than whether it was simulator or 
classroom as far as the cognitive element is concerned.  However, my bias would be that 
classroom training would not be as effective, particularly for actions like venting a containment.  
• When I refer to the amount of training on a particular action as being high, nominal or low, I do 
not generally differentiate between classroom training and simulator training, although both types 
are usually included for most actions credited in the PSA.  Note that some actions credited in the 
PSA are performed locally at the equipment.  As such, simulator exercises are of little use.  
However, such actions typically have corresponding Job Performance Measures (JPMs) which 
have the operators simulate the actions. 
• Only indirectly – use a larger sigma for classroom training to account for larger spread in timing.  
• The Cause-Based Method includes consideration for training on steps and for actually practicing 
the actions.  I use these features to account for training and practice. 
• Yes. Not generally used in calculation, however this may be a consideration for determination of 
stress level. 
• Yes, I believe most simulator training would include classroom training subjects (such as EOP 
response from the control room).  However, classroom training can also included local actions or 
recovery actions from different alternatives.   
• Yes, I introduce training as a heading in the HDT formulation.  I then use training quality as a 
measure within the training heading.  Exposure to training on the simulator is obviously of a 
higher value than classroom training particularly if data is collected and analyzed.   
• It appears to me simulator training would carry more weight; due to the premium demand on the 
simulator, a surrogate of interviewing simulator instructors appears to be the most pragmatic way 
of getting the information. It is recognized, however, that simulator instructor may be somewhat 
biased in his understanding of the scenarios and experience. Most of the simulator instructors still 
have the design basis mentality, i.e., assume multiple failures and worst case scenarios rather than 
considering the scenarios on a cutset-by-cutset  basis. 
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Question 2  
  Question 2: “To what extent do you think training influences your HEP 
calculations?”   
  The responses show that most analysts consider that the parameter of training 
should have some effect on the HEP calculation.  (See Fig. 15)  
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Fig.  15 Participants Opinions on How Training Influences HEP Calculations 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “Do you think your answer to Question 2 is different for different 
methodologies? If so how?”   
  Six of the participants agree training has the same influence regardless of which 
methodology is used. (See Table 57). Only one participant thinks training will influence 
the results differently between different methods, and his response is more convincing 
than a simple No response.  The section “Choice of Methodology” further addresses 
questions related to different results from different methods.   
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Table 57 
Responses to Question 3of Phase II Survey – Training 
 
Response 
• No (5 responses) 
• No, I don’t think training would change its significance in different HRA methods.  
However, I see the training and the products of training (e.g., knowledge, experience, and 
skills) are as a whole. 
• I think that the training influences are different among methodologies for numerous 
reasons.  First, not all methodologies may even quantify the impact of training.  The HRA 
Calculator, for example, does not quantitatively account for the training influence.  Our 
HRA methodology, although based on the EPRI HRA Method, quantitatively assesses the 
impact of performance shaping factors (PSFs) such as training using an approach similar 
to the one contained in the NRC’s SPAR-H Method.  Second, the adjustment factors for 
HRA methods that do quantitatively account for training may not be the same.  Lastly, 
even for those HRA methods that use the same adjustment factors, the criteria for 
designating the level of training (e.g., high, nominal, or low) may be different. 
• I do not know enough to say how other methodologies might weight training, but I could 
not analyze it in much more detail than I do now with my current background. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 When rendering engineering judgments about how training influences HEP 
calculations analysts consider what type of training operators receive (classroom vs 
simulator) either implicitly by incorporating this information into other parameters or 
following the use prescribed by the methodology.  With one exception when rendering 
engineering judgments about methodology choice analysts do not consider how the 
parameter of training can vary among methods.  
 
TIMING  
 
Question 1 
 Question 1: “How would you calculate/determine Tsw?”  
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 The participants agreed that they would use some type of thermal-hydraulic 
model based around the success criteria to obtain Tsw. However in addition they also use 
other sources including: operator interviews, manufacturers’ recommendations, and the 
FSAR. (See Table 58)  
 
Table 58 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Timing Information  
 
Response 
• Engineering Analysis.. Thermal Hydraulic models such as MAAP would be used for time to 
core melt calculations; engineering calculations would be used for items such as time to drain a 
tank; manufacturer recommendation/judgment may be used for items such as the time a pump 
can operate in a degraded condition (i.e., insufficient NPSH [Net Positive Suction Head]) before 
damage occurs. 
• I would calculate Tsw from the time that the event occurs to the latest time at which an action 
must be completed in order to prevent an irreversible state, which is not always equivalent to 
core damage.  For example, if core damage occurs in 6 hours but the pumps that are required to 
prevent core damage cavitate at 2 hours, our value of Tsw would be 2 hours (not 6 hours). 
• T-H [Thermal-hydraulics] analysis using MAAP or other simplified scoping analysis based on 
information from FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]  or accident analysis done for success 
criteria determination.  
• The reference sources or calculation methods for Tsw are determined by the action and its 
success criteria.  Sometimes that means that thermal hydraulic analyses are the appropriate 
bases while in other cases hand calculations may be more appropriate.  In certain cases, there is 
no easy way to determine Tsw and judgment is required.  In those cases, I have tried to obtain 
system engineer input, but sometimes, it is up to the HRA analyst to estimate it based on his or 
her judgment (last resort). 
• By plant specific analysis whenever possible (preferred). Otherwise, analysis from a similar 
design, or finally best estimate, provided that timing is not critical. If timing is critical, one had 
better use analysis (otherwise the NRC will use 1E-01). 
• It depends on the system failure criteria set for the task.  TSW is the time lapse between the 
initiating event and the system failure state reached assuming that there is no operators’ 
intervention on the system state.  
• Use of Code MAAP4, use of owners’ group analyses, interview operators or ops training 
personnel 
• Most of them by MAAP analyses.  Some based from the WCAP [Westinghouse Topical 
Report], plant specific calculation results.  If none of them available, would use operator inputs 
or simulator times. 
• The time window is usually defined by carrying out transient analyses.  Even a simulator could 
be used for these purposes if the plant models are reasonably accurate. 
• Typically from thermal-hydraulic calculations 
• MAAP Calculations, hand calcs, or estimates. 
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Question 2 
 Question 2: “How would you calculate/determine TM?”  
 From these responses (See Table 59) it is observed that there are three general 
ways in which analysts obtain this data: Interviews of either operators or simulator 
instructors, Job Performance Measurements (JPM), and actual observation of the action. 
If none of these sources are available, then the analyst could use data provided by 
THERP or ASEP, but these are used with caution because they tend to be overly 
conservative.   
 
Table 59 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – Timing Information 
 
Responses 
• Timing information from Operation's records.  Individual execution tasks are periodically trained on... 
these tasks are timed and recorded (Job Performance Measures). 
• Maybe from JPM or from simulator exercises. 
• I would estimate Tm as the time required to complete the action as measured from the start of the 
response. 
• Observations of crew during simulator scenarios, estimates from observations of similar actions.  
• Discussion with simulator instructor or actual simulator runs if available; some bounding values based 
on judgment.  
• The means of obtaining an action’s manipulation time is also dependent on the action itself.  If it is 
one that is practiced in a simulator and time permits a simulator observation, then the action can be 
timed.  Walk-downs are also a means of determining manipulation times.  Job Performance Measures 
are guidelines that plants keep as part of the operator training program and they are sometimes helpful 
in obtaining times.  Operator interviews can be used, but THERP suggests double any operator 
estimate, which can yield overly conservative results.  As a last resort, the time can be estimated by 
the HRA analyst using a consistent set of rules such as those provided in ASEP. 
• Observation of actual action. Interviews and table tops are not reliable. 
• From experiments (e.g., simulator exercises) or field data 
• Conservative estimate + interview Ops Training personnel 
• Almost all of these manipulation timing are from the operator inputs.  Very little from calculation 
results or assumptions. 
• Tm can be estimated by experts or just run the simulator. 
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Question 3 
 Question 3: “How would you calculate/determine T1/2?” 
  The responses to this question were similar to Question 2 and the same 
conclusions about Question 2 apply. (See Table 60) 
 
Table 60 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey – Timing Information 
 
Response 
• Operator interviews or simulator data 
• Simulator exercises if available, but only if forced to use the HCR.  I would avoid it.  
• I would determine T1/2 as the time to begin the response starting from the time the cue is 
received.  In terms of where to get this information, simulator exercises would be the preferable 
choice.  However, since it is not always practical or possible to get these times from simulator 
exercises, other options would be talk-throughs with operators or training personnel, walk-
throughs of the procedures or walkdowns of the actions. 
• For some actions actual simulator timing data is available. For others, estimates based on some 
timing observations of how long it takes to process through EOPS. 
• Discussion with simulator instructor or actual simulator runs if available; some bounding values 
based on judgment.    
• I calculate the diagnosis time by taking the time from the cue to the irreversible end state and 
subtracting the manipulation time from it.  I think this is not technically the same as the median 
response time. 
• I calculate the diagnosis time by taking the time from the cue to the irreversible end state and 
subtracting the manipulation time from it.  I think this is not technically the same as the median 
response time. 
• TSW  - (Tdelay + TM). The critical determination is when diagnosis stops and manipulation begins. 
Our practice defines this as the point in the procedure where the Operator has arrived at the most 
critical step. 
• From experiments (e.g., simulator exercises) or field data.  
• Conservative estimate + interview Ops Training personnel 
• Again, almost all of these median response timing are from the operator inputs.  Very little from 
calculation results or assumptions. 
• T1/2 can be obtained from simulator results and this is easy if the simulator group keeps good 
records, otherwise one can use expert judgment. 
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Question 4 
 Question 4: “Do you believe that it is necessary to document all timing 
information (See Fig. C-5) even if the method you are using for your HEP calculation 
does not require this information? For example, the CBDTM method only requires the 
analyst to determine if there is enough time available to complete the action, or the 
Annunciator Response Model is independent of timing.” 
 Two participants responded with a simple no response. Eight others responded 
that all information should be gathered regardless of what is input into the calculations, 
because it is important for documentation, and it is necessary to understand all aspects of 
the action modeled. (See Table 61)  It is concluded that all timing information asked for 
by the HRA Calculator should be input regardless of which methodology is used. 
 
Table 61 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey – Timing Information 
 
Response 
• No [2 Responses} 
• It is very important to have estimates of the system time window, the time of the cues, an 
estimate of the time it takes to get through the procedure to the appropriate step(s), and an 
estimate of the time to completion for the CBDTM, as this is necessary to determine (a) whether 
the action is feasible, and (b) whether there is time for recovery. 
• I believe that the timing information (Tsw, Tm and T1/2) should be documented as part of the 
HRA. 
• It is important to evaluate both cause-based and time-based method for all actions unless there is 
a large amount of time available for simple actions (Ie. Clearly not time-based) 
• Yes; they seem to represent key information that may provide a good benchmark of factors 
affecting the HEP. For us, since we are using the maximum of the two or three applicable 
methods, the questions is moot; we have to compile these for TRC/HRE by default 
• Including the timing information as part of an action’s definition and if time permits, it should 
be done.  Given that resources are not always available to document issues that are not used in 
the quantification, it does not have to be done to allow a reviewer to reproduce the results. 
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Table 61 Continued 
 
• Absolutely! The credibility and validity of the analysis will depend on the scrutability of each 
HRA. 
• I don’t think it is necessary.  Such detailed classification on timing window provides the things 
need to be considered for assessing time sufficiency.  Collecting each segment of time for all 
tasks is only useful for certain type of tasks. 
• YEA!. A traceable record is documented. 
• Yes, many of the successful actions depended on the operator response timing.  Proper 
documentation will ensure the bases for the critical time response action are justified. 
 
Question 5    
 Question 5: “Is your decision about how to collect timing affected by your choice 
of methodology?” 
 Five participants responded with a simple yes, and three participants responded 
with a simple no. The others (with one exception), agree that under certain 
circumstances the method by which the timing information is collected is affected by 
their methodology choice. Although there is some disagreement in the responses to this 
question, most state that there is a correlation between judgments on how timing 
information is collected and methodology choice.  (See Table 62)  
 
Table 62 
Responses to Question 5 of Phase II Survey – Timing Information 
 
Response 
• No [3 responses] 
• Yes [5 responses] 
• Yes.  While we may effectively discuss T1/2 and Tm in our HRA, we do not actually 
separate the two for quantification.   
• Yes. At the risk of not doing what I am preaching in question 17 above; we may not 
collect certain timing information if it is simply a rule-based or THERP is used. 
• Not really.  The timing is to ensure that how much time the operators have to successfully 
complete the action.  
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Conclusions 
 Engineering judgment on where to collect timing information are based on the 
specific information identified within the method. Analysts collect Tsw by first 
considering thermal-hydraulic calculations, then additional sources. TM is collected by 
one of the following: operator interviews, observation of the actions, or JPM. If none of 
these are available, a more conservative approach is used by consulting THERP or 
ASEP.  The same is true for T1/2. Analysts are in agreement that all information should 
be documented regardless of which methodology is used. In addition, engineering 
judgments about choice of methodology are affected by the timing information.  
 
TABULATED THERP PROBABILITIES 
NOTE:  Only seven out of the eleven respondents stated that they routinely use THERP. 
 
Question 1  
 Question 1: “The CPSES analyst has interpreted Table 20-7 of the THERP as 
follows:  
“In determining the EOM pexe values, if the operator action takes 
place within ten procedural steps from the start of the accident 
sequence, Item 20-7(1) [short list, with checkoff provisions] from 
THERP is used.  If the operator action takes place > 10 steps into 
the sequence, Item 20-7(2) [long list, with checkoff provisions] is 
used.  Items 20-7(3) and 20-7(4) [no checkoff provisions] are 
usually used when the procedure is not an Emergency Operating 
Procedure.”16  
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Is this how you would use Table 20-7 for errors of omission? i.e. How do you use Table 
20-7 in your HEP calculations?”  
 This question was asked in response to disagreement generated within the Pilot 
Survey, and Table 63 shows that there is agreement on how to apply THERP Table 20-7.  
Analysts agree with the CPSES interpretation of how to apply THERP  Table 20-7. 
While most analysts agree on how to count steps/tasks in procedures, there is some 
discussion about how to credit check-off provisions. If there are questions about check-
off provisions, most analysts would directly identify them within the questionable 
procedure.   
 
Table 63 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Tabulated THERP Probabilities 
 
Response 
• For this type of Westinghouse procedure, yes, though I would check whether they actually 
check off the step on the procedure before giving them credit for checkoff. 
• The interpretation I use for Table 20-7 is virtually identical.  That is, I would assign a short list 
to those actions performed in procedures that have less than or equal to 10 steps or, for longer 
procedure, for actions taken within the first 10 steps.  Even if the EOPs do not officially have 
check-off provisions, I would treat the steps in EOPs as such since the operators are trained to 
use placekeeping aids such as checking off or circling steps that have been completed. 
• Long list only if action requires 10 steps or more. There can be multiple tasks in one procedure 
step. 
• I use the CBDTM Method’s mechanism to treat step omission and do not count it again for 
execution.  I usually assume that the CBDTM Method’s step omission component applies to 
each subtask within an action, so if there are 10 subtasks, I multiply the initial step omission 
mechanism’s contribution by 10.  The use of Table 20-7 from the example seems like a 
reasonable approach and I would feel comfortable applying that interpretation of THERP. 
• Yes. I suspect that there may be some differences in interpreting the long list / short list criteria. 
At Seabrook, we are considering all steps of the procedure to determine which value to use. As I 
read the later questions, I get the impression that some may only be counting steps in a specific 
step / action. I believe that this is incorrect, particularly w/ regard to errors of omission. 
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Table 63 Continued 
 
• Yes for short vs. long list. However, for checkoff vs. no checkoff, I use the procedure that 
documents the actual step performed by the operator i.e. no guessing about this important aspect 
since it heavily influences the results. In fact, I produced several recommendations to improve 
various procedures by adding Checkoffs. This has lowered the plant CDF [Core Damage 
Frequency] 
• Similar to CPSES. 
 
 
Question 2 
 Question 2: “Other than THERP Table 20-7, are there any other THERP Tables 
you use for Errors of Omission on a regular basis? Under what circumstances do you use 
the other tables?” 
 The responses (See Table 64) show that for errors of omission THERP Table 20-
7 is used almost exclusively. It should also be noted that seven out of the 11 respondents 
stated that they routinely use THERP. 
 
Table 64 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – Tabulated THERP Probabilities 
 
Response 
• Occasionally use 20-6 , though more likely to be used for pre-initiators. 
• I do not typically use other omission tables. 
• We stick to the HRA calculator, i.e. no longer delve into THERP outside the context of the 
Calculator. [The HRA Calculator provides an electronic version of the tabulated THERP 
values.]  
• Table 20-7b with RNO, procedure with RNO column. 
• No [Three responses]  
 
 145
  Question 3   
 Question 3: “Besides THERP Table 20-12, what other THERP Tables do you use 
for Errors of Commission for control room actions (excluding recovery actions.)? Under 
what circumstances do you use the other tables?”  
 In general, most analysts use THERP Table 20-12 for errors of commission for 
control room actions, and on occasion THERP Tables 20-10 and 20-11 are used. (See 
Table 65).  All three of the tables are available for use within the HRA Calculator.   
 
Table 65 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey – Tabulated THERP Probabilities 
 
Response 
• 20-13 if the procedure calls for local operation. 
• Table 20-12 is the most commonly used table, but there are additional tables that are used as 
well, depending on the actions involved.  For control room actions, Tables 20-10 and 20-11 are 
also used.  In addition, for actions performed outside the control room (e.g., local valve 
manipulation), Table 20-13 would also be used. 
• I have, on occasion, used Tables 20-10 and 20-11 when a specific reading is important to the 
completion of an action on a gauge that is not one of the primary reactor parameters.  I do not 
have a specific set of conditions for myself that trigger the use of these tables, which, is 
probably a weakness. 
• We stick to the HRA calculator, i.e. no longer delve into THERP outside the context of the 
Calculator. [The HRA Calculator provides an electronic version of the tabulated THERP 
values.] 
• Also use Table 20-11 for control room actions of reading displays, checking indicators, etc. 
 
  
Question 4 
 Question 4: “Under what circumstances do you use data sources other than the 
tabulated THERP values for Errors of Omission and Errors of Commission?” 
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 Table 66 shows that when rendering judgments about what failure probabilities 
to use within an HEP Calculation, one should use THERP as the primary database. The 
one participant who observes simulator training exercises as potential data sources has 
spent many years collecting this data. For most HRA analysts this is not within the scope 
of their analysis.  
 
Table 66 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey – Tabulated THERP Probabilities 
 
Response 
• In general, I only use values from THERP for errors of omission or commission.  An exception 
could be for immediate action steps (i.e., actions that occur during the first few steps of a 
procedure that are supposed to be committed to memory), for which an error probability can be 
obtained from NUREG/CR-4772. 
• Never 
• I can almost always find a way to use a THERP table value that is appropriate for the 
circumstances.  However, for multi-step actions that are highly trained, practiced, and used in 
actual plant operations (such as initiation of SPC [Suppression Pool Cooling] in a BWR), the 
THERP data can provide overly conservative results. In those cases, I may modify some values 
and make a note identifying the reason for the change.  There is no set of guidelines for this and it 
is done based on experience and interaction with the PRA model.  For example, it would becomes 
apparent during cutset review that the HEP for SPC initiation is too high when the loss of DHR 
[Decay Heat Removal] CDF dominates the risk profile due to an HEP of 1E-4 with 24 hours 
available for action. 
• None (with the usual disclaimers). There can always be a time when a specific source could be 
considered more pertinent. 
• Errors of Omission (EOOs) are typically due to failures of operator’s attention and memory (slip 
and lapse types of error correspondingly) in this context.  Poor procedure format is the likely 
cause of attention failure.  Unexpected interruption of the task is likely causing memory failure.  
Taking a short cut is typical Errors of Commission (EOCs) in this context.  The causes are likely 
that the operator links current plant symptoms to a scenario familiar to the operator (e.g., by 
training). 
• Always use THERP 
• The operator comments.  
• For most of my work I use either data or information derived from simulators or expert judgment. 
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Question 5 
 Question 5: “Fig. C-3.  is a page from EOP 0.0. and Step 6a has been identified 
as a critical action. Can you determine an Error of Omission and an Error of 
Commission using only procedures? If not, what other information is need?”  
 The responses show (See Table 67) that judgments about errors of omission and 
errors of commission are based on more than procedure identifications. Most analysts 
base these judgments on understanding of the scenario and observation of the control 
room layout (especially indicators). 
 
Table 67 
Responses to Question 5 of Phase II Survey – Tabulated THERP Probabilities 
 
Response 
• The EOM could probably be derived based on looking at the procedure only.  However, in order 
to correctly calculate the ECOM, knowledge of the control room panel layout should also be 
included since this impacts whether the ECOM for selecting the wrong control would use item 
(2), (3) or (4) in Table 20-12.  In addition, other performance shaping factors (PSFs) would need 
to be known (in particular, stress level). 
• No. I need to know the scenario- Is MSAFW pump failed so that RNO action is needed. Did 
both (all) AFW pumps fail; Have the operators been instructed preciously to try to restart? I  
also need to know crew protocol-Do they use checkoffs with each step, do the use formal 
communications, etc.  
• No.  In addition to the preceding steps of the procedure (to determine where it is in the 
procedure (the step numbers themselves are not adequate)), I would need to see the instrument 
display for the relevant equipment to determine the appropriate EOCs for Pexe.  I think it would 
also be necessary to know about the accident sequence in which that action would be taken to 
help define the performance shaping factors that might be important (stress level, instrument 
availability (maybe an alternate gauge is required to be used), environmental conditions, etc.). 
• The evolving accident/initiating event is also important to determine PSFs, workload, stress, 
number of alarms, and others. 
• Omission – Table 20-7b with RNO, Procedure with RNO column.  Commission - Table 20-11. 
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Table 67 Continued 
 
• I agree that the EOP 0.0 might be a critical step in the response to the accident by  the crew, but 
I cannot evaluate the impact without examining the context.  The   accident determines the 
context within which the crews work.  The displays of the  information in the MCR determine 
what the operators see and this may obscure  the ability of the crews to select the correct 
procedure.  Training maybe such that  the operators do not carryout the response as well as they 
could do!  So context matters! 
• Control room panel layout. 
 
Question 6 
 Question 6: “Besides procedures, are there other methods you use to determine 
Errors of Omission and Errors of Commission? For example, do you do a walk-through 
of the control panel, or conduct operator interviews?” 
  The responses to this question are in agreement with Question 5. (See Table 68)  
When rendering engineering judgments about errors of omission and errors of 
commission, analysts find it helpful to do both a walk-through of the control room and 
conduct operator interviews.  It is expected that in an ideal world this would be done for 
every action modeled; however, in reality due to time constraints this may not be 
possible.  
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Table 68 
Responses to Question 6 of Phase II Survey – Tabulated THERP Probabilities 
 
Response 
• The former is necessary, the latter helpful. 
• I would want to either walkdown the control panels or look at a drawing of the control room 
panel layout. 
• For local actions, walk through may be important. Operator interviews and simulator 
observations are always invaluable.  
• Walk-through and conducting operator interview are great.  The drawbacks are level of effort 
requirement and accessibility.   
• A control panel walkdown is highly desirable and all efforts should be made to perform a 
walkdown of the panels and take pictures.  Operator interviews can provide some insights, but 
the actual panels are the most helpful. 
• Also use the operator inputs.  Do both walk-through and conduct operator interviews.  
• In addition to procedures: the accident scenario, training, man-machine interface, workload, 
communications protocol, and leadership.  Interviews of NPP operators, and instructors.  
Reviews of procedures and control boards.  Observations of simulator sessions of operators 
responding to various accidents, etc. 
 
Conclusions 
 In general, there is good agreement among HRA analysts (who use THERP) on 
how to interpret the tabulated THERP probabilities. Analysts used Table 20-7 almost 
exclusively as a database for probabilities of Errors of Omission. When interpreting 
Table 20-7 of THERP analysts begin counting procedure steps from the beginning of the 
accident sequence procedures.  For Errors of Commission analysts tend to use THERP  
table 20-12 for control room actions6 and occasionally use THERP6 Tables 20-10 and 
20-11.   
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LOWER BOUNDS  
 
 
Question 1  
 Question 1: “In your opinion should there be a lower bound for HEP 
calculations? If so what value do you use and how did you determine that value?”  
 The responses show (See Table 69) that analysts unanimously agree that there 
should be a lower bound for HEP calculations. In addition most agree that this should be 
in the range of 1E-6 to 1E-4; however, there is a lack justification for this range. 
 
Table 69 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Lower Bounds 
• Yes, 1E-4 Based on engineering judgment [2 responses] 
• Yes, an HEP should not be lower than the lowest value in the Annunciator Response 
Model Table. 
• I believe that the lower bound value for the overall mean HEP for a given action should 
be no lower than 1E-5 and for most actions should not be lower than 1E-4.  I also believe 
the combined HEP (i.e., multiple operator action failures) should not be lower than 1E-6. 
• Yes. as low as just above truncation if may still be of practical significance under certain 
conditions.  
• Yes. We use 1E-04 as a lower bound. This value is based on 25 year of PRA discussion 
w/ NRC and personal opinion. It is difficult to imagine that a complex activity can be 
considered more reliable than 1 in 10000, regardless of instructions and training. Beyond 
this value, one is likely to have missed dependencies that have significant impact. 
• <1.0E-05 
• No, should be based on the HRA calculator results.  [The HRA Calculator does apply a 
lower limit of 1E-6 for the overall HEP] 
• Yes, there should be a lower bound for HEPs and combinations of HEPs. I usually use a 
floor of 1E-6 for individual HEPs and combinations of HEPs that are required within 24 
hours of an event.  This is consistent with previous PSAs and HRA documentation 
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Question 2 
 Question 2: “In your opinion should there be a lower bound on Pcog values? If so, 
what value do you use, and how did you determine that value?” 
  The responses (See Table 70) show that analysts are equally split about whether 
to apply a lower bound for Pcog values. From these responses, an argument could be 
made that a lower limit does not need to be applied, because exceptionally low values 
for Pcog will have little or no influence on the final results. 
 
Table 70 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – Lower Bounds 
Response 
• Yes, an HEP should not be lower than the lowest value in the Annunciator Response Model 
Table. 
• I do not believe there should necessarily be a lower bound value for either the cognitive error or 
execution error….. I do believe there should be a lower bound value for the overall HEP. 
• I am not sure about an absolute lower bound, but our results tend to be greater than 1E-4 
• Yes. as low as just above truncation if may still be of practical significance under certain 
conditions.  
• I wouldn’t apply a floor limit separately to the cognitive and execution components, just the total 
HEP. 
• Yes. We use and overall HEP lower bound of 1E-04. We are equally suspicious of individual 
contributions w/ values less than these values. 
• 1E-5 
• No [2 responses] 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “In your opinion should these lower bounds be consistent between 
methods?” 
 With one exception, HRA analysts agree that there should be consistent lower 
bounds between methods.  (See Table 71) 
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Table 71 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey – Lower Bounds 
Response 
• Yes (8 responses) 
• The ERPRI doc (TR-100259) clearly says to use the CBDTM Method as the lower bound. We 
do that by using the Max(HEPCBDTM, HEPHCR/ORE) 
• It probably doesn’t make a lot of difference if the methods use slightly different HEP floor values.  
If they are very high floors, then the method will be unusable because it will mask potentially 
important hardware vulnerabilities.  Very low floors could also mask potentially important 
contributors and would not be accepted by the PSA community.  In summary, small variations can 
be tolerated while large variations would not be useable or accepted by the industry. 
 
Conclusions 
 Unanimously, all analysts agree that there should be some lower limit to HEP 
calculations and that this limit should be the same regardless of the methodology used. 
Most analysts agree that this limit should be in the range of 1E-6 to 1E-4 with a tendency 
towards the higher end. Engineering judgments about what a lower bound limit should 
be based not on measurements or method used. Instead they are based on what is a 
practical and meaningful result. 
 
CHOICE OF METHODOLOGY 
 
Questions 1  
 Question 1: “How do you determine which methodology to use for an HEP 
calculation?”  
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 The response in Table 72 show that analysts determine which method to use by a 
combination of the following: precedents, guidance provided in respective method 
description or the use of more than one method. (Question 4 further addresses this topic.) 
 
Table 72 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Choice of Methodology 
Response 
• We have used both the CBDTM and HCR for each HEP and chosen the greater failure 
probability between the two methods 
• On the nature of the action, whether it is automatic (instinctive), procedure driven, or a 
recovery action. 
• We only use one methodology throughout the entire HRA.  I believe it is more 
important to use one methodology consistently throughout the analysis than it is to use 
a particular method. 
• Use CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE Correlation for almost all actions. We do not use 
the Annunciator Response Model.  
• Based on the guidance from the HRA Calculator training workshop and previous 
examples from the HRA experts. When in doubt, use two or three methods and see how 
they compare.  
• I want one that allows for flexibility and thoroughness and one that accounts for major 
contributors to cognitive and execution errors (like ASEP and CBDTM Method for 
cognitive and THERP for execution error). 
• Since the industry has no guidance or consensus, we generally calculate HEPS using 
both CBDTM and HCR/ORE, and select the largest HEP. We have occasionally limited 
our calculations to a given method if the action is clearly (overwhelmingly, etc) time 
limited (HCR/ORE) or clearly a cognitive / diagnostic problem (CBDTM).  
• Each method has its strength in predicting the HEP of certain types of tasks.  Selection 
of the appropriate method is dependent on the type of task of analysis. 
• Pre-determined by using EPRI & HRA Calculator guidelines, availability and 
importance of timing is also an important factor. 
 
 
Question 2  
 Question 2 “Is it better to use the same methodology for an entire analysis or to 
use a method that is appropriate for each individual action?” 
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 The responses to Question 2 are shown in Table 73. Six participants would apply 
one method and four participants would apply more than one method.  (See Table 73)  It 
should be noted that typical actions modeled within a complete analysis are either skill-
based or rule-based proceduralized actions, and more than likely the same methodology 
is appropriate to use for every action. To justify both view points presented in Table 73, 
when rendering engineering judgments about methodology choice an analyst considers 
the type of action being modeled and chooses an appropriate method for each action, and 
often the same method is used for every action within an entire analysis. 
 
Table 73 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – Choice of Methodology 
 
Response 
• We have used both the CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE Correlation for each HEP and chosen 
the greater failure probability between the two method. 
• I would use the same method for each action within the same type 
• I believe it is more important to use one method consistently throughout the analysis. 
• We apply both methods (CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE Correlation) to all actions except 
where long times are available.  
• I believe is more appropriate to use a method that is appropriate for each individual action; 
however, on certain cases, it may be useful to compare different methodology if they present 
significantly different results.  
• Picking a specific methodology for specific types of actions implies that the analyst believes the 
numbers the calculations produce are accurate, which is questionable.  In HRA, a consistent 
application of a methodology that provides a means of developing a relative ranking of the 
difficulty of the actions is about the best that one could hope for, quantitatively.  One would hope 
that the results are close to “correct”, but there is no real way of knowing.  By mixing methods, a 
major benefit of the quantitative portions of the HRA is eliminated (consistency in the evaluations) 
and I consider it detrimental to the analysis.  There may be a small, specific set of operator actions 
that cannot be quantified using the methods applied the majority of plant actions, but I have not 
encountered them yet (at least not those that should be quantified using HRA techniques). 
• It would be preferable to use the method that is appropriate for the action, however there is no 
consensus guidance on this topic. 
• Use the method appropriate for a specific action as long as the HEP assessment is consistent. 
• Yes it is better. Change of methodology to achieve a more favorable answer is like cheating. 
Only timing consideration may force you into a different method. 
• I would suggest using one method but changes in context would affect the HEP values. 
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Question 3 
 Question 3: “Do you believe that any method can be used to analyze any action?”  
 The responses are shown in Table 74. Analysts agree that there is no one method 
appropriate for every action, and this further supports the conclusions from Question 2. 
 
Table 74 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey- Choice of Methodology  
 
Response 
• No. HCR method may be important to use when timing is a critical component but it may not give 
the best result when timing is not a key component. 
• Different methods can be used within their realm of applicability. 
• I believe it should be up to the HR analyst as to which HRA method to use. 
• No, both methods (CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE Correlation) should be used on almost all 
actions.  
• Not necessarily. Some methods do not make sense for some circumstances.  
• I would say the answer is yes (for a goof methodology) and that while the method might not represent 
what the “real” answer is believed to be as well as another, it will be close enough.  And if it I not, then 
something should be able to be done within the framework of the methodology to make it work.  Take 
the example of BWR SPC initiation.  The EPRI HRA Calculator would yield a result that is too high 
for long term loss of DHR cases, but there are override options that would allow for a correction to be 
made. 
• No. I don’t believe the Annunciator Response Model is appropriate given CBDTM and HCR/ORE. 
• No, none of the existed HRA methods covers the whole scope of possible actions. 
• No 
• If the methods are consistent, the answer should be “Yes” 
 
Question 4 
 Question 4: “Under what circumstances do you calculate an HEP value using 
more than one method and compare the numerical results?” 
 The responses are shown in Table 75. Generally, analysts do use multiple 
methods, and usually it is done to compare the results of different methods  numerically. 
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Table 75 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey –Choice of Methodology 
 
Response 
• Always 
• Only to get an idea of where the range of opinions lies.  None of the methods is calibrated, 
therefore it is useful to have some idea of what the range of values is. 
• I cannot say that I would ever use more than one methodology to calculate an HEP other than to 
compare the results. 
• Always use the larger HEP from both methods (CBDTM Method and HCR/ORE Correlation. 
• I will check numbers against other industry `examples, but I do not use multiple methods and 
perform multiple cross-method calculations myself. 
• Since the industry has no guidance or consensus, we generally calculate HEPS using both 
CBDTM and HCR/ORE, and select the largest HEP. We have occasionally limited our calcs to 
a given method if the action is clearly (overwhelmingly, etc) time limited (HCR/ORE) or clearly 
a cognitive  diagnostic problem (CBDTM).  
• When I feel the method has great variability in determining the HEP of a task. 
• When the result is unreonable (too low or too high) such that the applicability of the adopted 
method becomes suspect. 
• To present a case for why the selected method is better. 
 
Conclusions 
 Several of the users of the HRA Calculator calculate HEPs using both the 
CBDTM Method and the HCR/ORE Correlation and then take the higher of the two 
values. Using older, non-computerized methodologies, it would be time consuming and 
difficult to perform two independent analysis for the same action. Using the HRA 
Calculator this is a simple task, and the second calculation can be done in a matter of 
minutes. Assuming that the analyst is familiar with the methodology. Many analysts do 
not perform more than one analysis for the same action, because they calculate HEPs by 
non-computerized methods.  
 The responses also show that most HRA analysts are applying some variation of 
THERP, CBDTM Method and the HCR/ORE Correlation for their analysis. This is 
important to identify, because it shows that the methods employed by the HRA 
 157
Calculator are what current analysts are using even if the HRA Calculator is not being 
used.  
 When rendering engineering judgments about which methodology to use, 
analysts should follow internal guidance for recommendations on methodology choice 
and if using an electronic method should repeat the calculation using multiple methods 
for comparison, then chose the higher HEP.  
 
ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE MODEL 
 Only a few responses to questions about the Annunciator Response Model were 
received. It is believed that this is because few HRA analysts apply this method.   
 When applying this model one must keep in mind that the probabilities provided 
by THERP were based entirely on engineering judgments. Therefore, it was anticipated 
that current analysts may want to modify theses probabilities. However, responses to  
Questions 2 and 3 show this not to be the case.  The documentation of the Annunciator 
Response Model provided in THERP clearly states that the HEP values provided in 
THERP Table 11-3 are based on a single control room operator. However, responses to 
these questions indicate it is common practice to interpret them to be for a control room 
crew even though THERP provides instructions to modify the HEPs in THERP Table 
11-3 for a crew. This practice is stated to be conservative.  
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Question 1 
 Question 1: “How do you determine the number of annunciators present in the 
control room for a specific action?” 
 The analysts agree that there is no ideal way to collect this data. Therefore, it is  
concluded that there are three different ways in which an analyst can render judgments 
about how to collect data on the number of annunciators. He can ask operating staff, use 
alarm response procedures, or observe simulator exercises.( See Table 76). All three of 
these tasks are time consuming, and it is difficult to obtain the exact numbers of 
annunciators.  
 
Table 76 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – Annunciator Response Model 
 
Response 
• Ask operating staff. 
• For this reason, I would be reluctant to use the annunciator response model in the first place.  
However, if it is to be used, the best way would be to either observe the scenario in the simulator 
or talk-through the scenario with an experienced operator or trainer.  There may be cases where 
expert judgment by the HRA analyst could be used.  For example, if the alarm is caused by the 
initiating event or if the alarm occurs well out in time such that other alarms would not be 
expected. 
• Use simulator or discuss with simulator instructor for the scenarios of interest to come up with an 
estimate.  
• Use of Alarm Response Procedures. Interview operators. 
 
Question 2 
 Question 2: “In your opinion, is it appropriate to use the values shown in Table 
11-3 of THERP when there is more than one person present in the control room? These 
values were derived for single operators, but CPSES always has at least 3 or more 
people present in the control room.” 
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 The responses (See Table 77) clearly show that respondents apply the tabulated 
values to crew behavior.  This is acknowledged by some to provide conservative results. 
However, numerical values of HEP results from the Annunciator Response Model using 
the modifications for crew presence given in THERP agree more closely with the 
CBDTM Method (See Chapter V). 
 
Table 77 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – Annunciator Response Model 
 
Response 
• Yes, if more crew members are focused on the same annunciators they are less likely to miss it, but 
typically one operator has the responsibility for sections of the control room. 
• Yes, I believe that Table C-1 should apply to the entire crew. 
• I believe it may be slightly conservative; however, given the dependency of the crew (i.e. similar 
training and perception), and also, one person may be dedicated to reading the procedure or other 
task, the applicability of one person for a three-person crew is still reasonable.  
• Diagnostic values in NUREG 1278 are for control room crew, not per person or for one person. I do 
not apply recovery of one’s error for diagnostic failures. 
• The approach does model crew’s response. 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “If you were to model crew behavior using the values in THERP 
Table 11-3 would you modify any of these values to take credit for additional people?” 
 The responses (See Table 78) show that the respondents interpreted this question 
as applying to the initial HFE. Therefore, the responses are essentially the same as those 
to Question 2.   
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Table 78 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey – Annunciator Response Model. 
 
Response 
• No 
• No, I would not modify the HEPs in Table 1 to take credit for additional personnel.  However, 
there could still be opportunity to take credit for recovery by either the same person or additional 
personnel if additional cues are present. 
• Not really. Unless there is significant more independent and available resources and timing is not a 
critical issue. 
• Only if time for second crew. 
• Yes I would change the values. I do not use the Annunciator Response Model, I do not think that 
operators function the way that the model implies, i.e. the more annunciators the higher 
unreliability of crews!  Operators select a number of key annunciators to determine the accident 
and use EOPs to confirm the accident and then proceed.  The Swain model of how operators 
respond to accidents is based upon a state of knowledge of plant operation around about 1980, 
limited exposure to simulators and event based procedures.  Does not correspond to current 
operating conditions! 
 
Conclusions 
 HRA analysts who apply the Annunciator Response model acknowledge that this 
model is conservative, but they do not attempt to apply additional engineering judgments 
on how to modify the tabulated probabilities to obtain more realistic HEPs.   
 
HCR/ORE CORRELATION 
 
 
Questions 1 
 Questions 1: “List all the sources you use for collecting timing information.”  
Table 79 shows the responses and Question 2 further addresses this topic. 
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Table 79 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• Simulator exercises, Operator estimates, Job Performance Measures 
• Three potential sources would be simulator data, operator interviews or expert judgment, with 
the third option being a last resort. 
• Simulator data for the action, walk through, simulator data for similar actions. 
• MAAP runs, T-H calculation, FSAR, NUREGs, Operator interviews, Simulator runs, Simulator 
instructor interviews,  
• Field observations, simulator observations, estimates (very cautiously). 
• Field observation, event analysis, and experiment s (e.g., simulator exercise) 
• Engineering calcs, MAAP4, owners’ group analyses, operators’ estimates 
• Most of them by MAAP analyses.  Some based from the WCAP/WOG, plant specific thermal 
hydraulic calculation results.  If none of them available, would use operator inputs or simulator 
times. 
• Timings from simulators, expert judgment, walkthroughs with plant personnel and transient 
analyses 
 
Question 2  
 Question 2: “From your list of timing sources, under what circumstances do you 
use each source in your HEP calculation? Are all the sources equally considered when 
choosing which source to use in a calculation?” 
 The responses to Question 2 are shown in Table 80.  It is concluded from both 
Tables 79 and 80 that all sources of timing information should be considered, and then 
the best source should be identified based on the specific action.  In addition, analysts 
would prefer to collect timing information from simulator or actual observation of the 
action.  
 Within the HCR/ORE Correlation the timing information includes both Tw 
(cognitive response time) and T1/2 (mean crew response time, both cognitive and 
execution).  However, the HRA Calculator determines Tw based on Tsw. The responses 
to questions on timing indicate experts determine Tsw primarily based on thermal-
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hydraulic calculations. But T1/2 must be determined from other data.  The HRA 
Calculator determines Tw by Tsw-Tm-Tdelay. Therefore, analysts must check Tw 
determined by the HRA Calculator against Tw determined by observation to verify 
sufficient cognitive time is available.    
 
Table 80 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• Information from simulator exercises and job performance measures is used when available. 
Otherwise, operator estimates are used. 
• The first choice would be simulator data or actual plant experience.  The second choice would be 
operator interviews.  The last resort would be expert judgment. 
• Simulator data for the action (with at least three crews) is the best source. 
• I would consider all sources and then depending on the purposes of the application choose either 
a best estimate or conservative values.  
• Field observations, simulator observations, and estimates (very cautiously). 
• All sources should be considered as long as they are available.  Weight factors may be applied to 
these sources. 
• Usually one source is available and usually one source dominates when multiple sources are 
available. 
• Direct evidence is better than expert judgment.  The quality of the information depends on the 
chosen expert.  I would use the above to test the quality of the information received 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “Do you consider the accuracy of the timing information when using 
the HCR/ORE? If so, how does this affect your calculations?” 
  This question was intended to determine if analysts consider the sensitivity of 
the HCR/ORE Correlation to small variations in time when rendering judgments about 
which timing source to use. Table 81 shows that analysts are equally divided. Those who 
do consider this tend to adjust the information rather than choose a different data source.  
It is concluded that an analyst may wish to render additional judgments about the 
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accuracy of the timing by adjusting the timing information; however, the accuracy of the 
information does not influence which timing source to use.  
 
Table 81 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey - HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• No 
• Regardless of where the timing information is derived, consideration should be given as to 
whether the response times need to be adjusted.  For example, if operator interviews are used 
to obtain response times, the estimates could be on the optimistic side.  Even when simulator 
exercises are used to obtain response times, care should be taken that the simulator scenarios 
from which the response times are collected are applicable to the scenarios for which the 
action is credited in the PSA.  
• If I do not have strong simulator data, I consider increasing sigma 
• No. I use point estimate . 
• To the extent possible, we calculate a median based on multiple observations. Otherwise you 
use what you have. Accuracy is not a term one should associate w/ HEP calculations. 
• Yes, I would and have done so in the past.  I would consider using different sources to give 
me some sense of the uncertainty range to be considered 
 
Question 4 
 Question 4: “In your opinion, should the stress level chosen in the decision tree 
used to determine sigma be the same as the stress level to calculate Pexe?”  
 Within the HRA Calculator the user determines a stress level for both Pexe and 
Pcog portions. The two stress levels do not necessary have to match. Furthermore, within 
Pexe the choices for stress level are low, moderate or high, but in the HCR/ORE 
Correlation the choices are low or high. There is no choice for moderate stress.  This 
question was intended to address this discrepancy and to identify if analysts use the same 
judgments to determine stress levels in both Pexe and Pcog.  
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 The responses (See Table 82) show that the analysts are equally divided on 
whether to match the stress level between Pcog and Pexe. Those who do match stress levels 
acknowledge this is not possible for moderate stress within the HRA Calculator. 
Therefore, it is concluded that if a perfect model were available and an ideal situation 
were being modeled, the stress levels between Pcog and Pexe should be the same. In reality 
many models (including the HCR/ORE Correlation) are not designed so that the stress 
level in Pcog and Pexe can match, and HRA analysts rarely model ideal situations. 
Therefore, the stress levels will usually vary.    
 
Table 82 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• Not necessarily, since the person completing the cognitive and the person completing the 
execution may be doing so under different conditions. 
• Ideally, yes.  However, there are only two stress levels (high or low) in the HCR/ORE 
Correlation Decision Tree, but there are three stress levels (nominal, high and extreme) in 
calculating Pexe. 
• Yes, we use high in the sigma decision tree for moderate and high. 
• They should be considered in context, and thus separately; however, they may not be totally 
independent.  
• No. There are three choices for the value (Low, Moderate, High). The decision tree is too 
simplistic.  
• Yes, PSFs’ effects should be counted 
 
Question 5 
 Question 5: “What do you consider a lower bound for the calculation of Pcog?” 
  It is well established that the HCR/ORE Correlation can give exceptionally low 
values for Pcog if there is a long time available (greater than 1 hour) to complete the 
actions. This question was intended to address the issue of what analysts considers a 
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lower bound to be for the HCR/ORE Correlation and to determine if the responses are 
consistent with the responses in the lower bound section.  
 
Table 83 
Responses to Question 5 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation. 
 
Response 
• I would not place a lower bound on either Pcog or Pexe but, rather, the overall mean HEP.  There 
are some instances where one could argue that the cognitive error is negligible compared to the 
execution error (and vice versa), in which case it would not be appropriate to arbitrarily assign a 
lower bound value to either the cognitive or execution error. 
• CBDTM Method is the lower bound for the HCR/ORE Correlation. 
• In IPE days, epsilon basically is zero; but currently with the peer review and increased use of 
HRA, 1.0E-7 or so.   
• We use 1E-04 as a lower bound. This value is based on 25 year of PRA discussion w/ NRC and 
personal opinion. It is difficult to imagine that a complex activity can be considered more reliable 
than 1 in 10000, regardless of instructions and training. Beyond this value, one is likely to have 
missed dependencies that have significant impact. 
• 1.0E-05 
• 1.0 E-04, but it depends on my overall assessment of the plant operations in the MCR 
 
 Table 83 shows that most analysts (with one exception) use a lower bound in the 
range of 1E-7 to 1E-4. While this is a large range, it does suggest that there should be 
some lower limit for Pcog, and this is in agreement with the responses to the questions 
asked in the Lower Bound section. Therefore, the conclusions from the Lower Bound 
section apply specifically to the HCR/ORE Correlation.  
 
Question 6 
 Question 6: “Consider the following sample calculation of Pcog using the 
HCR/ORE Correlation: [The complete sample calculation is shown in Appendix C. This 
is a calculation of Pcog using the HCR/ORE Correlation to model the action Loss of 
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Recirculation Capability. The calculated Pcog value was 3.1 E-10.] From the above 
information, would you use the HCR/ORE correlation to calculate Pcog?”  
 This question was attempting to identify if analysts render judgments on the 
methodology choice based on the results of the calculations.  The responses show (See 
Table 84) that several analysts would use both the HCR/ORE Correlation and the 
CBDTM Method and then use the largest value. In this example the CBDTM Method 
would produce a larger Pcog.  Two experts would not use this method, because the 
actions are not time dependent.  Therefore, analysts do chose the HRA methodology 
considering the numerical results produced by different methods. Most analysts would 
apply both the HCR/ORE Correlation and the CBDTM for the same action.  
 
Table 84 
Responses to Question 6 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• Yes, and we would use the CBDTM method, too. 
• I would personally use the CBDTM to calculate Pcog in general.  However, one could use the 
HCR/ORE correlation.  Another approach would be to calculate Pcog using both the CBDTM 
and HCR/ORE correlation and then use the higher of the two values to determine Pcog. 
• Yes 
• Yes, as a rule, we would try both HCR/ORE and CBDTM 
• Our general practice is to use both HCR/ORE and CBDTM to calculate HEPs and use the 
largest value. I see no reason to deviate from that our practice for this action. 
• No, the time window is about two hours.  Subtracting the time of delay, the operator still has 
about 30 minutes response time window.  With such long response time window the predictions 
of HCR/ORE are not good. 
• No 
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Question 7 
 Question 7: “Using the input stated above [Same example as Question 6], the Pcog 
value determined by the HRA Calculator was 3.1E-10. Do you feel that is a realistic 
value?” 
  The experts unanimously agree that the calculated value is unrealistic, and this is 
in agreement with the response to Question 4. Table 85 shows the complete set of 
responses, and the same conclusions from the Lower Bound section apply here. 
 
Table 85 
Responses to Question 7 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• No [ 3 responses]  
• No, too small. This is where our method of using two correlations and selecting the highest is 
useful. 
• No, 3.1E-10 is not a realistic value for this action.  However, I would argue that the basis of the 
calculation for Pcog is not correct.  The starting point for this action (t=0) should be considered 
as the time the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) is depleted (75 minutes).  The total 
system time window (Tsw) would then be 35 minutes (versus 110 minutes).  Using the same 
values for T1/2 (5 minutes) and Tm (3 minutes) still results in an HEP of 3.1E-10.  However, I 
also disagree with the premise that the stress level would be low.  I would consider stress to 
remain high following a LOCA [Loss Of Coolant Accident] until ECCS [Emergency Core 
Cooling System] recirculation was successfully established.  Therefore, I would use a sigma of 
0.4 versus 0.3, which results in a value for Pcog of 1.7E-6.  To assess whether this value is too 
low would require an estimation of the execution error.  For this case, I believe the cognitive 
error would be negligible compared with the execution error.  
• It is not a meaningful HEP. All it says it that this action is not sensitive to time. The CBDTM 
Method is always the lower bound. I do not see the T1/2 data but this should be a challenging 
cognitive action because the operators must do some diagnosis –put together the low RWST 
level with loss of water outside containment. The loss outside containment may not be obvious. 
It may require local verification which adds time.  
• No. Anything below 1.0E-7 probably is too low. 
• No. If you accept 3E-10, you are saying that you believe that a human error prob is 1 in 3 
billion. How credible is that. Shoe laces can’t be reliably tied much better than 1E-02. Values 
less than 1E-04 are difficult to justify. Unlikely events do happen, typically because of 
dependencies that were unforeseen by the “experts”. 
• 3.1 E-10 this is not a realistic figure, I would estimate that a figure nearer 1.0E-02 might be 
closer 
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Question 8 
 Question 8: “If you encounter an unrealistic Pcog valve (such as the example 
above), what would you do to correct this? Why?” 
  Table 86 shows that most analysts would apply another method (primarily the 
CBDTM Method).  Only one analyst would calculate Pexe and determine if Pcog is even 
relevant to this calculation. Again the responses to this question are in agreement with 
the conclusions from the Lower Bound Section.  
 
Table 86 
Responses to Question 8 of Phase II Survey – HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
Response 
• We would calculate the failure probability using CBDTM and would use that value since it 
would be greater. 
• Even if I was a fan of HCR, and used it, the EPRI document introduced the CBDTM to develop 
a floor for pcog. 
• I would calculate Pexe to see whether a low value for Pcog is even relevant 
• Always use CBDTM Method then use Max(HEPCBDTM, HEPHCR/ORE). 
• I would try CBDTM and see the difference.  
• The usual; Review the information, Review the HRA Calculator inputs and assumptions. 
Compare the value to the CBDTM value. If still very low, we would bound at 1E-04. This 
should be a fairly reliable action since diagnosis is not difficult and there is plenty of time to 
complete the action. One could argue that the Tdelay shouldn’t really count because the operator 
will be well aware that the action is coming and will need to be completed.  
• Use another method or apply the residual HEP.  There are different residual HEPs mentioned.  
THERP is at 1E-3 level.  The newer HRA method such as SPAR-H uses 1E-5.  However, real 
data suggest that 1E-7 might be a reasonable value.  
• Use Figure 12-4 of NUREG 1278 
• Use expert judgment with the experts being the instructors not operators or manager. 
 
Conclusions 
 Within this section several different areas of engineering judgments were 
surveyed. In addition to further supporting the conclusions from other survey sections, 
 169
the following additional conclusions can be drawn about engineering judgments 
rendered within the HCR/ORE Correlation.  
• Analysts would prefer to collect timing information from simulator or actual 
observation of the action. In addition, analysts must check Tw determined by the 
HRA Calculator against Tw determined by observation to verify sufficient 
cognitive time is available.    
• Analysts may wish to render additional judgments about the accuracy of the 
timing by adjusting the timing information; however, the accuracy of the 
information does not influence which timing source to use. 
• Engineering judgments on which methodology to use are based on consideration 
of the results produced by different methods.   
 
CBDTM METHOD 
 Questions 1 and 2 of this section were based upon reading the recommendations 
in EPRI Report TR-100259. The report recommends revisiting the decision trees on a 
case-by-case bases. It was suspected that very few analysts follow this recommendation, 
and Questions 1 and 2 test that theory.  
 
Question 1  
 Question 1: “The original report on the CBDTM method recommends that the 
HRA analysts revisit the numerical values used in the decisions trees and modify or 
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adjust as necessary.  Do you consider doing this in regular practice? If so what are you 
looking to adjust?” 
  The responses are shown in Table 87. As expected, generally, most analysts do 
not modify the original decision trees.  
 
Table 87 
Responses to Question 1 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• No 
• The report also suggested revisiting the structure of the trees.  This was included to indicate 
that the values used were the writers’ best assessment at the time, in the hope that more 
work would be done to improve the pedigree.  No-one ever did to my knowledge, except in 
the Temelin (Czech Republic) PRA the trees were modified to reflect the fact that the 
control room had computer guided procedure following software linked to the plant process 
computer, eliminating some of the reading errors. 
• No, in my opinion it is not necessary to revisit the numerical values used in the decision 
trees.  
• No, that is difficult to do for an individual analyst. That is like changing the rules. It would 
be appropriate for an expert panel to change values (or even add new branches or new trees. 
• No. If I do, I probably would make a judgment call on the branches and compare with 
various HFE to see whether they are consistent.  
• We do not adjust values. We don’t have the time or expertise to both research a different 
value AND be able to justify it’s use to the NRC. The practical bottom line is that the NRC 
would probably override your carefully crafted value if you were using the results to fight a 
violation. 
• Yes!. To look for obvious inconsistencies 
• Yes, operator self review, STA review and extra crew. 
• I find it strange that the authors of EPRI TR-100259 recommend that HRA users should 
change the values given by the calculator.  What is the basis for so doing?  If you believe 
that the CBDT values are the best, why change them?  If the authors suggest that might be 
possible to change the values there ought to be a recommended process for so doing.   
Further, I thought that the basis for the calculator was to produce HEPs that can be used to 
compare one plant with a similar plant.  Allowing variability as a matter of course defeats 
this objective! 
   
Question 2 
  Question 2: “Are there any entire decisions trees that you feel are no longer 
relevant to consider in HEP Calculations for U.S Nuclear Power Plants? If so how do 
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you determine this and which trees do you feel are no longer relevant?  The original 
report was written in 1992 and has not been updated to reflect current operations.” 
 The responses are shown in Table 88. With the exception of the decision tree 
“deliberate violation” analysts feel all other decisions trees are relevant to current 
analysis.  
 
Table 88 
Responses to Question 2 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• No 
• Tree a could be dealt with more explicitly in the scenario definitions perhaps. 
• I do not have any problem with using all the decision trees in the CBDTM, although in practice 
only a few of the decision trees yield non-zero probabilities for most actions. 
• We do not ever use the deliberate violation tree. 
• I think it is still at a high level such that the structure/framework is still applicable; judgment still 
need to be made; the only differences may be the use of HRA calculator may have popularize the 
uses and improve somewhat the consistency of the applications. 
• We use all the trees, but, given our procedure format and usage, the values from a few trees 
dominate the calculation.  
• Yes, deliberate violation tree seems irrelevant.  All trained operators are instructed to stop or 
consult with TSC if they believe the instruction is incorrect. 
• I cannot determine which are acceptable and which are not.  In my mind since the whole process 
depends on Swain in the first place the CBDT method is questionable!  Yes the report was 
written in 1992, but it was just a rehash of THERP written in 1980 or even earlier! 
 
 
Question 3 
 Question 3: “When using the decision tree pca- Availability of Information [See 
Fig. C-7.] the CPSES HRA analyst made the following assumption  
“Control room indication is provided for equipment status with 
visual and audible alarms indicators of equipment failures or 
parameter deviations. The control room indication is assumed to be 
available, and accurate unless affected by the initiating event.”16  
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This assumption was used for every action in the CPSES database and resulted in the 
Pca tree always giving a negligible value. Are there any actions for which you would 
consider doing an HEP calculation when this assumption is not valid and/or the Pca tree 
would result in a non negligible value?”   
 The responses (See Table 89) show that most analysts tend to agree with the 
CPSES assumption. However, some specific examples of when this assumption is not 
valid include fire in the control room and prolonged station blackout.  Therefore, the 
assumption that control room indication is available unless affected by the initiating 
event is appropriate with rare exceptions.  
 
Table 89 
Responses to Question 3 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• No [2 responses]  
• You’d have to work harder to find indirect indications of the need for the action. 
• In practice, like CPSES I do not believe that there are any cases in our HRA where this 
probability is not negligible.  However, it is conceivable that there could be situations where 
indication is available in the control room but the indication may not be accurate. 
• A rare occasion that I can think of is prolonged Station Blackout after battery depletion, there 
may not be any indication in the control room. 
• It is a good general assumption. There are some subtle instrumentation failures that would be 
difficult for an Operator to recognize. These failures are also difficult for the analyst to 
recognize, and are fortunately very unlikely. 
• Yes.  Initiating event is very important for the HRA development. 
• When there is a fire in or near the control room.  I would pick CR [Control Room] indication 
inaccurate.  
• The question is not if the indications are accurate but rather how are they perceived by the 
operators.  Is the quality of the MMI high or otherwise for the specific accident?  When taken 
together with all the other influences the result may lead to a high or low HEP.  Again, the result 
depends on the context.  The pathway selected by the CPSES HRA person is not the problem 
really, but rather that the other influences of procedures, etc. are not considered along with 
instrument accuracy. 
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Question 4 
 Question 4: “In the decision tree pcb-Failure of attention, how do you 
differentiate between high vs. low workload?” 
 Table 90 shows that there is no one parameter used to describe the workload. 
Instead, analysts tend to base this decision on a combination of the following 
parameters: 1) number of steps listed in the procedures, 2) number of crew members 
compared to number of tasks, 3) number of procedures being used in hand, and 4) total 
number of procedures in use.    
 
Table 90 
Responses to Question 4 of Phase II Survey- CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• Operator interview; and as a general rule we have found that high work load occurs early in the 
event, wheresas low workload occurs later in the event. 
• Based on what is going on in the control room in terms of number of alarms and whether they 
are reinforcing or distracting, and on the number of required responses.   
• In general, high workload is considered to represent situations where the operator may be using 
two or more procedures concurrently, is involved with performing two or more actions, or is 
required to keep track of several parameters. 
• Judgmental based on the number of alarms expected.  
• Number of the operators in the crew, and actual actions stipulated in the procedural steps.  
• We consider the context of the event. What is happening in the control room, what indications 
are available, how rapidly conditions are changing, etc. Still, this is a subjective decision. 
• More than one event taking place. More than 10 tasks to perform. 
• When the operator only use the EOP to response the general transients (without any LOCAs, 
SBO [Station Black Out], total loss of heat sink etc), I would considered it as “Low”.   Any 
actions that required the operator to mitigate the consequence of accident initiating events would 
consider “High”. 
• Go back to a definition of workload.  The analyst should have definitions of the quality of 
workload for each workload level; high, medium or low.  The standards ought to be set ahead of 
the analysis task.  The same goes for the other influences. 
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Question 5 
 Question 5: “The decision tree pcc-Misread/miscommunication asks the analyst 
to determine if the indicator is easy to locate. For control room actions, is it reasonable 
to assume that all indicators are easy to locate? Can you give an example when you 
would determine this not to be the case?” 
 There are two parts to this question. First, most analysts tend to agree that control 
room indications are easy to locate but realize that there are will be exceptions.  Second, 
examples of hard-to-locate indicators tend to be located on back panels or out of sight of 
the operators. (See Table 91) Therefore, engineering judgments about how to determine 
if an indicator is easy to locate should be based on determining if the indicator is out of 
sight (i.e., on the back panel) of the operating crew. 
 
Table 91 
Responses to Question 5 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• Yes; several years ago our Control rooms were modified to consider human factors for location of 
indications and controls.  
• For some actions, indicators are found on back panels, though I think these are mainly 
confirmatory.  I can’t give explicit examples. 
• No, I don’t think it is always reasonable to assume that all indicators are easy to locate.  It depends 
on the layout of the control room.  Some control rooms may have indications that are not within 
site of the operator or are close to the floor. 
• At our station, good control room mimics are used. So I would say all control rooms are easy. 
Some remote actions may be other than easy.  
• This is a reasonable assumption for actions required by Emergency Operating Procedures. We 
have not found a situation where we thought an indicator was difficult to locate. 
• Some indicators necessary for the situation may be located at the back of a control panel.   The 
operator need to move physically in order to obtain the readings. 
• Indicators are easy to locate at the control room of the plant where I work. 
• All of the controls and indicators on the control board and on the front panels are consider easy to 
locate.  The ones that I consider not easy to locate are located on the back panel or not on the 
control board. 
 175
Table 91 Continued 
 
• The terms easy and not easy to locate is not readily understandable in a human factors or human 
reliability sense.  Currently, in the world of human factors as applied to Human System Interfaces 
(HSI) there are numbers of people undertaking studies in usability analyses.  The process is not 
exact but people realize that it is necessary to test various HSIs in order to arrive at the ‘best’ 
arrangement for a specific application.  A similar approach has to be taken with the NPP users! 
• Not enough experience to recall one.  
 
Question 6 
 Question 6: “The HRA Calculator asks the following question to determine if the 
indicators are Good or Bad. Does the required indicator have human engineering 
deficiencies that are conducive to errors in reading the display?9 In your opinion, are 
there any groups or types of indicators that have human engineering deficiencies that 
have not been corrected in most control rooms?”  
 The analysts agree that most human engineering deficiencies have been 
corrected, and no analyst can identify any specific deficiency that still exists. (See Table 
92) This suggests that it would be a rare expectation for an HRA analyst to determine 
that an indicator has engineering deficiencies.  
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Table 92 
Responses to Question 6 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• No [3 responses] 
• I am not aware of any ergonomic deficiencies which have not been corrected. 
• It would be an exception – maybe local indications.  
• Not enough experience to recall one.  
• No opinion on ‘most’ controls rooms. Suspect it greatly depends on the vintage of the plant. The 
Seabrook control room indicators have been “human factored” since initial design. 
• I do not know what HFEs still exit in any current MCRs.  Some are good and possibly not very 
good.  But it could be that for accidents the arrangements are good and poor for others.  This 
depended on the skills of the HF personnel involved in the upgrade process.  I have seen some 
excellent MCRs and poor MCRs.  The devil is in the details. 
 
Question 7 
  Question 7: “List the circumstances under which you would consider an indictor 
to have deficiencies that could lead to human error?” This question further address 
engineering deficiencies, and again the same conclusions apply. When rendering 
judgments about indicator deficiencies, analysts may consider the examples shown in 
Table 93. 
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Table 93 
Responses to Question 7 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• This is a human factors problem and I would refer you to that literature. 
• The following examples are just theoretical.  One example could be an analog indicator where the 
range of indication is large but a precise measurement is needed, making it difficult to obtain an 
accurate value.  Another example is where the actual parameter value reads off-scale.  A third 
example could be in instances where the labeling on the indicator is poor or difficult to read.  
Again, however, I am not aware of any actual cases of the above examples. 
• Units not clear; or analog readings that require close-up readings; out-of sequence display or 
location.  
• It would be an exception - maybe local indications.  
• Units or style significantly different than other similar indicators. Different response than similar 
indicators, e.g. top to bottom, left to right, right to left, etc. 
• 1. shifted or incorrect calibration; 2. being an indirect indication rather than a direct indication of a 
measurement; 3. reading is affected by glare or low illumination; 4. low capacity or capability in 
visual accommodation. 
• One example, if the operators have to interpolate or extrapolate to get their reading. 
• Equipment manufacturers light LEDs, they have low power consumption and can be reasonably 
visible when viewed from the correct position, but they cause misreadings.  Indicators located in too 
high or low positions can cause problems.  Mixed solutions involving computer displays and old 
fashion indicators can cause confusion for operators.  The old board arrangements were good in 
some ways since operators could view displays in parallel, but computer displays are serial in 
nature, so the crews can have problems if the computer architecture is poor.  This is one reason the 
operators like dense displays, which are frowned on by the HF [Human Factors] community!  So 
the best way to see what works is to test the crews by running accident scenarios on simulators! 
 
 
Questions 8  
 Questions 8: “Using the CBDTM method decision trees, how do you determine if 
a procedure has standard or ambiguous wording?”   
 The responses are shown in Table 94 and Question 9 further addresses this topic. 
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Table 94 
Responses to Question 8 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• We assume training and resulting critiques have resulted in ambiguous wording being eliminated 
from procedures.  In addition, we have a writer's guide that helps to ensure standardization of 
procedure wording 
• Based on whether the language is clear or not. 
• EPRI-TR-100259 and follow-on reports describing the EPRI CBDTM provide ample guidance in 
determining whether the procedure has ambiguous wording.  In general, the lower branch is seldom, 
if ever, used. 
• Judgment – Look for odd wording. We have a case where the operator must determine whether 
level is less than (-) 85”. The presence of a double negative (Less than, negative elevation) would 
qualify as ambiguous.  
• General versus specific; scenarios can be easily distinguished versus not easily distinguishable; no 
double negative, etc.  
• If there are any doubts about standard wording, we do a simple poll of people in the general office 
area. If there are a number of different interpretations or questions, it’s ambiguous. 
• The qualitative statements that allow operator’s judgment are ambiguous wording.  For example, “if 
RCS [Reactor Cooling System] pressure is too high then …).  “Too high” is qualitative statement.  
Changing it to a quantitative statement such as “if RCS pressure exceeds 2200 psi then…). 
• I get the required operator manual tasks from the procedure. If they are clear to me without required 
training (not a licensed operator), they are considered unambiguous to licensed operators. 
• Since the procedures are written in accordance with the industry standard, I often pick “Standard” 
• Best ask the crews and even better run a number crews responding to similar scenarios. 
 
Question 9 
  Question 9: “In Fig.C-11 are there any examples of what you would consider 
ambiguous wording? Justify using your response to question 8.” 
  Questions 8 and 9 are both directed at understanding how analysts determine if a 
procedure is ambiguously worded.  The responses in both Tables 94 and 95 show there are 
multiple approaches even when all analysts are given the same input. (See Fig C-3).  It is 
concluded that engineering judgments concerning procedure ambiguity should be based on 
multiple simultaneous approaches and evaluated on a case-by-case bases.    
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Table 95 
 
Responses to Question 9 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• No 
• Yes, but because of the word verify.  It would seem that it would have been better written as a 
Check whether containment spray is required, then the response not obtained would be to start it.  It 
is complicated by the AND and NOT statements and would be picked up in pcg 
• I would not consider the wording to be ambiguous. 
• Proper Alignment, If necessary are ambiguous words. 
• CBDTM would penalize you for this wording. There are several examples of AND, IF, NOT, 
THEN, all in proximity and combination, and in both the expected response and the RNO. 
• The procedure in Fig. C-4. provides more information than in Fig. C-3.  Fig. C-4. not only provide 
instruction on which component to act on but also indicate the location of the controller.  As a 
result, the procedure of Fig. 11. has longer wording than in Fig. 10.  As long as the operators are 
training and feel comfortable of such instructions, I don’t think they would make much difference. 
• Three preconditions may confuse a newly trained operator. Overall, not ambiguous. 
• Step 7a HAS REMAINED.  I would considered ambiguous, because as long as the containment 
pressure is over 18.0 psig, containment spray is required. 
• This seems to me to be the problem with poorly designed procedures from a human factors point of 
view.  Westinghouse EOPs are full of poorly designed statements.  The negative statements leading 
to actions are almost always a problem! 
 
Question 10 
  Question 10: “Using the CBDTM method, the analyst is asked to determine if the 
steps are hidden or obvious. What do you consider to be a “hidden” step?” 
  Table 96 shows that there is no consistent approach for determining hidden steps 
among experts. It further suggests that some analysts are applying very optimistic 
assumptions within their analysis, while other apply detailed analysis. The responses do 
give various suggestions and approaches to addressing hidden steps, and it is believed that 
if analysts were to consider a combination of the suggestions, then consistent results could 
be achieved.  
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Table 96 
Responses to Question 10 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• We don’t have any examples of hidden steps. 
• See page 4-7 of the EPRI report TR-100259 
• I would generally not consider any critical steps to be hidden.  As such, I do not recall any cases 
where the lower branch (hidden) was used.   
• Unusual to be hidden.  
• An action or decision point embedded in another step or action. 
• An action step that is buried in the middle of a lot of text, e.g. a “do” step in the middle of a note or 
caution. 
• Is there operator’s training on the essential and supplement instructions in performing an activity 
not explicitly written in the procedure steps? 
• As an example: If you are referred to other procedure that may not be easily located or, if they take 
the operators to perform contingencies to contingencies. 
• If there is a specific procedure available for system or component restoration, but EOP RNO did not 
specifically identified this procedure number.  I would consider this as hidden. 
• Nothing is obvious to the central office analyst hence you are forced to consult domain experts 
rather than knowledge experts.  A hidden step is an action identified by the training process or by 
experience.  Many times procedures are found to be defective in some area, even now.  It often is 
discovered by operators/instructors running through different scenarios. 
 
Question 11  
 Question 11: “Using the CBDTM method, the analyst is asked to determine if 
steps are graphically distinct. How do you determine if a step is graphically distinct?” 
 The responses are shown in Table 97 and Question 12 further addressees this 
topic. 
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Table 97 
Responses to Question 11 of Phase II Survey _CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• We do not take credit for “graphically distinct” steps. 
• See EPRI Report TR-100259 
• Using WOG EOPs as an example, I would consider the first step in a procedure to be graphically 
distinct, as I would a step that follows a note or caution or is by itself on a page. 
• Several action verbs in the same step. 
• Not easily mixed-up for example, if a dyslexic can read the distinction, it is distinct.  
• Steps that are boxed, or the only step on a page. 
• Not easy to be overlooked.  It’s subjective judgment. 
• If there is an easy selection from a graph or table 
• I assume that graphically distinct means that an influence is either clearly good or bad.  If the states 
are not clear then the analyst has to consider where both branches lead to and then decide if a better 
HEP might be given by an average or a weighted value of some kind.  So for example the first 
branch is between Easy and Not Easy and the other branches are Bad and Good.  The Easy branch 
would lead to 1.0E-03 and the Not Easy branch would yield 4.0E-03.  An average number would 
yield 2.5E-03! 
 
Question 12   
 Question 12: “Below is a page from EOP 0.0. (Fig. C-3.) Step 6a has been 
identified as a critical action, and the analyst has determined that step 6a is “obvious” 
and graphically distinct from other actions on the page. Would you agree or disagree 
with these decisions? Discuss how you made your decision.” 
 The responses are shown in Table 98, and most analysts agree with the CPSES 
HRA analyst in identifying this step as an obvious, graphically distinct step. Questions 
11 and 12 were directed at determining how an analyst determines if a procedure step is 
graphically distinct.  
 The responses show that each analyst defines the term differently. Furthermore, 
some analysts apply a vague or rather subjective definition such as “not easily mixed 
up”, and others apply a concrete definition like “the only step on the page.”  No 
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conclusions can be drawn on which set of definitions is more appropriate, but if an 
analyst wants to render consistent, justifiable, and well-documented results, the best 
approach would be to follow some combination of the concrete definitions.  
 
 
Table 98 
Responses to Question 12 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• I agree that it is “obvious” but I do not agree that it is “graphically distinct.” The step is not more 
conspicuous than the surrounding steps. 
• In the sense that the step has a distinct address, yes.  As a historical note, this was originally 
thought of more in the context of flowchart procedures, typical of BWRs, and some PWRs.  
• Step 6 is the only procedure on the page.  Therefore, Step 6a, being the first step in Step 6, could 
be considered graphically distinct.  However, because the critical step (Step 6a) is not the only step 
on the page, I would not consider Step 6a to be graphically distinct.  Having said that, I would not 
object strongly to designating the step as graphically distinct. 
• Yes, it is clear or obvious. 
• I would call the step obvious because it is a simple action / RNO. I do not consider it graphically 
distinct because it looks like every other step on the page. 
• Agree.  Some properties are concise wording, statement layout, distinct bullets, and consistent 
format through out the procedures. 
• I agree. The step is clear, there is no room for misinterpretations. 
• The procedure step, RNO are clear and simple.  Therefore, I agree with these decisions. 
• I do not agree with the assessment.  From a designers point of view the TDFW is the most 
effective pump having a much greater capacity.  The combination of the pumps fulfills the 
diversity requirement, which is extremely important.  Not so obvious! 
 
 
Question 13 
 Question 13 “Describe your methodology on how you apply recoveries and 
dependencies using the CBDTM method.” 
  The scope of this question was rather large, and the responses (See Table 99) 
address a variety of different areas. In general analysts follow some type of available 
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guidance when rendering judgments about dependences. It is more important to apply a 
consistent method that to seek an exact method. 
 
Table 99 
Response to Question 13 of Phase II Survey – CBDTM Method 
 
Response 
• Table 4-1 in TR-100259 outlines the nature of any recovery that may be credited for each of the 
eight failure mechanisms. The dependence characteristics are derived from the model presented in 
Table 20-17 of NUREG/CR-1278. 
• I use the EPRI report TR-100259 
• The following table [Shown in Table 27] summarizes the dependency we would use. It should be 
noted that this dependency level differs from that used in the current EPRI HRA Method, which 
assigns zero dependence after 1 hour.  It was judged that based on the same crew being involved 
in the response until the next shift turnover (6 hours on average), some dependency will most 
likely still be present.  Therefore, zero dependence (ZD) was not assumed until 6 hours.   
• Use the HRA Calculator recommended dependency level unless off-normal PSFs are present.  
• If there are recurring steps that provide opportunity I would assign a multiplier which accounts for 
dependencies. The dependency would be relatively high, say 0.5 or quite independent if there is a 
second person with more experience and freshness in the crew.  
• Review the steps for succeeding steps that would aid in discovering an error or omission. Review 
the preceding steps to determine if there are steps that if incorrectly executed, would cause an 
operator to bypass or miss the critical step.  
• Recoveries are allowed if timing allows for it.  No complete independency between people, at best 
use low dependency. I often use medium dependency (all based on NUREG 1278 guidelines). 
• Operator will conduct self-review while continuing through the procedure, extra crew will provide 
peer check, or STA could use diagnostic status tree to notify operator of required action.  Both 
recovery and dependency are based on time available to implement procedure steps. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 Within this section several different areas of engineering judgments were 
surveyed. In addition to further supporting the conclusions from other survey sections, 
the following additional conclusions can be drawn about engineering judgments 
rendered within the CBDTM Method.   
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• Since most analysts do not modify, remove or diverge from the original CBDTM 
decision trees, there is little engineering judgment applied to modification of the 
CBDTM method to produce more realistic results.   
• HRA analysts tend to agree that with rare exceptions it is appropriate to assume 
that control room indicators are available unless affected by the initiating event.  
•  Engineering judgments to differentiate between high and low workload are 
based on the follow four items: Number of steps in the procedures, number of 
crew members, number of procedures being used in hand, and total number of 
procedures in use.  
• Engineering judgments about how to determine if an indicator is easy to locate 
should be based on determining if the indicator is out sight of the operating crew.  
• Engineering judgments about procedure ambiguity should be based on multiple 
simultaneous approaches and evaluated on a case-by-case bases. 
• In order to determine if a step is graphically distinct an analyst should follow 
some concrete, consistent, and well-documented approach.  
• It is more important to render engineering judgments about recoveries and 
dependences using a consistent method than to seek an exact method.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE USE OF ENGINEERING 
JUDGMENTS WITHIN HRA CALCULATIONS 
 Regardless of which methodology an HRA analyst is using for quantification, the 
same judgments will be made within the definition stage. It is recommended that an 
HRA analyst review the “Good Practice For Implementing Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA),” NUREG 1792 and follow these recommendations when rendering judgments 
within the following areas.17    
1. Identification and definition of actions to modeled within the HRA Calculator 
2. Categorization of actions as pre or post-initiators  
3. Definition of critical actions 
4. Definition of cognitive portion of the actions 
SHARP1 also provides recommendations within this area. but it has not been updated to 
match current practice. At this time, NUREG 1792 is the most up-to-date and complete 
high level guidance for performing HRA.  
 The first step of an HRA is to identify and to define explicitly which human 
actions are to be modeled using the HRA Calculator. In order to accomplish this, an 
HRA analyst should complete the following three steps in order to render all the 
judgments within the definition stage. 
1. Review available information to gain an understanding of the PRA model and the 
systems and equipment involved. NUREG 1792 Sections 5.1.3.1-5.1.3.3 provide 
recommendations for good practice on what to do in this review.  Users of the 
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HRA Calculator should be aware that the following pieces of information will be 
needed for every action modeled with in the HRA Calculator, and documenting 
this information in this stage will help the user later in the quantification stage. 
• Procedure and tasks numbers 
• Types and number of annunciators the operating crew many 
 encounter 
• Locations of the crew – Control room/ex-control actions. 
• Potential cues that will alert the crew to perform certain tasks 
• Related human interactions that could act as recoveries 
2. Define each action such that it can be modeled as a basic event.  Each definition 
should include identifying what the initiating event is and what the possible out 
comes of the action are. NUREG 1792 Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 provide specific 
recommendations.  
3. Conceptualize post-initiators actions as two parts: the cognitive portion and the 
execution portion.  For the cognitive portion describe in as much detail as possible 
how the crew will know to perform the action and take note of when in the sequence 
of events the crew will receive a cue to perform the action. For the execution portion 
it is important to identify individual critical actions and potential performance 
shaping factors that would impact the crew’s performance. 
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JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE QUANTIFICATION STAGE 
 Once the action has been defined the HRA analyst must employ the use of 
engineering judgment several more times in order to quantity each HEP value.  The 
following recommendations are intended to be used as good practice guidance for 
quantification using the HRA Calculator and have been compiled from the following 
sources: results of two surveys of HRA experts, review of the original methodologies, 
review the CPSES complete HRA using the HRA Calculator, and mathematical 
comparison among methods applied by the HRA Calculator. These recommendations are 
not intended to be used as cook-book formula for the HRA Calculator but instead 
provide guidance for inexperienced HRA analysts on how current HRA analysts render 
these same judgments.  
 
Choice of methodology 
 There are several different approaches to selecting a method by which to 
calculate Pcog. Appendix D describes the parameters recommended by SHARP1 in 
identifying which methodology to use3. While the HRA Calculator is not a single 
method, it can be evaluated using the same parameters as the individual methods. The 
SHARP1 report3 identifies which methods were available for quantification in 1990, but 
it does not give guidance on how to interpret and to complete any analysis using an 
identified method. At the time of the SHARP1 publication, the HRA Calculator had not 
yet been developed. SHARP1 provides the user with an overview of mechanics of each 
method but gives little insight into strengths and weaknesses of the mathematical 
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modeling of each method.  The user of the HRA Calculator may wish to consult this 
table if previous analyses are available for comparison and they wish to gain insight on 
why one method was chosen over another.  
 Table 100 shows the strengths and weaknesses of each methodology as used 
within the HRA Calculator. If the HRA analyst has identified that one parameter should 
be a dominating influence on the HEP calculation, it is important to ensure that the 
method accounts for that parameter accordingly.   
 
Table 100 
Strength and Weakness of Each Method Employed by the HRA Calculator 
Method Strength Weakness 
Annunciator 
Response Model 
Requires little input 
Simple to understand 
Not widely used by industry  
Does not explicitly account for time, 
stress, procedures, training or crew work 
load  
Derived from engineering judgments 
HCR/ORE 
Correlation 
Explicitly accounts for time 
dependence 
 
Derived from simulator data 
For actions where there is a long time 
(several hours) available the correlation 
gives unrealistically low Pcog values.  
For actions where there is a short time(5 
minutes or less) available the correlation 
give unrealistically high Pcog values. 
CBDTM Method Explicitly addresses  the use of 
procedures during accident 
sequences. 
Address a variety of different 
parameters that have the potential 
to influence the probability of 
failure.  
Derived from both engineering 
judgments and practical 
experience. 
Requires detailed information about the 
action, which is not always available 
Knowledge-based actions may be difficult 
to model because method focuses on how 
operators use procedures. For knowledge 
based actions typically no procedures are 
used. 
Widely used in industry 
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Once the HRA analyst has an understanding of the strengths and weakness of each 
method, the choice of which method to use may become clear. If the user is still not 
certain which method is best suited for an action, the following steps are recommended. 
1) Complete the analysis using the CBDTM method.  The CBDTM method 
addresses the most parameters and requires the user to gather the most 
information. Using this method will ensure that analyst has considered and 
documented all possible parameters. 
2) Recalculate the HEP using the HCR/ORE Correlation.  Using the HRA 
Calculator this is a simple task, and all the information can be imported from the 
CBDTM calculation.  The user must be sure to complete the window labeled 
Pcog. The HRA Calculation will import default values into this window, not the 
data used in the CBDTM method. For most actions, one can expect that the two 
methods will give results to within the same order of magnitude. Two large 
exceptions are: 
a. For actions that are high stress and T1/2 is less than five minutes the 
HCR/ORE Correlation will produce a consistently higher probability. 
b. For actions in which the Pexe value is exceptionally low (below 5E-4) the 
two methods will diverge. If this is encountered, it is best to reconsider 
the recoveries applied to the Pexe value.  
3) As a conservative approach the higher final probability of the two calculations 
should be used.   Special consideration must be taken if there is a very short time 
available to complete the action (less than five minutes), because the HCR/ORE 
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Correlation tends to give exceptionally high values. In some situations the 
analyst can justify this high value, but sometimes it seems unrealistic, and the 
HRA analyst may wish to defer back to the CBDTM method.  
4) Document and save both calculations for reference.  
 The Annunciator Response model is difficult to justify because it is only 
influenced by the number of annunciators an operator receives in the control room. If 
this is the dominating influence, then this model is acceptable. Otherwise, the HCR/ORE 
Correlation or the CBDTM Method should be used. On the positive side, the 
Annunciator Response Model and the CBDTM Method do give results which agree to 
within the same order of magnitude, and approximately 62% of actions will agree to 
within one significant digit.  Using the Annunciator Response Model may lead a 
reviewer to question why other parameters were not explicitly considered in the 
calculation of Pcog.  
 
Stress 
 Within the calculation of Pexe, the stress parameter is based upon THERP. If an 
analyst is familiar with the THERP methodology and new to the HRA Calculator, the 
following differences should be noted.  THERP defines stress as four levels 6: 
• Very Low – Insufficient arousal to keep alert – PSF = 2 
• Optimum –  Facilitative level  - PSF =1 
• Moderately High – Slightly to moderately disruptive – PSF = 2 
• Extremely High – Very disruptive – PSF = 5 
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 The tabulated probabilities in THERP presume an optimum level of stress.  It is 
important to understand these definitions, because the HRA Calculator only allows the 
user to choose among the following three options with no definitions to accompany the 
choices:9 
• Low/Optimum – PSF =1 
• Moderate – PSF = 2 
• High – PSF = 5 
Furthermore, every tabulated failure probability referenced within the HRA Calculator 
was derived assuming optimum stress as defined within THERP.  Because THERP uses 
four levels and the HRA Calculator only uses three levels, is more important to choose a 
PSF value rather than a specific level designation. The responses from the surveys show 
that different analysts use different stress level classifications for the same PSF. 
Therefore, it is important to document both the stress level classification and the PSF 
(See Chapter VII – Stress Level).  From this point forward, it will be assumed that stress 
levels are defined as used within the HRA Calculator.      
 Very low stress as defined by THERP does not fit within the three definitions of 
the HRA Calculator. If an analyst would like to apply this term within the HRA 
Calculator, one option would be to choose moderate stress to match the PSF of 2.  Then, 
in the comments section make careful and clear comments that this is a very low stress 
action.  The PSF value is what is important; the classification is for documentation.   
 Low/optimum stress can be considered the same as optimum level stress as 
defined by THERP. This type of stress is characterized by active interaction between the 
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operating crew and the environment at a pace that they manage comfortably.  Low stress 
actions are typically actions that crews complete on a routine bases, and they can 
anticipate how the plant is going to respond. The crew is comfortable in performing this 
action either because it is routine, or they have received extensive training on this action.  
For optimum stress level actions, the plant is not in imminent danger of core damage, 
and the crew will not feel pressure to complete the actions within time constraints.  
 Moderate stress level is comparable to the THERP level of moderately high 
stress.  A moderate stress level is used for actions that require the crew to perform 
several tasks at a rapid pace. The crew has had both simulator and classroom training on 
this action but is not required to perform the action on a routine basis.  THERP 
references the following examples as moderate stress actions: 
• Single transients (Other than large LOCA), that involve shutdown of the 
reactor and turbine.6 
• Tasks preformed during startup and shut down that must be performed with 
time constraints.6 
In addition to these types of actions, HRA analysts classify the following events as 
moderately stressed actions (See Chapter VII – Stress Level): 
• The crew currently has the plant under control but the situation is quickly 
evolving and operator actions are time critical. 
• The operators receive multiple instruments and alarms unexpectedly at the same 
time. 
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 High stress is comparable to extremely high stress as defined by THERP. Other 
HRA analysts often refer to this type of stress as extreme. THERP defines high stress as 
a level of stress that “threatens a crews well-being.”6 For operating crews this would be 
the threat that the crew has lost control of the situation and without action core damage 
is imminent. High stress actions are always time dependent. The tasks involved in these 
actions are skill- or knowledge-based, and inexperienced crew members are hesitant to 
perform these tasks.  Examples of high stress actions include: 
• Actions that are necessary because the crew has previously misdiagnosed an 
event, and now the plant is not responding as expected. 
• The consequence of the action has the potential for radiation release not only to 
the public but also workers.6 
• Several emergency backup systems have already failed. 
• Work preformed within a radiation environment where protective clothing must 
be worn.6 
 Because each action is complex and unique, the parameters that influence stress 
will vary among actions, and no formula can be used to determine a stress level.   
Furthermore, individual analysts tend to create individual approaches to determining a 
stress level. Therefore, it is not appropriate or justifiable to make a general assumption 
about stress levels within a complete HRA. For example, an HRA analyst may want to 
state that optimal stress will be used as a default value, because operators are well 
trained (See Chapter VI Assumption 1 and Assumption 30). If an independent reviewer 
disagrees with this assumption, they will specifically question the stress choice in each 
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and every calculation. The analyst will also spend a significant amount of time within 
each calculation justifying why the assumption was appropriate in each case.  If one 
wishes to state a general assumption at the beginning of an analysis, it is better to 
comment about the approach by which the stress level will be determined. As in the 
example above, one could state: To determine a stress level, a moderate stress level was 
first considered, then adjusted up or downward depending on type of training the crew 
has received.    
 To determine a stress level the following steps are recommended for an analyst to 
follow in order to encompass all the areas that influence stress which current analysts 
feel are important to consider.  
1. Consider all parameters (shown in Table 101) that influence the stress of the operating 
crew.   
2. Using information obtained in step one, assign a stress level with appropriate PSF 
value used to calculate Pexe.  While there could be some variation among HRA analysts 
on a stress level chosen, if the main influences of stress have been identified, the HRA 
analyst should have little difficultly justifying to reviewers his choice for the stress level.   
 If all the influences have little or no effect on the stress level then an optimal 
level of stress should be used. Similarly, if all the influences are considered as high 
contributors to stress then a high stress level should be used. There will obviously be a 
gray area at the boundary between the low and moderate stress and moderate and high 
stress. 
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 If actions are required to be completed in a limited amount of time such that the 
crew is aware of the time constraints, then either a moderator or a high level of stress 
should be used. HRA analysts, as well as THERP, agree that if protective clothing is 
needed because of environmental conditions, then the stress level should be high. One of 
defining differences between moderate and high stress is that for high stress actions the 
crew is aware that core damage is imminent, because either several back up systems 
have failed or they have already failed a different action.    
 Users of the HRA Calculator have the option of choosing different stress levels 
for different tasks within an action. Unless specific actions are completed by two 
different people at independent locations with significant time between the actions, it is 
difficult to justify using different stress levels between different sub-tasks within a 
specific action.  It is best to apply a stress level to the operating crew as opposed to 
trying to identify how each member will respond to the action.  
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Table 101 
Parameters to Consider When Identifying a Stress Level 
 
Sequence of 
events occurring 
in the plant 
This includes identifying what has previously occurred and what the 
operators anticipate will occur.     
 
Timing  There are two parts to consider in the influence of timing and its impact on 
stress level; First, how long has the crew already been involved in this 
sequence of events? Naturally, as the sequence progresses the stress level of 
the operating crew should also increase.  Second, how much time is 
available to for the crew to diagnose and to respond to the action? If the 
crew is under shorter-than-normal time constraints to complete the action, 
then a moderate or high stress level should be used.     
Crew’s 
familiarity with 
the tasks 
Training is a separate parameter discussed in latter sections. The crew’s 
familiarity with the action can come from training exercises and by 
identifying how often the crew performs the same series of tasks on a 
routine basis. One would expect that the more training a crew receives on 
action the less stress the crew will feel.  
Clarity of 
procedures 
The analyst should take note of how procedures will be followed during an 
action.  For skill-based actions, procedures will be memorized and the use of 
procedures should have little or no effect on stress level. For rule-or 
knowledge-based actions, procedures will be used in hand, and if 
exceptionally clear could aid the crew and potentially lower the stress level. 
If the procedures are ambiguous or confusing, the stress level of the crew 
would tend to increase.  For knowledge-based actions, procedures will need 
to be interpreted, and this should lead to a stress level of moderate or high.    
Environmental 
conditions 
Because Version 2.01 of the HRA Calculator does not account for 
environmental conditions explicitly as a PSF, the environmental conditions 
should be accounted for within the choice of stress level. If the 
environmental conditions are the same as normal operating conditions, then 
this parameter should have no influence on the stress level. This is because 
the tabulated values for errors of omission and errors of commission are 
normalized to the “normal” conditions in which they were measured.  If the 
crew is working in a high radiation environment, then a high level of stress 
should be chosen.   
Alarms and 
signals  received 
from plant 
It is important to identify what signals the crew expects to receive for the 
sequence being analyzed. If the signals can be used to diagnose several 
different accident scenarios and are unclear, this could lead to confusion 
among crew members thus increasing the stress level.  If the alarms, provide 
clear identification of a specific accident, then the stress level of the crew 
could decrease. If using the Annunciator Response Model, the analyst must 
identify how many annunciators are present for diagnosing the event. As the 
number of annunciators increases, the stress level of the crew will also 
increase. 
Number or tasks 
required 
As the number of tasks increase, the stress level should also slightly increase. 
This influence should be ranked below other influences because, if the tasks 
are performed on a routine bases, several tasks should be routine, and the 
crew could feel comfortable performing these actions.  
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3. Ask operators what they would estimate the stress level to be.  It is common practice 
for HRA analysts to ask operators for opinions about how stressful certain actions are to 
perform. When interviewing operators it is critical that the operators understand the 
context in which the questions are being asked. Before asking questions about stress, it is 
important to review why you are interested in determining a stress level and the 
definition of each level as applied to the HRA Calculator. The operators may consider 
every action to be high stress, but using the HRA Calculator definition of high stress this 
is not appropriate.  
 There are situations in which the HRA analyst and the operators will disagree on 
the stress level.  If this arises, the analyst should go back to step 1 and discuss each 
parameter with the operators and determine whether that the HRA analyst and operators 
are in agreement. If there is still no agreement after the discussion (assuming the analyst 
is confident in his evaluation), the HRA analyst’s decision should used.  This is because 
the HRA analyst should be most familiar with how this input will influence the HEP 
calculation.       
4. Match the explicit stress choice determined in Pexe to the implicit stress level 
used within Pcog. The Annunciator Response Model and the CBDTM Method both have 
considered stress implicitly in the calculation of Pcog. The HCR/ORE Correlation uses 
stress explicitly, but the only choices the user has available are high or low stress. Once 
a stress level has been identified for the Pexe portion, it is good practice to ensure 
consistency between Pexe and Pcog.  Consistency does not necessarily mean that the stress 
levels are the same. The survey responses show that HRA analysts often use a variation 
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between Pexe and Pcog in order to best model each individual action.  If there is not 
consistently between the two, the user has three options: First, re-examine the stress 
level identified for Pexe taking careful note of the parameters within the Pcog portions. 
Second, choose a different method to calculate Pcog that considers stress more 
appropriately. Third, simply document the discrepancy and continue the calculation. The 
third option should be used only when other approaches have been exhausted.    
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 If using the Annunciator Response Model to calculate Pcog, stress level must be a 
function of the number of annunciators the crew receives to diagnose an event. The HRA 
analyst must be able to justify that stress level of the operating crew also increases in 
proportion to the number of annunciators.  
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Using the HCR/ORE Correlation, the user must judge the stress level as high or 
low. There is no choice for moderate stress level. Low and high stress are defined the 
same as in Pexe.  If an HRA analyst determines a moderate stress level for  Pexe, then one 
option to ensure consistently is to interpolate between high and low stress used in Pcog. 
This is possible because stress is the final branch in the decision tree used to calculate 
sigma, and the HRA Calculator allows the override function to be used.  In the 
documentation section, the user must document why the override function was used.  
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 Another option would be to reconsider the stress level in Pexe, and identify if the 
action could be re-categorized as high or low stress instead of moderate. This approach 
would be consistent, but changing the stress level used in Pexe could influence the end 
result by a factor of three.   
 
CBDTM Method 
 Stress is accounted for within the decision trees by identifying the parameters 
that could influence stress such as training, workload of the operating crew, and clarity 
of the procedures. In step 1 the analyst will identify all of these parameters, and when 
doing the Pcog calculation needs to consider these decision branches in the same manner 
as done in step one. It should be noted the decision trees are not affected by timing 
information, and if the analyst determines that the stress level is dominated by a limited 
amount of time, then the CBDTM method is a poor methodology choice.       
 
Rule-, skill-, or knowledge-based designation 
 Rule-based, skill-based, and knowledge-based actions are defined in the HRA 
Calculator in the same manner as THERP. THERP defines skill-based actions as actions 
that consist of more or less subconscious routines governed by stored patterns of 
behavior. Typically, current HRA analysts refer to skill-based actions as actions that are 
memorized and can be preformed without consulting procedures. While these actions are 
usually stated in the procedures, the operators are so familiar with the situation that they 
do not directly consult procedures. Examples of these types of actions include: 
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Manipulating a single switch in response to an expected annunciator, manually tripping 
the reactor during ATWS event, or operator uses hand tool to perform routine 
maintenance.   
 THERP defines rule-based actions as actions that require a more conscious effort 
in following stored (or written) rules. Typically, HRA analysts refer to rule-based 
actions as actions which are proceduralized, and the operating crew is familiar with 
general procedure guidance.  These actions are compliance based, and procedures are 
always referenced. Most of the failure probabilities provided by THERP and given 
within the HRA Calculator are for rule-based actions.  
 Knowledge-based actions, as defined by THERP, are actions in which the tasks 
are, to some extent, unfamiliar and there is considerable cognition involved in deciding 
what to do.  HRA analysts refer to knowledge-based actions as actions in which the crew 
must formalize a solution based on symptoms of the plant and no written procedures 
exist.  Within a complete HRA, there are typically very few knowledge-based actions 
modeled within a PRA. In current plants, there is comprehensive training and procedures 
for most anticipated operator actions.  If an HRA analyst encounters a knowledge-based 
action, they typically exclude the action from the PRA model because it occurs outside 
the scope of the PRA, or the probability of failure is set to one. The methods employed 
by the HRA Calculator poorly model these types of actions because of the extremely 
complex level of cognition involved.  
 To determine the classification of each action, it is recommended that the HRA 
analyst consult Table 102. This table lists the different aspects that characterize each 
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type of action. For each parameter, the HRA analyst should be able to identify which 
category the actions fit into.  After reviewing the complete table, the type of action that 
is identified most often should be used to classify the action.  
 
Table 102 
Parameters Used for Classification of Actions 
 Skill-based actions Rule-based actions Knowledge-based 
actions 
How are procedures 
used within the action? 
All procedure are 
memorized. 
Procedures are used in 
hand even though 
experienced crew 
members may have 
procedure memorized. 
There are no specific 
procedures used for 
diagnosing the action. 
Once the crew 
diagnoses the event, 
there may or may not be 
exact procedures 
suitable for use. 
Do crew members 
have general 
procedure guidance 
committed to 
memory? 
Yes Yes, the crew will know 
what to expect, but they 
will not react until 
directed to do so by the 
procedures. 
No, because event has 
proceeded beyond 
procedures’ 
applicability. 
Are the actions 
committed to 
memory? 
Yes Sometimes No 
What type and how 
often does the crew 
receive training on this 
action? 
The crew has received 
extensive training on 
these types of actions, 
and these actions are 
practiced often. 
The crew has received 
training on these types 
of actions, but the 
actions are not practiced 
regularly. 
There is no formal 
training for these types 
of actions. 
How much 
communication among 
crew members is 
expected? 
The crew will respond 
immediately, and no 
communication is 
necessary. 
Typically, three-way 
communication will be 
employed. 
The crew will have 
extensive discussion on 
developing a solution. 
  
 Once the action has been assigned a classification, the HRA Calculator requires 
the user to identify the complexity of the both the cognitive and execution portion as 
simple or complex. While this may be useful in understanding the action being modeled, 
the user’s response has no numerical impact on the results.  Thus, the user should 
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attempt to classify the action but should not exhaust time or resources on these sub-
classes. If no choice is input, the HRA Calculator assigns the action a default value of 
complex.    
  Within the HCR/ORE Correlation, the user must identify the action as rule-based 
or skill-based. There is no choice for knowledge-based actions.  If the analyst identifies 
the action as knowledge-based, it is recommended that another method be used for 
quantification of Pcog. The CBDTM Method may not be appropriate to model 
knowledge-based actions, because this model is highly dependent upon the crew’s use of 
procedures. For knowledge-based actions the event has proceeded beyond procedures 
applicability. If an action is considered to be knowledge-based, the user has two options: 
1) choose a different methodology not presented within the HRA Calculator or 2) apply 
a conservative approach and set the probability of failure to one.  
 
Timing information 
 Depending upon the methodology used to calculate Pcog, timing information 
influences the calculation of Pcog differently. (See judgment section). Taking note of this, 
it is still recommended that all judgments about timing be rendered following the same 
set of guidelines.  Furthermore, it is recommended that all timing information be 
collected and documented regardless of what is specifically input into the calculation. 
This provides complete documentation of the action as well as provides justification for 
the method selected.  
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 There are several different ways in which an HRA analyst can collect timing 
information. Table 103 gives a list of possible sources of timing information.  
 
Table 103 
Sources of Timing Information Ranked in Order of Importance 
 Tw and Tdelay TM T1/2 
1 Engineering analysis 
such as MAAP or other 
thermal-hydraulic codes 
Observation of action in 
the simulator.  
Simulator and training records 
2 Manufactures 
recommendations 
Operations records  T1/2 =Tw –(Tdelay+Tm) 
3 FSAR Job performance 
measures  
Operator interviews 
4 Timings referenced in 
procedures 
Operator interviews Estimation based on talking 
through procedures 
5 Calculations used in 
similar PRA models 
ASEP recommendations   
 
To collect timing information the HRA analyst should begin by examining the first 
method listed in Table 103 and proceed down the table until all information is gathered.   
 If possible, it is recommended that more than one source be used for comparison 
of timing information; this would determine consistency between sources or make the 
HRA analyst aware of potential differences. The times need to be representative of times 
that would actually occur during the accident sequence and not ideal conditions. An 
HRA analyst could simply use a stop watch to time Tw during a simulator exercise. In 
the true scenario, the operators could respond differently because of more confusion, 
higher stress level, or different environmental conditions. Comparing two sources of 
information would alert the HRA analyst of any overly optimistic times that may have 
been obtained.         
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 After the timing information has been collected, the HRA analyst must address 
the question: Is there enough time available to complete the action?  If not, the HRA 
Calculator will not allow the user to proceed, and the HRA analyst will either have to 
assume the probability of failure is 1, or re-examine the times being used within the 
HRA Calculator.  
  
Annunciator Response Model 
 The probabilities for this method were intended to be interpreted such that as 
time increases, the severity of the accident will also increase. If this is not the case for 
the action being modeled, then another method should be used to calculate Pcog. 
 
HCR/ORE Correlation 
 Timing is the dominating parameter in the HCR/ORE Correlation, especially T1/2 
and Tw. Pcog is so sensitive to the ratio of Tw/T1/2 that a one minute variation in Tw can 
change the Pcog value up to 50% .  Because of this, the HRA analyst must recognize this 
high degree of sensitivity will produce large uncertainty in the calculation of Pcog.  This 
is especially true when Tw is very short (less than about 5 minutes); for theses types of 
actions, the HRA analyst must consider if timing is the dominating influence on Pcog. If it 
is, then the HCR/ORE Correlation is appropriate to use.  
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CBDTM Method 
 The CBDTM uses timing information to provide recommendations on 
considering additional crew who many be available for recovery. The longer the 
sequence progresses, the more people will become involved; and their presence may be 
credited in cognitive recovery. It is recommended that the HRA analyst follow the 
recommendation of the HRA Calculator for determining times at which additional crew 
can be credited. (See judgments section on timing)      
 
Training 
 Classification of the type of training as simulator or classroom should be 
relatively clear to an HRA analyst. It is recommended that HRA analysts consult with 
training instructors and training records to determine how often and what type of training 
occurs. The number of times an action is trained has no numeric effect on quantification. 
It does give the analyst an idea of how comfortable a crew should be at performing an 
action which would affect the stress level. HRA analysts agree that engineering 
judgments about training should also impact judgments about stress and action 
complexity.         
 HRA analysts tend to agree that most Level 1, post-initiator actions modeled for 
U.S nuclear power plants are well-trained. If this assumption is applied to a complete 
HRA analysis by always using the most optimistic values, then the actions are not 
differentiable by different types and degrees of training. This is problematic, because all 
analysts agree that different types and degrees of training should be a dominating 
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parameter in determining the HEP. This is considered to be a weakness of the HRA 
Calculator because training is not explicitly modeled as a PSF within the calculation of 
Pexe. It is recognized within Pcog using the CBDTM Method and the HCR/ORE 
Correlation. Some of the decision trees explicitly differentiate between simulator or 
classroom training and it is recommended that analysts not choose the most optimistic 
value but instead take the time extra time to identify differences between classroom and 
simulator training.  
 For additional guidance on how to render specific engineering judgments within 
decision tree nodes for both the CBDTM Method and the HCR/ORE Correction, it is 
recommended that analysts following the recommendations within the HRA Calculator.  
 
Procedures  
 The use of procedures by operating crews within U.S nuclear power plants is 
considered by most to be second nature.  In addition to identifying which procedures will 
be used during the accident scenario, the HRA analyst must also address the high level 
question: How does the use of procedures affect the probability of failure? This question 
can be further broken into small questions. 
• How will the operating crew know to transfer to another procedure if necessary? 
• How are the procedures used by the operating crew? For example, the crew could 
have the procedures in hand, or they may complete the steps from memory. 
• How does the clarity of the procedure affect the actions of the operating crew? 
• How accurately does the operator or operating crew follow the procedures? 
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 To answer these questions, it is recommended that the HRA analyst observe at 
least one action during a simulator exercise.  It is not practical for an analyst to observer 
every action modeled, but observation of similar simulator exercises would provided the 
analyst with a general understanding of how a crew, specific to the plant being modeled, 
uses procedures. To further understand the use of procedures it is recommended that the 
analyst do a talk through of each action with the procedure in hand and ask the operators 
how they would answer the above questions.   
 Procedures are used within the calculation of Pexe when specifically identifying 
critical actions and recoveries applied to specific tasks. Version 2.01 of the HRA 
Calculator requires the user to identify a step number from the procedures for every 
critical action and recovery.  For most actions this is simple task. There are actions in 
which procedures are not used in hand, and no step number can be identified. In these 
situations, it is recommended that the user simply place a dummy variable in place of the 
step number.  The user can not leave this input blank.  By requiring the user to input a 
step number the program inadvertently assumes all actions are proceduralized.      
 NUREG 1792 provides a list of procedure characteristics that could be 
considered to have negative impacts on the HEP. Most of these specific parameters are 
identified within the CBDTM Method only. Again, like training, procedures are not 
addressed as an independent PSF within Pexe, and many HRA analysts consider this a 
weakness of the HRA Calculator.  
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HCR/ORE Correlation 
 The HRA Calculator recommends that the decision node about procedures 
address the extent of procedural guidance and the cues available.  For example, whether 
the procedure, itself, is sufficient to guide the operator or whether he/she also has to 
monitor meters, position indicators, etc. This can be identified by answering the 
following two questions:   
1) “Is the procedural guidance simple/explicit enough; e.g., one step, clearly 
defined (is it unnecessary to monitor meters/alarms to make the correct 
decision)? 
 
2) Are the indications/alarms clear enough to support a decision, or is it 
necessary to take additional observations to reach a correct decision?  Is the 
diagnostic straightforward without the need for consulting SPDS or bringing 
in additional crew members?”9 
 
The decision tree used to determine sigma was developed as part of the HRA Calculator 
and these questions and recommendations come directly from the HRA Calculator 
User’s manual 
 
CBDTM Method 
 Within the CBDTM Method judgments about procedures are made within the 
following decision trees.   
• Pcd – Information Misleading 
• Pce –Skip a Step in the Procedure 
• Pcf – Misinterpret Instructions 
• Pcg – Misinterpret Decision Logic 
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It is recommended that for most of the decision nodes addressing procedures the analyst 
answer each question by simple observation of the procedure. Most of the nodes have 
concrete, obtainable solutions and require little judgment by the analyst. The following 
nodes have been identified to require sometimes subjective judgments, and further 
recommendations are provided.     
 Pce –Skip a Step in the Procedure –The analyst must address the node titled 
Hidden vs Obvious.  Most procedures have been updated to correct for potentially 
hidden steps, and the hidden branch is seldom used. A hidden step is considered to be 
one of the following: 
• A step that is given within a caution statement,  
• A step located on the back of a page,  
• More than one step is contained within a single statement,  
• The step references another procedure that is difficult to locate.  
 Also within the Pce tree, the user must address the node titled graphically distinct.  
There is no common definition of graphically distinct among HRA analysts. 
Furthermore, they define graphically distinct in vague terms such as, not easily 
overlooked, or not easy to mix up. EPRI Report TR-100259, gives the following 
example of graphically distinct:  
“Steps that form the apex of branches in flowchart procedures, steps 
proceeded by notes or cautions, and steps that are formatted to emphasize 
logic terms are more eye-catching than simple action steps, and are less 
likely to be overlooked simply because the look different than 
surrounding steps.  However, this effect is diluted if there are several such 
steps in view at one time (as on a typical flowchart), and for this reason 
the only steps on flowcharts that should be credited as being graphically 
distinct are those at the junction of two branching flow paths.”8 
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  For non-flow chart procedures, it is recommended bulleted, boxed, or other 
highlighting techniques be identified as graphically distinct. Also steps listed first in a 
series of steps or which is the only step given on a page can be considered graphically 
distinct.      
 Pcf – Misinterpret Instructions – Within this tree, the analyst must address the 
node titled, Standard or Ambiguous Wording.  Again, HRA analysts tend to agree that 
most procedures in current plants have been updated to remove ambiguously worded 
steps. EPRI Report TR-100259, recommends the following three questions be addressed 
within this decision node:  
1) “Does the step include unfamiliar nomenclature or an unusual grammatical 
construction?   
 
2) Does anything about the wording require explanation in order to arrive at 
the intended interpretation?   
 
3) Does the proper interpretation of the step require an inference about the 
future state of the plant?”8 
 
Answering yes to any of the above questions would alert the HRA analyst that the 
procedure has ambiguous wording.  Furthermore, HRA analysts also use some additional 
criteria. 
• Qualitative statements such as pressure is too high, are considered to be 
ambiguously worded because of the word too. 
• The use of double negatives within a procedure step is considered to be 
ambiguously worded.  
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Human interactions with hardware 
 For each critical action identified within Pexe the HRA analyst must identify both 
an error of omission and an error of commission for every critical action and recovery. 
The HRA Calculator provides the user with tabulated failure probabilities, which were 
taken from THERP.  HRA analysts all agree THERP provides the most complete set of 
failure data available, and they seldom use other available databases. It is, therefore, 
recommended that HRA analyst use the provided databank and only under rare 
circumstances use data from other sources.  
 The HRA Calculator has modified some of the THERP probabilities based on 
Swain’s recommendations to credit exceptionally well-written procedures. Current HRA 
Calculator users tend to agree that these modifications from the original methodology 
are appropriate. But, HRA analysts using other methods feel that these modifications are 
overly optimistic. In order to obtain consistency among HRA Calculator users, it is 
recommended that users of the HRA Calculator use the tabulated probabilities provided 
in the HRA Calculator and not refer back to the original THERP values.    
 For errors of omission it is recommended that HRA analysts use Table 20-7 
exclusively for post-initiator actions. Within this table the HRA analyst must identify 
where the procedure contains a short list (less than 10 items) or a long list (greater than 
10 items). It is recommended that each proceduralized step be considered an item.  Also, 
within THERP Table 20-7 the user must determine if check off provisions are correctly 
used. It is recommended that the analyst specifically identify if there are check off  
provisions and the crew actually uses them. This has lead several analyst to produce 
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recommendations for improvements within various procedures by adding check-offs 
which lowered CDF.  It is not appropriate to assume that all EOPs use check off steps 
without physically identifying them.   
 For errors of commission it is recommended that HRA analysts do the following: 
1) observe the control room layout and if time permits do a walk-through, 2) identify 
procedures being followed and 3) understand the sequence of events being modeled. 
Without completing all three items the HRA analyst can not choose an appropriate 
value.  Typically, HRA analysts use THERP Table 20-12 for most post-initiators, and 
occasionally THERP Tables 20-11, 20-13 will also be used.       
 
Annunciator Response Model 
 The Annunciator Response Model is only impacted by this parameter. The 
analyst must determine how many annunciators the operating crew will observe before 
they can diagnose and correct the problem.  This is a difficult problem to address, 
because THERP defines a single annunciator as a group of alarms or indicators that 
trained operators regard as a single unit and does not further define single unit.  This is a 
rather subjective decision, and most HRA Calculator users do not apply this method. It is 
recommended that if an analyst is not able to differentiate clearly between single or 
groups of annunciators, then the CBDTM Method or the HCR/ORE Correlation be used 
to calculate Pcog.  
 HRA analysts who do use this model agree that there are three ways in which to 
collect annunciator data. 
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1) Use alarm response procedures 
2) Operator or training instructor interviews 
3) Simulator observation 
It is recommended that HRA analysts begin by identifying all potential alarms listed 
within alarm response procedures.  Then discuss the list with training instructors to 
identify if some annunciators could be grouped together because they are always trained 
together.  These interviews will also provide useful insight into identifying annunciators 
other than alarms that would aid the crew in diagnosing the response.  Observation of 
simulator exercises would be useful for the analyst to compare his list of annunciators to 
those that are important during the scenario. However, using simulator observations as 
the primary source for data would be difficult to justify unless the action being modeled 
is identical to the simulator exercise.  The alarms are highly dependent upon the specific 
action.    
  It should be noted that THERP provides a method for taking credit for the 
presence of additional people, and if an analyst would want to credit additional people 
for recovery, they would have to modify the result of the calculations external to the 
HRA Calculator. There is no override function available within the Annunciator 
Response Model. 
 
CBDTM Method 
 Pca- Availability of Information- Within this tree the user must determine 
whether there are indications available to correctly diagnose the accident and then 
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determine if the indicators are accurate. For most Level 1 post-initiator actions the HRA 
analyst can assume that unless the indicator is malfunctioning because of the initiating 
event, it is available for correct diagnoses. There are few situations in which the 
indication is not available and they include: 
• Fire in or near the control room. 
• Prolonged station blackout after battery depletion 
These exceptions are considered rare, but when they do occur, the analyst must then 
carefully address the rest of the decision tree nodes, because this tree would then become 
a dominating factor to the overall HEP.   
 Pcb –Failure of Attention – First, the analysts must determine whether the work 
load of the crew is high or low.  It is recommended that HRA analysts use the following 
criteria in Table 104 to differentiate between high and low work load. 
 
Table 104 
High vs Low Workload 
 High Work Load Low Work Load 
Number of required steps listed 
in procedures. 
Greater than 10 steps Less than or equal to 10 steps 
Number of operators in crew 
compared to number tasks. 
More tasks than operators 
available to complete 
simultaneous tasks. 
No single operator is assigned 
more than one task at a time 
Number of procedures being 
used. 
Two or more simultaneously Only one procedure at a time 
Number of parameters crew 
must keep track of within 
response. 
Greater than two  Less than or equal two  
  
 215
 Next, within the Pcb decision tress, the analyst must determine whether the 
control panel needs to be continuously monitored or checked only once. This is usually 
specified within the procedure steps. 
 Table 105 gives commonly-used terms which can be applied to differentiate 
between monitor and check. In addition to identifying these key words listed in the 
procedures, operator interviews would also be of great benefit to the HRA analyst. 
 
Table 105 
 Terms Used to Differentiate Between Monitor and Check 
Check Monitor 
Verify PERFORM ……. UNTIL set point is reached. 
Ensure MAINTAIN level BETWEEN ……. 
 CONTROL level BETWEEN …….. 
 WAIT UNITL …………. 
 
  
 Pcc – Misread/miscommunication – In the first node the user must address the 
following question:  
“Is the layout, demarcation, and labeling of the control boards such that it 
is easy to locate the required indicator?”9   
 
HRA analysts tend to agree that most indicators are easy to locate for control room 
actions directed by EOPs. An indicator would be considered difficult to locate if it is 
located on the back panel and out of general sight of the operators.   For ex-control room 
actions, this node is more difficult to address and would require the HRA analyst to go 
physically into the plant and watch an operator perform this task.   
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 Next, the HRA analyst must address the question asked by the HRA Calculator:  
“Does the required indicator have human engineering deficiencies that are 
conducive to errors in reading the display?9  
 
HRA analysts agree that most control rooms have been updated to correct any human 
engineering deficiencies. When HRA analysts were asked if they could identify any 
groups or types of indicators that may be considered deficient the following suggestions 
were provided.  
• Indicators that required interpolation or extrapolation. 
• Indicators where the range of indication is large, but a precise measurement is 
needed. 
• Units or styles are different than similar indicators. 
• Reading is off the scale. 
• Reading is affected by glare or low illumination. 
 
Recoveries within an action 
 The HRA Calculator does not address the issue of recovery actions between 
individual actions. As a general rule of thumb, most HRA analysts only credit recoveries 
directed within the procedures. Furthermore, it is difficult to justify taking credit for site 
policies such as self-review for every action. 
 Most HRA analysts agree that justifiable HEP values are above 1E-5. The most 
prevalent mechanism to obtain probabilities lower than 1E-5 is to apply multiple 
recoveries. It is, therefore, recommended that recoveries not be applied if they lower the 
final HEP below 1E-5.   
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 To address dependency levels between actions and recoveries within Pexe, it is 
recommended that the HRA analyst use the recommendations provided within the HRA 
Calculator. THERP can also be consulted for further guidance if necessary. The HRA 
Calculator’s recommendations are based upon the stress level identified and the time 
available to complete the action.  It is difficult to provide further recommendations on 
how to assign a dependency level, because there is large disagreement among HRA 
analysts. Users of the HRA Calculator tend to follow the HRA Calculator 
recommendations, but HRA analysts using different methods all created unique and 
individual approaches.    
 
CBDTM Method 
 After completing each decision tree, the HRA Calculator asks the user to account 
for recoveries made by the presence of additional people.  The more time available to 
complete the action, the more people may become available for recovery. While there is 
a minimum amount of time available to allow additional crew, the user is not required to 
take credit for any recovery.  It is recommended that HRA analysts follow the 
recommendations of the HRA Calculator to apply recoveries to decision trees.  These 
recommendations were based on ERPI Report TR-100259. In addition, it is 
recommended that HRA analysts not take credit for self-review unless a requirement for 
it is explicitly stated in the procedures. Self-review is already credited within the 
decision trees.   
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Review of final HEP 
 Once an HEP value is obtained, the analyst must review the results to ensure that 
the value has physical meaning.  This is done by addressing the following questions:  
 1) Is the final value realistic? 
 2) Does the final value appear to be consistent among other actions within the 
 same analysis? 
 It is recommended that the analyst look at similar calculations using different 
methods and previous analysis. Analysts use previous calculations to identify an 
estimate of what the final value may be. However, this should be done with caution 
because in many cases the analyses have either been completed using a different method, 
or that plant conditions have been updated.   
 The second question can be addressed by comparing actions within the model. 
For example, analysts tend to agree that as more time is available the lower the failure 
probability, and this can be verified after each calculation. A second example is that as 
stress increases the probability of failure also increases.   
 HRA analysts tend to use a lower bound for HEP values in the range of 1E-6 and 
1E-4 with a tendency towards the higher end. This range of values can be used to 
identify the results that may be unrealistically low.  For results that may be 
unrealistically low it is recommended that the analyst review the entire calculation 
especially engineering judgments rendered about recoveries.  It is also recommended 
that prior to beginning a complete analysis that an analyst set a consistent lower bound 
regardless of which methodology is applied.  
 219
 Regardless of which methodology is used to calculate Pcog, it is recommended 
that analysts review Pcog in relation to the final HEP value.  In some cases Pcog will be 
exceptionally low (below 1E-6) and, therefore, not have any influence on the final 
results when compared to Pexe. However, if the analyst determines prior to completing 
the calculation that the cognitive portion of the action is a contributor to the failure 
probability, then the analyst may wish to apply another method for Pcog.  
 During the review stage it is also recommended the engineering judgments made 
about timing and recoveries be reviewed, because these judgments specifically have 
major influences on the numerical results.  
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 This study has identified thirteen areas of judgments (See Table 106) that an 
HRA analyst would have to render when completing an HEP calculation using the HRA 
Calculator. In addition, recommendations on how to render each of theses judgments 
have been proposed. The recommendations represent current HRA practice and identify 
what constitutes a complete, justifiable, well-documented calculation. In some instances, 
there were multiple approaches to rendering the same judgment, and the study’s 
recommendations try to incorporate theses different approaches into a single 
recommendation. For example, see Chapter VIII , Stress Level.   
 
Table 106 
Areas of Judgments That an HRA Analyst Will Render for a HEP Calculation Using the 
HRA Calculator. 
 
 
1 Identification and definition of actions to be modeled within the HRA Calculator 
2 Categorization of actions as pre- or  post-initiators 
3 Definition of critical actions 
4 Definition of cognitive portion of the action 
5 Choice of methodology 
6 Stress 
7 Rule-, skill- or knowledge-based designation 
8 Timing information 
9 Training 
10 Procedures 
11 Human interactions with hardware 
12 Recoveries and dependencies within an action. 
13 Review of final HEP 
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As part of this study, the results of the three methods employed by the HRA 
Calculator were compared for a complete set of post-initiator actions from a PRA. It is 
concluded that for the same input, the three methods generally produce HEP values on 
the same order of magnitude with two large exceptions: 
 1) Actions that are high stress and T1/2 is less than 5 minutes, and   
 2) Actions in which the Pexe value is exceptionally low (below about 5E-4). 
 If this study were to be continued, the next step would be to have an HRA analyst 
follow these recommendations for a complete analysis. While these recommendations 
were created by surveying current HRA analysts, it is expected that once an analyst tries 
to apply them, minor adjustments will need to be considered.   
 These recommendations have been created specifically for Version 2.0 of the 
HRA Calculator. It is expected that as newer versions of the HRA Calculator become 
available, the specific recommendations will need to be reconsidered, but the areas of the 
judgments will remain constant. (Assuming the methods are still the same.)  This is 
because the areas of judgment were created by consideration of the original 
methodologies as well as how the parameters are used within the HRA Calculator.    
 The field of HRA is still in its infancy, and there is a lack of databases of human 
failure probabilities. Therefore, engineering judgments are critical to all HEP 
calculations regardless of which method is being applied. As the field of HRA continues 
to develop, it is expected that more failure probabilities will be collected, and hopefully 
this will reduce the number of subjective judgments an HRA analyst needs to render for 
HEP calculations.  
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE Pcog CALCULATION USING THE CBDTM METHOD 
WITHIN THE HRA CALCULATOR 
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The following figures show the eight decision tress and the choices made for a sample 
Pcog calculation using the CBDTM Method. 
 
 
 
Fig. A-1.  Decision Tree Pca: Availability Of Information 
 
 
Fig. A-2. Decision Pcb Failure of Attention 
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Fig. A-3. Decision Tree Pcc Misread/miscommunicate data 
 
 
Fig. A-4. Decision Tree Pcd Information Misleading 
 
Fig. A-5. Decision Tree Pce Skip a Step in Procedure 
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Fig. A-6. Decision Tree Pcf Misinterpret Instruction 
 
Fig. A-7. Decision Tree Pcg Misinterpret Decision Logic 
 
 
Fig. A-8. Decision Tree Pch Decision Tree Pch Deliberate Violation 
  
228
TABLE A-I 
Sample Calculation Cognitive Unrecovered 
 
Pc Failure Mechanism Branch HEP 
Pca: Availability of Information a neg. 
Pcb: Failure of Attention a neg. 
Pcc: Misread/miscommunicate data a neg. 
Pcd: Information misleading a neg. 
Pce: Skip a step in procedure a 1.0e-03 
Pcf: Misinterpret instruction a neg. 
Pcg: Misinterpret decision logic k neg. 
Pch: Deliberate violation a neg. 
Sum of Pca through Pch = Initial Pc = 1.0e-03 
 
 
TABLE A-II: 
Sample Calculation for Cognitive Recovery 
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Value 
Pca: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Pcb: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Pcc: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Pcd: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Pce: 1.0e-03 X - - - - 1.0e-01 HD 5.0e-01 5.0e-04 
Pcf: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Pcg: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Pch: neg. - - - - - NC - 1.0  
Sum of Pca through Pch = Initial Pc =                                                                                                5.0 e-4 
DF-Dependency Factor 
HD –High Dependency 
NC- No Credit 
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INTRODUCTION 
Objective 
The overall objective of this study is to better understand the subjective use of 
engineering judgment as applied to analytical human reliablity analysis (HRA) methods. 
Your responses to this two-part survey will be used to study and identify when, why, and 
how to apply the use of engineering judgment in HRA.  The intended final results of this 
study will be a set of proposed guidelines on how and when it is appropriate to apply 
engineering judgment for modification of the results of the HRA Calculator.  These 
guidelines will benefit the probablisitic risk assesment (PRA) industry by providing 
insight on understanding engineering judgment, and this knowledge can be used to 
produce more consistent and justifiable human error probabilities (HEP) values. 
Comanche Peak Human Reliability Analysis 
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), has graciously provided their HRA for 
use in this study.  CPSES is a two unit, 4 Loop Westinghouse design Pressurized Water 
Reactors (PWR).  In 2004, CPSES updated their HRA analysis using the HRA 
Calculator.  The HRA under consideration for this study is for their Level 1 PRA for 
internal events during full power operations only.  
 
For the purpose of this study, you should assume that the analysis and data provided 
comes directly from CPSES. While the format of the information has been adjusted to 
meet the needs the study, the analysis has not been modified from what CPSES provided 
to the researcher.   
HRA  Calculator 
All analyses shown in this survey were completed using the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) HRA Calculator.  The HRA Calculator provides a standardized 
approach to HRA that promotes uniform methods to achieve comparable results when 
considering plants that are similar in design, procedures and training. The software is 
setup to guide the user through and HEP calculation by interactive worksheets.  
 
The user has the ability to choose which HRA method to apply. For post-initiator, the 
methods available are, Caused Based Decision Tree Method (CBDTM), THERP, and 
ORE/HRC. For pre-initiators, the methods available are THERP and ASEP.  While the 
HRA Calculator provides many choices for input values, the user also can add their own 
input values and comments for documentation if desired.      
 
The software also creates detailed reports in a logical easy-to-follow format, making it 
convenient for a second analyst to understand what has been inputted into any 
calculations.  
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SURVEY PART ONE 
Instructions 
Below is the complete set of general HRA assumptions made by the CPSES HRA 
analyst during his analysis. Please identify and discuss where you would have made 
alternative or additional assumptions if you were performing this analysis. 
General Assumptions Made Throughout Entire CPSES HRA Analysis  
The following are general assumptions used in most of the HEP analysis, but in some 
circumstances the HRA analyst has chosen not to follow these general assumptions.  
These assumptions were taken directly from the CPSES Human Reliably (HRA) 
Notebook.  Comments in [ ] have been added by the researcher for additional 
clarification. A  *  indicates that this assumption is built into or is the default value used 
by the HRA Calculator  
 
1. Operators are highly skilled in performing the necessary tasks, each having more than 
6 months experience and most with several years experience.  In most cases, “optimum 
stress” is applied due to the level of experience, the nature of the event and lack of an 
undue challenge in performing the proceduralized tasks. Some events, however, result 
in a high stress situation.  For example, a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event 
would in general result in a high stress situation and the nominal human error rates 
would be modified as appropriate. . [The HRA Calculator asks the user to choose an 
operator stress level. The choices available are optimum, moderate and extreme. This 
assumption says that the optimum stress level will be chosen as a default value. 
Assumption 30 gives an exception to the default value.] 
 
2. Control room indication is provided for equipment status, with visual and audible 
alarm indications of equipment failures or parameter deviations.  The control room    
indication is assumed to be available, unless affected by the initiating event. 
 
3. Visual and audible alarms demand (or serve as prompts for) initial operator response.  
Some events such as Loss of Component Cooling Water and Loss of Safety Chill 
Water, are diagnosed within their respective Abnormal Operating Procedures.  For any 
other abnormal plant condition resulting in a reactor trip or the need for reactor trip, 
the operators' activities begin with the proceduralized steps in EOP-0.0, within which 
diagnosis of the event is conducted.  The operators are not led from the alarm 
indications directly to diagnosis of the event without going through the EOP-0.0 
procedure. 
 
4. It is assumed that each operator is responsible for completing specific tasks.  In 
addition to the Control Room Supervisor (CRS), Reactor Operator (RO) and Balance of   
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Plant Operator (BOP) who are normally in the control room, there is a Shift Supervisor 
(SS) and a Shift Engineer (SE, who is also the STA) on each operating crew.  The RO 
and BOP operators are familiar with the operations and controls in the entire control 
room; each is assigned one position for a shift, but can be rotated to the other position 
on a different shift.  For non-time critical actions, where the extra crew members are 
not specifically assigned to other tasks, a recovery factor for the extra crew member 
can be credited.  Credit for STA actions, generally Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
related, are not credited until 15 minutes after the initiating event occurs, if credit is 
taken.  
 
5. Since “self checking” is a site-wide policy that has received high management 
   attention, this is the recovery most often credited.  Credit is taken for STA actions for 
the HRA events that need to be accomplished at a relatively long period of time after 
the initiating event has occurred 
 
Time critical actions are those which take a long time to diagnose and perform relative 
to the length of the time window available.  The time critical actions are primarily 
identified either through the operator interview process or via an examination of the 
relevant procedures, and an examination of the time windows available from thermal-
hydraulic analyses (such as RELAP or MAAP) or other engineering calculations.  The 
operator interview process ascertains the cues and steps in the procedure that the 
operators use to diagnose the event and the time at which this diagnosis takes place.  
Then, the steps judged to be critical to that particular Human Interactions (HI) are 
confirmed and the overall time to successfully complete these steps determined.  The 
overall time accounts for potential delays due to additional, non-critical procedural 
steps that must be executed first, time required for the component to change state (e.g. 
to start a turbine-driven pump), and limitations that may be present due to crew 
manning. [Assumptions 26 and 27 gives more detail on timing] If the available time 
window is less than the diagnosis time plus the time required to successfully complete 
the action, then the action is assumed to be failed.  If the available time window is 
longer than the diagnosis time plus the time required to successfully complete the 
actions, then the probability of failure is adjusted through selection of the stress factor 
and the allowed credit for recovery.  For example, if there is a 30-minute time window 
and the action takes 5 minutes to diagnose and 15-20 minutes to execute, then an 
optimum to moderately high level of stress is taken and no credit is given for recovery.  
Alternately, if the time window is 1 hour, and the action is at the end of the success 
branches on the event tree (e.g. LOCA followed by successful injection, cooldown, 
and depressurization such that the time window starts several hours after the initiator), 
and the competition from other actions is low, then the stress is taken as optimum and 
credit may be given for recovery.  In each case the operator actions are examined 
within the context of the scenario to determine the potential impact of time constraints. 
 
6.  In general, if the success of a task requires the success of “OR”ed operator actions, 
the 
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     dependency modeling is applied.  This assumption is based on the belief that if the  
     operator fails the first step in a series or group of “OR”ed actions, it is more likely 
that 
     he will fail subsequent steps in the group.  In that regard, the nominal human error 
     probability (HEP), multiplied by the applicable performance shaping factor (PSF), is 
     applied to the first step; then a dependency is applied to the HEP of the first step to 
     derive the HEP of the second and subsequent steps.  Dependencies are calculated    
     using the formulas in Table 20-17 of Reference 5. 
 
*7. Execution errors are calculated using the THERP tables in Reference 5.  Values from 
      these tables for errors of omission are divided by three based on Swain’s notes in     
      Chapter 15 of Reference 5.  These notes describe adjustments to the nominal Swain    
      values, in particular to credit the layout of the procedures into a “response/response 
      not obtained” format.  Additional details on the application of this method are 
      outlined in the quantification description of Section 4.3.  
 
8.  A procedure step is considered graphically distinct, as used in decision tree “e” of the 
cognitive error calculation (pc–e), if it is preceded by a boxed CAUTION or NOTE or 
is the only step on the page. 
 
9.  The Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Review recovery factor is not applied if the 
operator action took place less than one hour into the sequence, or if the time available 
for the operator action is less than one hour.  The Technical Support Center (TSC) and 
Operations Support Center (OSC) are typically manned within one hour of an 
emergency plan declaration. 
 
10. The immediate action steps in Emergency Operating Procedures are steps performed 
from memory without reference to the written procedures.  However, immediate 
action steps are reviewed after the actions are performed to ensure all required 
actions are taken. Recovery credit is typically not applied in this analysis of the final 
cognitive error (pc) estimation even though reading the procedure serves as a 
check/recovery of the operator's immediate actions.  This is conservatively held as a 
potential future recovery. 
 
11. There are a few instances where the EPRI Cause Based Decision Tree Methodology    
 (CBDTM) may be inappropriate for estimating the cognitive human error 
probability (pc).  Operator response to events indicated by a Main Control Board 
alarm(s) rather than a reactor trip are often skill-based in nature and do not require a 
decision or diagnosis.  Initial operator guidance is typically provided in the 
appropriate Alarm Response Procedure(s), rather than in the Emergency Operating 
Procedures.  For this type case, pc is validated by comparison to the THERP 
Annunciator Response Model (Table 20-23 of Reference 5). 
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12. The Emergency Operating Procedures are written in a columnar “response/response 
not obtained” format.  They incorporate checkoffs and have provisions for place 
keeping.  Use of both of these aids is practiced during operator training on the 
simulator.  These assumptions are important to the EPRI CBDTM assessment of 
procedure usage performance shaping factors. 
 
13. For Control Room actions, only proceduralized recoveries are credited.   
 
14. The application of recovery is included when it is judged that there is enough time  
for re-visitation, based on the sequence timing and time available for the operator 
action provided in the PRA Accident Sequences and Success Criteria analyses 
(References 2 and 7-9).  See assumption #20 for additional details on the impact of 
timing on dependencies. 
 
15.  In applying recovery, moderate dependence is usually assumed when the instruction 
that provides the recovery mechanism for an action is on the same page of the 
procedure as the instructions to perform the action, the rationale being that one way 
to miss a procedural step is to skip a page.  The equation for conditional probability 
for moderate dependence from THERP Table 20-17 (Reference 5) is used. 
 
16.  If the recovery instruction is on a different procedural page, the recovery factor  
used is usually the Error of Omission (EOM) (from Table 20-7 of Reference 5) for 
the procedure step. 
 
17. In determining the EOM pe values, if the operator action takes place within ten 
procedural steps from the start of the accident sequence, Item 20-7(1) [short list, with 
checkoff provisions] from THERP is used.  If the operator action takes place > 10 
steps into the sequence, Item 20-7(2) [long list, with checkoff provisions] is used.  
Items 20-7(3) and 20-7(4) [no checkoff provisions] are usually used when the 
procedure is not an Emergency Operating Procedure. 
 
18. Table 20-13 from THERP is for local manual valve operation.  This table is also 
applied to operation of other local components such as switchgear breakers and room 
doors. 
 
19. Application of stress factors in quantifying human error probabilities tends to be 
quite subjective, and can vary considerably between analyses and analysts.  For the 
CPSES HRA, stress is considered objectively in the following manner: 
 
a. Stress is implicitly included in the EPRI TR-100259 (Reference 6) 
determination of cognitive errors (pc) through some of the selections in the 
decision trees such as workload and the recovery credit; stress is explicitly 
modeled in the determination of the execution errors (pe) (Reference 5) as 
outlined below; 
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* b. Optimum stress (x1) is usually used for the pe portion of operator actions 
directed by the "base" emergency procedures.  In some cases, such as steam 
generator tube rupture, the stress level is judged to be higher and a moderately 
high stress (x2) is applied; 
 
* c. For those operator actions where the operators are following instructions 
in the Function Restoration (FR) procedures or the Emergency Contingency 
Action (ECA) procedures, moderately high stress (x2) is applied to pe to reflect 
the increased stress caused by the failure(s) that put the operators in those 
procedures; and 
 
*d.     If operator action is required as a result of subsequent equipment failure 
while in a FR or ECA, extremely high stress (x5) is applied to the pe for the 
additional action. 
 
 20 .  The dependence between elemental human error probabilities in the 
 subtasks that   
        make up each pe are handled using the dependency rules in THERP (Table 20-17
  of Reference 5).  For example: 
 
If an operator action required 2 of 2 manipulations for success within one HEP 
calculation, pe includes HEPs for EOC(1)+ EOC(2). [EOC - Error Of Commission]  
If an operator action required 1 manipulation, with 2 switches available, failure to 
manipulate the first switch can be recovered by operating the second switch: 
EOC(1) * EOC(2).  Consideration must be given that EOC(2) may have a link or 
dependence with EOC(1) based on the time available. 
 
A similar consideration exists for core damage sequences containing multiple 
operator action failure events.  In this case the degree of dependence between the 
events representing different functions (no common elements) is determined using 
the following guidelines: 
 
a. Two operator action failures separated in time by an essential successful 
action are regarded as independent. 
 
* b. The time available for most operator actions varies from minutes to 
hours.  The degree of dependence between operator actions is varied accordingly:  
 
 Time Separation (min.)  Dependence 
   0 < t < 15   High 
 15 < t < 30   Moderate 
 30 < t < 60   Low 
 60 < t    Zero 
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c. Events initiated by the same cue and on parallel success paths are treated 
as having a common pc element. 
 
d. Responses to memorized IMMEDIATE ACTION steps are independent 
of actions taken later in the procedure.  Similarly, the IMMEDIATE ACTION 
steps are independent if they are performed by different crew members. 
 
e. For cases where an operator action failure significantly reduces the time 
window for a subsequent operator action, high dependence would be assessed on 
the second operator action. 
 
f. For cases where an operator action failure guarantees failure of a 
subsequent operator action, complete dependence would be assessed. 
 
21. The HRA was conducted using the Emergency Response Guidelines and 
Abnormal Procedures from Unit 1.  Discussions with the operators indicate the 
procedures are close enough for Unit 2 that they can be assumed to be identical. 
 
* 23.     In the quantification of human error probabilities, a lower bound of 1E-5 was 
used as the minimum allowed value for single, or combinations of  multiple, human 
interactions.  
 
24.        All post initiator Human Failure Events (HFE) in the PRA model had their Risk 
Achievement Worth (RAW) calculated using the PRA current model of record 
(Reference 45).  To ensure that the risk significant HFEs were included in this 
recalculation, several risk significant systems had one train removed and then the HFE 
RAWs were calculated.  The HFEs were ranked and the top 30 were recalculated using 
the HRA calculator.  Many HFEs were based on the same calculations so they were 
recalculated even though they may not have been in the top 30.  The list is shown in 
Attachment G.     
 
25.      All latent HFEs were recalculated.   The latent HFE equations, section 4.4, were 
used as basis for the input to the HRA Calculator.  The latent HFEs were recalculated 
with all of the pertinent information documented using the HRA Calculator.  The results 
from the HRA calculator may not agree with the values shown with the equations since 
the HRA calculator analyzes the HFE in more more detail.  The equations are shown for 
historical purposes and should not be used in the HFE analysis.    
 
26.       The default value for time required to manipulate a switch on the control board is 
3 minutes.  This value is used as the minimum time, even if the operator stated a shorter 
time in the operator interviews, required by the operator to find and manipulate the 
switch.   
 
27.  The default value for time required to recognize and respond to an 
inidication/annuciator in the control room is 5 minutes.  This value is used as the 
minimum time even if the operator stated a shorter time in the operator interviews, 
required by the operator to respond to an inidication/annuciator in the control room.   
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*28.      The value used for the dependency in the recovery of an execution error was the 
value determined by the HRA Calculator (i.e. zero, low, medium, and high), this is in 
lieu of any comments made during operator interviews. 
 
29.       The procedures in the reference section do not contain the revision number.  The 
revision number for the procedures used will be documented on the operator interview 
sheets. 
 
30.     The stress level (optimal, medium, high) was determined during the operator 
interviews and are not annotated in each HFE detailed calculation.  The stress level was 
based on time and actions required to complete the task. [This assumption is an 
exception to the default stress level chosen in assumption 1] 
 
References Cited in Assumptions 
[5]   Swain, A.D and Guttmann, H.E, Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with 
       Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications, (THERP)  NUREG/CR-1278,  
       Sandia National Laboratories, August 1983. 
 
[6]   EPRI TR-100259, “An Approach to the Analysis of Operator Actions in   
        Probabilistic Risk Assessment”, June 1992. 
 
[45]  R&R –PN-022,”Accident Sequence Quantification”  
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SURVEY PART TWO 
Instructions 
Please read the following analysis prepared by CPSES and answer the questions 
presented at the end. 
HEP Given Information 
Human Failure Event (HFE) Scenario Description 
 
1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operations 
2. Initiating Event:  General Transient 
3. Accident sequence:  Transient sequences shown below. 
 
 
 
Fig. B-1. Transient Event Tree 
 
4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:  N/A 
5. Operator action success criterion: Start of Bleed and Feed 
6. Consequence of failure: Core damage 
7. Key assumptions:  The stopping of the reactor coolant pumps, resetting SI [Safety 
Injection] sequencers, and resetting containment spray are non-critical actions 
 
During the accident scenarios listed above, the operator is required to establish Feed and 
Bleed if a loss of auxiliary feedwater occurs.  Upon the loss of all AFW, the operators 
are instructed by the Critical Safety Function Status Trees in the Emergency Response 
Guidelines to enter FRH-0.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink".  This 
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procedure first instructs the operator to attempt to restore secondary cooling via AFW 
and MFW, with condensate not questioned.  If this is not possible, the procedure requires 
the operator to use the pressurizer PORVs to provide the bleed path from the RCS and 
high pressure safety injection to provide the feed to the RCS.  High pressure safety 
injection is assumed to require initiation via generating a safety injection signal (S 
Signal). 
 
All of these tasks can be accomplished from the control room and the operators are well 
trained on this task.    
 
[Unlike other PWR plants 2 PORVs on the primary side are required for successful 
completion of this action. Opening only 1 PORV will not provide sufficient flow.] 
Operator Interviews  
Two operators were present in this discussion and their combined responses are shown 
below.   
 
What are cues that operator would observe? 
 No secondary heat sink 
How much time is required for operator to see the cue and diagnose the problem? 
 1-2 minute 
How much time is required for control room manipulation?  
 2 minute 
How many times is this action trained in the classroom? 
 Once every 2 years 
How many time is this action trained in the simulator? 
 Once every 2 years 
What type of response would you classify this as? 
a) Simple, intuitive, or memorized action (skilled) 
b) Procedure-directed (Rule) 
c) Requires a lot of diagnosis or is non-proceduralized (knowledge-based) 
The operator responded with answer B 
Would you classify this action as simple or complex? 
 Simple 
What is the operators workload during this scenario? 
 High 
What is operators stress level relative to normal operations? 
 High 
 
Discussions with the operators indicate there will be no hesitation on the part of the 
operator to initiate bleed and feed when the procedure dictates it. 
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Application 
These operator actions apply to the Transient initiating event category (General 
Transient, Inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation, Steam/Feedwater Line Break, Loss of 
Main Feedwater, Loss of Cooling Water (component cooling water, station service 
water, and safety chill water)), and Loss of various electrical buses.  Each of these basic 
events models failure to start Primary Feed and Bleed cooling following a transient 
initiating event where it is conservatively assumed there is no S signal. 
Procedure 
The procedure used for this task is FRH-0.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat 
Sink".  FRH-0.1 is entered from the Critical Safety Function Status Tree or EOP-0.0, 
"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection".   
Timing Information 
The time available for this action (beginning state to end state) comes from the review of  
MAPP  calculation RXE-LA-CP1/0-062.  The success criteria determined in the 
calculation are based on the operator opening the PORVs.  Based on the above Tsw is 
1200 seconds (20 minutes).    
 
Cue 
At least 3 Steam Generators less than 27%  
                           or 
Pressurizer pressure greater than 2335 psig due to loss of secondary heat sink 
 
 
Fig. B-2. Feed and Bleed Timing Information 
 
The above terms are defined as follows:  
 
Reference (Start) Time (T0)- The starting point of an HRA timeline. This is defined at 
the time at which the  initiating event begins. 
 
System Time Window (Tsw) -  Time available for action before an undesired end state is 
reached 
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Manipulation Time (TM) - The time required to complete the execution portion of a 
human interaction 
 
Delay Time (Tdelay) - The time from To until the cue is reached. 
 
Median Response Time (T1/2) – The time available to diagnose the problem.  
 
Miscellaneous Information Provided By CPSES HRA Analyst 
 
The HRA Calculator asks the analyst for the following environmental conditions for 
documentation purposes.  However, the results are not used in the mathematical 
computation of the HEP.   
 
Degree of Clarity of Cues & Indications: 
 
X - Very Good 
 - Average 
 - Poor 
 
Human-Machine Interface: 
 
X - Control Room Panels 
 - Local Control Panels 
 - Local Equipment 
 
Environment: 
 
Lighting Heat/Humidity 
X - Normal X - Normal 
 - Emergency  - Hot / Humid 
 - Portable  - Cold 
Radiation Atmosphere 
X - Background X - Normal 
 - Green  - Steam 
 - Yellow  - Smoke 
 - Red  - Respirator required 
 
Equipment Accessibility: 
 
  Location Accessibility 
X - Control Room Front Panels Accessible 
 - Control Room Back Panels  
 - Hot Shutdown Panels  
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HEP Calculation 
 
Method Approach  
HRA Calculator using Caused Based Methodology 
Critical Actions 
1. Diagnose the need for Feed and Bleed 
2. Actuate injection via an S signal 
3. Reset the Safety Injection and Containment Isolation Signals, and open the air supply 
4. Open the 2/2 PORVs.   
Calculation Of Pc 
Dotted lines shows chosen path. 
 
Fig. B-3. Pca: Availability of Information 
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Fig. B-4. Pcb: Failure of Attention 
 
 
Fig. B-5. Pcc:  Misread/miscommunicate Data 
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Fig. B-6. Pcd: Information Misleading 
 
 
 
 
Fig. B-7. Pce: Skip a Step In Procedure 
 
 
Fig. B-8. Pcf: Misinterpret Instruction 
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Fig. B-9. Pcg: Misinterpret Decision Logic 
 
Fig. B-10. Pch: Deliberate Violation 
 
 
TABLE B-I 
Summary of Event Tress and  Unrecovered Pc Calculation 
Pc Failure Mechanism Branch HEP 
Pca: Availability of Information a neg. 
Pcb: Failure of Attention l 7.5e-04 
Pcc: Misread/miscommunicate data a neg. 
Pcd: Information misleading a neg. 
Pce: Skip a step in procedure a 1.0e-03 
Pcf: Misinterpret instruction a neg. 
Pcg: Misinterpret decision logic k neg. 
Pch: Deliberate violation a neg. 
Sum of Pca through Pch = Initial Pc =  1.8e-03 
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TABLE B-II 
Cognitive Recovery 
 
Initial 
HEP Se
lf-
 
Re
v
ie
w
 
Ex
tr
a 
Cr
ew
 
Re
co
v
er
y 
M
at
rix
 
D
F 
M
u
lti
pl
y 
H
EP
 
By
 
Final 
Value 
Pca: neg. - -  - 1.0  
Pcb: 7.5e-04 X - 1.4e-01 MD 1.4e-01 1.0e-
04 
Pcc: neg. - -  - 1.0  
Pcd: neg. - -  - 1.0  
Pce: 1.0e-03 X X 1.0e-01 * 
5.0E-1 
ND –self 
review 
MD- Extra 
crew 
5e-02 5.0e-
05 
Pcf: neg. - -  - 1.0  
Pcg: neg. - -  - 1.0  
Pch: neg. - -  - 1.0  
Sum of Pca through Pch = Initial Pc =1.5e-04 
 
No credit was taken for STA Review, Shift Change and ERF Review.  
 
DF  = Dependence Factor  
ND= No dependence 
MD =Medium Dependence  
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TABLE B-III 
Execution Unrecovered Calculated Using THERP 
 
Step Omission 
  Table Item Stress Stress 
Step No. HEP Ref. Ref. E/M/O Value 
11 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions:  Actuate SI 
12 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Verify RCS feed 
14 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Reset both trains of SI 
16 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Reset Containment Spray Isolation phase A and B 
17 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Reset Containment Spray Signal 
18 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Establish N2 and Instrument Air 
19  1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Open 2/2 PORVs and Block Valves to establish bleed path 
20  1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Verify bleed path 
 
 
TABLEB-III Continued 
 
 Commission Total 
 Table Item Stress Stress Per 
 Ref. Ref. E/M/O Value Step 
 20-12 8a E 5 7.8e-03 
 Comments:  
 20-12 3 M 2 5.2e-03 
 Comments: Recovers step 11 with medium dependency 
 20-12 8a M 2 3.1e-03 
 Comments:  
 20-12 8a M 2 3.1e-03 
 Comments: Completed with step 14 therefore it is zeroed out 
 20-12 8a E 5 7.8e-03 
 Comments:  
 20-12 3 M 2 5.2e-03 
 Comments:  
 20-12 3 E 5 1.3e-02 
 Comments:  
 20-12 3 M 2 5.2e-03 
 Comments: Recovers step 19 with medium dependency 
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The tables referenced are those given in the THERP handbook. The HRA calculator has 
some of the tables built into the software with some assumptions built in. These tables are 
attached at the end for reference.      
 
Discussions with the operators indicate there will be no hesitation on the part of the 
operator to initiate bleed and feed when the procedure dictates it. For these scenarios, 
there is assumed to be both high stress and a high workload. 
 
E- Extreme Stress – PSF = 5 
M- Moderate Stress – PSF = 2 
O-Optimum Stress – PSF = 1 
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TABLE B-IV 
Execution Recovery Calculated Using THERP 
Critical 
Step No. 
Recovery 
Step No. Action HEP (Crit) 
11   Actuate SI 7.8e-03 
 12 Verify RCS feed  
14  Reset both trains of SI 3.1e-03 
 16 Reset Containment Spray 
Isolation phase A and B 
 
 18 Establish N2 and Instrument Air  
19   Open 2/2 PORVs and Block 
Valves to establish bleed path 1.3e-02 
 20  Verify bleed path  
17  Reset Containment Spray 
Signal 7.8e-03 
Total Unrecovered: 3.2e-02 
 
 
TABLE B-IV Continued 
HEP (Rec) Dep. Cond. HEP (Rec) Total for Step 
   3.9e-03 
5.2e-03 HD 5.0e-01  
   7.8e-04 
3.1e-03 HD 5.0e-01  
5.2e-03 HD 5.0e-01  
   6.5e-03 
5.2e-03 HD 5.0e-01  
   7.8e-03 
Total Recovered: 1.9e-02 
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TABLE B-V 
Summary of Calculation 
Analysis Results: without Recovery with Recovery 
Pcog 1.8e-03 1.5e-04 
Pexe 3.2e-02 1.9e-02 
Total HEP  1.9e-02 
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Survey Questions 
Instructions 
Please answer the following questions with either yes or no responses or a brief text 
response to the question. 
 
1) When completing and HRA analysis do you or your company follow a set of 
guidelines? If possible, please provide a copy of these guidelines when submitting your 
responses.  
 
2)  If possible, without doing an independent calculation, what would you expect a 
typical HEP value for this Human Failure Event (HFE)? Based on your intuition do you 
agree with the model HEP value? 
 
Assumptions (Part Two portion only) 
3) Are there assumptions within this specific HFE that you feel are invalid or lacking 
justification? 
 
4) If asked to complete this HFE analysis independently, would you have chosen to 
make the same assumptions? Please note your different assumptions and your 
justifications for making theses. 
 
Choice of  Methodology 
5a) The methodology chosen for this analysis was Caused Based Methodology. In your 
opinion, is this the best methodology for this HFE? Other methods available are:  
HCR/ORE/THERP and THERP.  
 
5b) If you would choose to use a different methodology, what is your reasoning for this? 
 
Critical Actions 
6) Do you agree with the critical steps assigned to this HFE? 
  
7) Would you add or subtract any of these steps? 
 
Calculation of Pc  
8) The values for the branches of the trees were taken directly from THERP.  Do you 
agree with the choices made in the decision trees and the values assigned to them? 
 
9) CMPSES has a site policy of self checking. Is this enough justification for ALWAYS 
taking credit for self checking? 
 
Calculation of PE 
10) Do you agree with the choices of THERP values for errors of omission and errors of 
commission? If you disagree, then why and what value would you use?  
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11) Do you agree with the stress values and how the stress performance shaping factors 
are applied? 
 
Acceptability of final HEP results 
12a) How would you determine if this HEP value is acceptable in terms of meeting the 
needs of the PRA model?   
 
12b) What additional information would be needed?  
 
12c) What other people, would need to be included in this discussion? 
 
13a) Can you determine if the HEP is consistent with historical values and/or similar to 
other NPPs values? 
 
13b) If this value were inconsistent with the historical value, would you question and 
change this analysis in any way?  
 
14) Do you have any prior knowledge of how a crew may actually behaves during this 
action (or similar ones)? Is the HFE adequately represented to reflect how the crew 
actually behaves?    
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APPENDIX C 
PHASE II SURVEY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Objective 
The overall objective of this study is to understand better the subjective use of 
engineering judgment as applied to analytical human reliablity analysis (HRA) methods.  
This Phase II Questionaire is produced in response to the results and findings from the 
Phase I Pilot Survey. The Phase I Survey showed that there was very little agreement 
between HRA experts on the questions asked. The responses to the Phase I Survey  were 
so specific to the example that it was difficult to make general conclusions. 
Consequently for this survey, more general questions have been asked. 
 
The Phase I Survey also indicated that  many  respondents were not familar enough with 
the method used in the pilot survey to answer many of the questions. This questionaire is 
divided into sections that are specific to different methods. The respondents need to  
answer  only the questions about the methodology which he is are familiar.  It is 
intended and expected that very few participants will answer all the questions. 
 
Comanche Peak Human Reliability Analysis 
As in the Phase I Survey, the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stations HRA [1] will be 
used as an example. However, in this survey some modifications have been made from 
the original analysis in order to meet the needs of the study.  Since the CPSES analysis 
was completed using only the Caused Based Deterministic Method (CBDTM), all 
calculations using different methods were done by the researcher with input from a 
CPSES HRA analysis.  Therefore, the HEP calculations shown in this survey are similar 
but  not identical to what CPSES actually uses in the PRA model.    
  
CPSES has two 4-Loop Westinghouse design Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR).  In 
2004, CPSES updated its HRA analysis using the HRA Calculator.  The HRA under 
consideration for this study is for Level 1 PRA for internal events during full power 
operations only.  
Overview of HRA Calculator 
All analyses shown in this survey were completed using the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) HRA Calculator [2].  The HRA Calculator provides a standardized 
approach to HRA that promotes uniform methods to achieve comparable results when 
considering plants that are similar in design, procedures and training. The software is 
setup to guide the user through HEP calculation by interactive worksheets.  
 
The user has the ability to choose which HRA method to apply. For post-initiator, the 
methods available are (1) Caused Based Decision Tree Method (CBDTM) [3], (2) 
THERP [4], and (3) ORE/HRC [5]. For pre-initiators, the methods available are THERP 
and ASEP. However, this survey is concerned only with post-initiator actions.  While the 
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HRA Calculator provides many choices for input values, the user also can add his/her 
own input values and comments for documentation if desired.      
 
The HRA Calculator breaks every HEP calculation into two parts: (1)  failure to execute 
the action correctly (Pexe) and (2) failure to recognize the need for human intervention to 
determine the correct action to take (Pcog).   Pexe is calculated using THERP regardless 
of the method chosen by the user. Each critical action is assigned an error of omission 
and an error of commission, and each critical action is adjusted by a stress Performance 
Shaping Factor (PSF).  The user can then apply recoveries and dependencies to Pexe.   
 
Pcog is where the numerical variation in HEP calculations occurs within the HRA 
Calculator between different methods.
  
The CBDTM method calculates Pcog by the use of 
a series of decision trees and then applies recovery by the identification of time available 
for recovery and the use of additional personal present in the control room. Examples of 
the decisions trees and recoveries will be shown in latter examples. 
 
The THERP approach to Pcog is a simpler approach compared to CBDTM.  This 
approach selects Pcog from a table of failure probabilities based on the number of 
annunciator present in the control room. THERP has defined an annunciator as a set of 
alarms that trained operators regard as a single unit. Table C-I below gives the tabulated 
values for the choices of Pcog using the annunciator response model. 
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TABLE C- I 
Tabulated Pcog Values using Annunciator Response Model 
 
# of 
ANNs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Pr[Fj] EF Mean 
1 0.000
1 
         0.0001 10 0.0003 
2 0.000
1 
0.001         0.0006 10 0.0015 
3 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002        0.001 10 0.003 
4 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004       0.002 10 0.005 
5 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008      0.003 10 0.008 
6 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016     0.005 10 0.014 
7 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032    0.009 10 0.024 
8 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064   0.02 10 0.04 
9 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.13  0.03 10 0.08 
10 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.13 0.25 0.05 10 0.14 
11 to 
15 
0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.13 0.25 0.12 10 0.31 
16 to 
20 
0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.13 0.25 0.15 10 0.40 
21 to 
40 
0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.13 0.25 0.20 10 0.53 
> 40 0.000
1 
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.064 0.13 0.25 0.25 10 0.67 
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The third method available for calculating Pcog is the HCR/ORE [4] correlation.  This 
method uses the following correlation derived from simulator data to calculate Pcog. 
 
 
1/ 2
ln( )
1 [ ]
w
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σ
= − Φ  [1] 
σ  =  logarithmic standard deviation 
Φ  = standard normal cumulative distribution - 
2
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2
z u
e du
z
−
−∞
∫  
wT = time window for cognitive response 
1/ 2T  = crew median response time 
 
The HRA calculator [1] calculates σ  using decision trees based on procedures, operator 
training and stress level.  For the actions used in this project, the CPSES analyst 
considered all the actions to be proceduraized and well-trained.  An example of the 
decision tree used to calculate σ  is shown below. 
 
 
Fig. C-1.  Decision Tree Used for Determining Sigma using HCR/ORE 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Please provide short answer responses to the questions in each section. Only complete 
the sections with which you are familiar. Very few people will have the background to 
provide responses to every section. Please consider each question as it would pertain to a 
Level 1 PRA for internal events during full power operations only.  
 
GENERAL HRA JUDGMENTS 
 
Notes: 1)  The questions pertain to post-initiator control room actions only. 
            2)  A color printer is needed to see Figures 6 and 13 in hard copy. 
Complexity of Actions 
 
1) How do you judge whether an action is Rule-based, Skill-based or Knowledge 
based?  
 
2) Do you use this type of designation in your HEP calculations? If so, how is this 
information used? 
 
3) To what extend do you think the designation between Rule-based, Skill-based, or 
Knowledge-based actions influences your HEP calculations? 
 
a. Not at all 
b. Very little 
c. Somewhat 
d. Are a dominating factor 
 
4) Do you think your answer in 3 is different for different methodologies? If so 
how?  
Stress Level 
 
5) How do you determine stress level for an action?   
 
6) Suppose during operator interviews that the operators conclude that the action is 
low stress but you believe the action is high stress, how do you determine a stress 
level? 
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7) To what extend do you think the Stress level choice influences your HEP 
calculations? 
 
e. Not at all 
f. Very little 
g. Somewhat 
h. Are a dominating factor 
 
8) Do you think your answer in 7 is different for different methodologies? If so 
how?  
 
9) When calculating Pexe  (using the HRA Calculator) is it better to maintain a 
constant stress level for all critical actions or vary the stress level between 
actions? Table C- II and C-III show both scenarios for the Feed and Bleed Action 
used in the Phase I Survey. 
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TABLE C-II a and C-II b   
Pexe Calculated for Feed and Bleed Using Different Stress Levels For Different Critical 
Actions 
 
Step Omission 
  Table Item Stress Stress 
Step No. HEP Ref. Ref. E/M/O Value 
11 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions:  Actuate SI 
12 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Verify RCS feed 
14 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Reset both trains of SI 
16 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Reset Containment Spray Isolation phase A and B 
17 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Reset Containment Spray Signal 
18 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Establish N2 and Instrument Air 
19  1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Open 2/2 PORVs and Block Valves to establish bleed 
path 
20  1.3E-3 20-7b 2 M 2 
Actions: Verify bleed path 
 
 
Commission 
 Table Item Stress Stress 
HEP Ref. Ref. E/M/O Value 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 M 2 
Comments: Recovers step 11 with medium dependency 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a M 2 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a M 2 
Comments: Completed with step 14 therefore it is zeroed out 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 M 2 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 M 2 
Comments: Recovers step 19 with medium dependency 
 
E- Extreme Stress – PSF = 5 
M- Moderate Stress – PSF = 2 
O-Optimum Stress – PSF = 1 
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Table C-III a and C-III b  
Pexe Calculated for Feed and Bleed Using the Same Stress Level For All Critical 
Actions 
 
Step Omission 
  Table Item Stress Stress 
Step No. HEP Ref. Ref. E/M/O Value 
11 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions:  Actuate SI 
12 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Verify RCS feed 
14 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Reset both trains of SI 
16 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Reset Containment Spray Isolation phase A and B 
17 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Reset Containment Spray Signal 
18 1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Establish N2 and Instrument Air 
19  1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Open 2/2 PORVs and Block Valves to establish bleed 
path 
20  1.3E-3 20-7b 2 E 5 
Actions: Verify bleed path 
 
 
Commission 
 Table Item Stress Stress 
HEP Ref. Ref. E/M/O Value 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 E 5 
Comments: Recovers step 11 with medium dependency 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a E 5 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a E 5 
Comments: Completed with step 14 therefore it is zeroed out 
2.7E-4 20-12 8a E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 E 5 
1.3E-3 20-12 3 E 5 
Comments: Recovers step 19 with medium dependency 
 
E- Extreme Stress – PSF = 5 
M- Moderate Stress – PSF = 2 
O-Optimum Stress – PSF = 1 
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Training 
 
10) Do you differentiate between simulator training vs. classroom training in HEP 
calculations? If so, how is this used in your calculations? 
 
11) For the CPSES analysis, the HRA analyst has determined that every action in the 
database is WELL trained. Do you consider all training to be equally weighted in 
HEP calculations? Do you have a consistent system for distinguishing between 
well trained and poorly trained action? 
 
12)  To what extend do you think training influences your HEP calculations? 
 
i. Not at all 
j. Very little 
k. Somewhat 
l. Is dominating factor 
 
13) Do you think your answer in 12 is different for different methodologies? If so 
how?  
Timing 
 
The HRA Calculator uses Fig. C- 2 to show timing aspects of an HEP calculation. The 
user is required to identify all timing portions regardless of the method used to calculate 
Pcog. 
 
Reference (Start) Time (T0)- The starting point of an HRA timeline. This is defined at 
the time at which the initiating event begins. 
 
System Time Window (Tsw) - Time available for action before an undesired end state is 
reached. 
 
Manipulation Time (TM) - The time required to complete the execution portion of a 
human interaction 
 
Delay Time (Tdelay) - The time from To until the cue is reached. 
 
Median Response Time (T1/2) – The time available to diagnose the problem.  
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Fig. C-2. Timing Diagram used by HRA Calculator 
 
14) How would you calculate/determine Tsw? 
 
15) How would you calculate/determine TM? 
 
16)  How would you calculation/determine T1/2? 
 
17) Do you believe that it is necessary to document all of the above timing 
information even if the method you are using for your HEP calculation does not 
require this information? For example, the CBDTM method only requires the 
analyst to determine if there is enough time available to complete the action, or 
the Annunciator Response Model is independent of timing. 
 
18) Is your decision about how to collect timing affected by your choice of 
methodology? 
 
THERP Tabulated Values 
 
The CPSES analyst has interpreted Table 20-7 of the THERP Handbook as follows:  
In determining the EOM pexe values, if the operator action takes place within ten 
procedural steps from the start of the accident sequence, Item 20-7(1) [short list, with 
checkoff provisions] from THERP is used.  If the operator action takes place > 10 steps 
into the sequence, Item 20-7(2) [long list, with checkoff provisions] is used.  Items 20-
7(3) and 20-7(4) [no checkoff provisions] are usually used when the procedure is not an 
Emergency Operating Procedure. 
 
19) Is this how you would use Table 20-7 for errors of omission? Ie. How do you use 
Table 20-7 in your HEP calculations? 
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20) Other than THERP Table 20-7, are there any other THERP Tables you use for 
Errors of Omission on a regular basis? Under what circumstances do you use the 
other tables? 
 
21) Besides THERP Table 20-12, what other THERP Tables do you use for Errors of 
Commission for control room actions (excluding recovery actions.)? Under what 
circumstances do you use the other tables? 
 
22) Under what circumstances do you use data sources other than the tabulated 
THERP values for Errors of Omission and Errors of Commission? 
 
23) Fig. C-3 is a page from EOP 0.0. and Step 6a has been identified as a critical 
action. Can you determine an Error of Omission and an Error of Commission 
only using procedures? If not, what other information is need? 
 
24) Using the THERP tables, what values of Error of Commission and Error of 
Omission would you assign to this Step 6a of Fig. C-3? What table numbers did 
you use in your decisions? Discuss any assumptions that you made in your 
choices of failure probabilities. 
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Fig. C- 3. Sample Page From EOP  0.0. Use for Question 23 and 24 
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25) In Fig. C-4 below Step 3a has been identified as a critical action.  What THERP 
tables and values for Errors of Commission and Errors of Omission would you 
assign this action? Discuss any assumptions that you made in your choices of 
failure probabilities.  (Do you believe there is enough information provided to 
answer this question?) 
 
 
Fig. C- 4:  Sample Page From EOP 0.0. Use for Question 25 
 
26) Besides procedures, are there other methods you use to determine Errors of 
Omissions and Errors of Commissions? For example, do you do a walk-through 
of the control panel, or conduct operator interviews? 
Lower Bounds  
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27) In your opinion should there be a lower bound for HEP calculations? If so what 
value do you use and how did you determine that value? 
 
28) In your opinion should there be a lower bound on Pcog values? If so, what value 
do you use, and how did you determine that value? 
 
29) In your opinion should these lower bounds be consistent between methods? 
Choice of Methodology 
 
30) How do you determine which methodology to use for an HEP calculation? 
 
31) Is it better to use the same methodology for an entire analysis or to use a method 
that is appropriate for each individual action? 
 
32) Do you believe that any method can be used to analysis any action? 
 
33) Under what circumstances do you calculate an HEP value using more than one 
method and compare the numerical results? 
 
Pcog CALCULATIONS USING ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE MODEL 
 
1) How do you determine the number of annunciators present in the control room 
for specific action? 
 
2) In your opinion, is it appropriate to use the values shown in Table C-1 when 
there is more than one person present in the control room? These values were 
derived for a single operators but CPSES always has at least 3 or more people 
present in the control room. 
 
3) If you were to model crew behavior using the values in Table C-1, would you 
modify any of these values to take credit for additional people? 
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Pcog CALCULATIONS USING HCR/ORE CORRELATION 
 
1) List all the sources you use for collecting timing information.  
 
2) From your list of timing sources, under what circumstances do you use each 
source in your HEP calculation? Are all the sources equally considered when 
choosing which source to use in a calculation? 
 
3) Do you consider the accuracy of the timing information when using the 
HCR/ORE? If so, how does this affect your calculations? 
 
4) In your opinion, should the stress level chosen in the decision tree used to 
determine sigma (See Fig. C-1) be the same as what is used to calculate Pexe?  
 
5) What do you consider a lower bound for the calculation of Pcog? 
 
Consider the following sample calculation of Pcog using the HCR/ORE Correlation: 
 
Operator fails to use ECA- 1.1 on Loss of Recirc Capability 
 
HFE Scenario Description: 
1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operation 
2. Initiating Event: All except LBLOCA ans MBLOCA 
3. Accident sequence: Loss of RCS inventory 
4. Operator action success criterion:  Successful implement ECA-1.1A 
5. Consequence of failure: Core damage 
 
On loss of recirculation capability, the operators are required to enter ECA-1.1, "Loss of 
Recirc. Capability."  This procedure will instruct them to limit injection flow, and 
provide makeup to the RWST in order to extend the injection phase.  Due to the high 
flow rates and short time to depletion of the RWST, this action is not credited in the 
Large and Medium LOCA trees.  Success in this recovery will prevent core damage.  
The length of time to RWST depletion is expected to exceed 2 hours. 
 
The Tsw timing for this Human Action was determined from a review of Calculation 
RXE-LA-CP1/0-003.  MAPP run SB2F1 was selected as the limiting case for this HEP 
determination.   This MAAP run is a  4 inch SBLOCA (the largest break in the small 
break range) where all Emergency Core Cooling fails at recirculation.  This represents 
the limiting case for these initiators because the depletion time of the RWST is 
minimized due to this being the largest break in the small break range. Since the SIPs are 
not injecting in this run, the time to RWST depletion could be less than the time 
calculated.  However, the time at which the containment spray is actuated is the lower 
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bound for RWST depletion because of the comparatively short time it takes to deplete 
the RWST after sprays are actuated.  If SIP injection was considered core uncovery 
occurred at approximately 8500 seconds approximately 22 seconds after RWST 
depletion (6302 seconds).  Thus, If SIP injection and injection form both CCPs had been 
considered, core damage would still occur after 6700 seconds (110 minutes).  Based on 
the above Tsw is 6700 seconds (110 minutes).   The Tdelay is 75 minutes based on the 
RWST depletion time of 4500 seconds.  
 
Procedure and step governing HI: 
Cognitive: EOP-1.0A, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant",  EOS-1.3b, "Transfer to 
Cold Leg Recirculation" 
Execution: ECA1-1.1A "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation" 
 
Training: 
 
 - None  
X - Classroom Frequency: 1 per year 
X - Simulator Frequency: 1 per year 
 
Degree of Clarity of Cues & Indications: 
 
X - Very Good 
 - Average 
 - Poor 
 
Stress: 
 
X - Optimum (Low) 
 - Moderate 
 - Extreme (High) 
 
Type of Response: Rule 
 
Human-Machine Interface: Control Room Panels 
 
Environmental Conditions: Normal 
 
 Lighting – Normal 
 Heat/Humidity – Normal 
 Radiation- Background 
 Atmosphere – Normal  
                     –No steam smoke or use of respirator required. 
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Equipment Accessibility: Control Room Front Panels 
 
Cue: 
RWST Lo Lo level alarm 
Leak outside containment 
Radiation monitors 
Containment sump level 
 
 
Fig. C- 5 Timing Diagram For Sample Pcog Calculation 
 
Reference for Manipulation Time: Operator interviews 
 
Duration of time window available for action (TW):  27.00 Minutes 
 
 
Fig. C-6: Sigma Decision Tree Used in HCR/ORE Correlation 
 
6) From the above information, would you use the HCR/ORE correlation to 
calculate Pcog? 
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7) Using the input stated above, the Pcog value determined by the HRA Calculator 
was 3.1E-10. Do you feel that is a realistic value?  
 
8) If you encounter an unrealistic Pcog valve (such as the example above), what 
would you do to correct this? Why? 
 
9) In the example above, do you feel the use of operator interviews to gather 
manipulation timing was appropriate? 
 
Pcog CALCULATIONS USING CBDTM METHOD 
 
1) The original report on the CBDTM method recommends that the HRA analysts 
revisit the numerical values used in the decisions trees and modify or adjust as 
necessary.  Do you consider doing this in regular practice? If so what are you 
looking to adjust? 
 
2) Are there any entire decisions trees that you feel are no longer relevant to 
consider in HEP Calculations for U.S Nuclear Power Plants? If so how do you 
determine this and which trees do you feel are no longer relevant?  The original 
report was written in 1992 and has not been updated to reflect current operations. 
 
3) When using the decision tree presented in Fig. C- 7 the CPSES HRA analyst 
made the following assumption “Control room indication is provided for 
equipment status with visual and audible alarms indicators of equipment failures 
or parameter deviations. The control room indication is assumed to be available, 
and accurate unless affected by the initiating event.”  This assumption was used 
for every action in the CPSES database and resulted in the Pca tree always giving 
a negligible value. Are there any actions you would consider doing an HEP 
calculations for when this assumption is not valid and/or the Pca tree would 
result in a non negligible value? 
 
 
Fig. C- 7. Pca Decision Tree – For use with Question 3 
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4) In the pcb decision tree shown in Fig. C-8, how do you differentiate between 
high vs. low workload? 
 
 
Fig, C- 8. Pcb Decision Tree – For use with Question 4 
 
5) The decision tree shown in Fig. C- 9 asks the analyst to determine if the indicator 
is easy to locate. For control room actions, is it reasonable to assume that all 
indicators are easy to locate? Can you give an example when you would 
determine this not to be the case?  
 
6) The HRA Calculator asks the following question to determine if the indicators 
are Good or Bad. “Does the required indicator have human engineering 
deficiencies that are conducive to errors in reading the display?” In your 
opinion, are there any groups or types of indicators that have human engineering 
deficiencies that have not been corrected in most control rooms? 
 
7)  List the circumstances under which you would consider an indictor to have 
deficiencies that could lead to human error? 
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Fig. C-9. Pcc Decision Tree- For use with Questions 5,  6, 7 
 
8) Using the CBDTM method decision trees, how do you determine if a procedure 
has standard or ambiguous wording?   
 
9) Using the CBDTM method, the analyst is asked to determine if the steps are 
hidden or obvious. What do you consider to be a “hidden” step?   
 
10) Again using the CBDTM method, the analyst is asked to determine if steps are 
graphically distinct. How do you determine if a step is graphically distinct? 
 
11) Below is a page from EOP 0.0. (Fig. C-10) Step 6a has been identified as a 
critical action and the analyst has determined that step 6a is “obvious” and 
graphically distinct from other actions on the page.  Would you agree or disagree 
with these decisions? Discuss how you made your decision. 
 
12) In Fig. C-11, are there any examples of what you would consider ambiguous 
wording? Justify using your response to question 8. 
 
13) In Fig. C-11, the analyst has identified that step 7 is a critical action. Using the 
CBDTM method decision trees the analyst has made the following choices 
shown in Fig. C-12. Assuming that scenario is well practiced, do you agree with 
the choices made in the decision tree shown in Fig. C- 13?  Justify your answer.  
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Fig. C-10. Sample Page From EOP 0.0. Use for Questions 11  
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Fig. C- 11: Sample Page From EOP  0.0. Use for Questions 12 and 13
  
278
  
 
Fig. C- 12. Decision Tree Choices Based Upon Fig. C-11. 
  
14)  Describe your methodology on how you apply recoveries and dependencies 
using the CBDTM method.  
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APPENDIX D 
SHARP1 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT HRA METHODS 
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TABLE D-1 
 
SHARP1 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT HRA METHODS 
 
 Comparison Index Handbook Method  CBDTM Method Normalized Correlations HRA Calculator 
 THERP/ASEP  HRC THERP, ASEP, CBDTM, HCR/ORE 
Ease of use H M M L 
Level of Resources Required L L H/M M 
Traceability M L H/M H 
Applications     
     Type of human actions A Cp Cp, Cr Cp Cr 
Cp Cr A B C 
(Excludes control room actions) 
     Type of error 
Slips and Mistakes Treated 
as EOM and EOC 
Errors of Cognition 
Slips and Mistakes Treated as 
EOM and EOC 
Slips Mistakes and Non-
responses Treated 
Explicitly Execution Errors, Errors of Cognition 
Qualitative Output     
     Degree of Knowledge is       
     enhanced through application L L M M 
Analytical Application     
     Form of Algorithm Boolean Expression Decision Trees 
A formula with graphical 
solutions 
Combination of Boolean Expressions, 
Mathematical formulas, Computerized 
database 
How Performance Shaping 
Factors are Handled Judgment Recoveries 
Recommend values 
provided 
Recommendations  
Only considers stress as a PSF 
Degree of integration of 
engineering knowledge L L Depends on skill of user L 
Data Required     
   Communication with   
   Others L M H M 
   Availability of data for 
   methods H H M 
M –Dependent upon which method is 
chosen 
Quantitative output      
    How is uncertainty 
    addressed 
By assignment of 
uncertainty factors 
By assignment of uncertainty 
factors Not considered 
By assignment of uncertainty factors 
     Capability for sensitivity   
     Analysis 
Fixed by elements in 
Handbook 
Fixed by decision trees 
Ranges for Key 
parameters established by 
evaluations 
Can be accomplished by trial and error 
method.  
 
H-High, M-Medium, L-Low 
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